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A CONSTITUTIONAL CHARGE AND A COMPARATIVE
VISION TO SUBSTANTIALLY EXPAND AND SUBJECT
MATTER SPECIALIZE THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: A
PRELIMINARY BLUEPRINT FOR REMODELING OUR
NATIONAL HOUSES OF JUSTICE AND ESTABLISHING A
SEPARATE SYSTEM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL COURTS
VICTOR WILLIAMS*
Where there is no judiciary department to interpret, pro-
nounce, and execute the law, to decide controversies, to pun-
ish offenses, and to enforce rights, the government must
either perish from its own weakness, or the other depart-
ments of government must usurp powers for the purpose of
commanding obedience, to the utter extinction of civil and
political liberty.1
I. INTRODUCTION
America's national court system has reached a critical junc-
ture and is under increased public scrutiny.2 For the past sever-
al years, our federal judiciary has endured consistently high
judicial vacancy rates, while struggling to cope with substantial
increases in civil and criminal cases.' The resulting logjam of
cases threatens the speed and quality of federal justice; without
substantial change, the situation will worsen. Indeed, a first of
its kind long-range planning effort by the U.S. Judicial Confer-
* Associate Professor of Law, John Jay College of the City University of New
York. B.A., Ouachita University (1980); M.A.T., National-Lois University (1982);
Ed.M., Harvard University (1984); J.D., University of California-Hastings College of
the Law (1990); LL.M., Columbia University School of Law (1994).
1. JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF TE UNITED
STATES 180 (1840).
2. See Doreen Carvajal, Awaiting Judgment: A Special Report; New York's
Clogged U.S. Courts Delaying Civil Verdicts for Years, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1995, at
Al; Neil A. Lewis, Survey to Press U.S. Judges on Caseload and Expenses, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1995, at 35.
3. See Janet Seiberg, Court Vacancies Result in Longer Case Dispositions, CONN.
L. TRIB., May 9, 1994, at 8.
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ence projects the judiciary's future as grave:4 "the picture in
2020 can only be described as nightmarish."5 The litigant casu-
alties of this crisis are escalating, and the integrity of the judi-
cial system is threatened.
For several years, the federal courts have suffered from high
judicial vacancy rates. Scores of our nation's 840 judgeships-as
many as one out of seven-have remained empty because of
appointment malfeasance by the political branches.6 Indeed, a
single judicial vacancy presently takes an average of 804 days to
fill. As a direct consequence of these vacancies and appointment
delays, the U.S. Courts' Administrative Office has declared "judi-
cial emergencies" in all but one of the federal judicial circuits. In
a recent state of the judiciary report, Chief Justice Rehnquist
cautioned: "There is perhaps no issue more important to the
judiciary right now than this serious judicial vacancy problem."'
President George Bush handed over more than 100 empty
judgeships to incoming President Bill Clinton. Notwithstanding
promises of prompt appointments, dozens of judicial vacancies
have remained throughout the Clinton Administration's tenure.'
More than one-third of the more than sixty vacancies that exist-
ed in mid-1995 existed for longer than eighteen months.9
High judicial vacancy rates greatly weaken a system that is
already stressed from the effects of a recent litigation explosion.
Over the last thirty years, combined civil and criminal case
filings have increased almost 1000% in the United States courts
of appeals and more than 250% in the district courts.'0 In the
4. Coping With the Great Flood, LA. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1994, at B6.
5. COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 18 (Mar. 1995) [hereinafter
PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN]; see Randall Samborn, Judges Foresee Federal Courts
Caseload Crush, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 9, 1995, at 1.
6. See, e.g., Mark Pazniokas, Judgeship Vacancies Add to Case Backlog,
HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 16, 1995, at Al.
7. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 1993 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
[hereinafter 1993 YEAR-END REPORT]; see William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass
Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, Address Before the University of Wiscon-
sin Law School (Sept. 15, 1992), in 1993 WIs. L. REV. 1.
8. See Robert Marquand, Clinton Races To Put His Stamp on Judiciary, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 7, 1995, at 1.
9. See Stephen S. Dunham, Vacant Federal Judgeships Hamstring Our Legal
System, DENV. POST, July 22, 1995, at B7.
10. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrEE, WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMIT-
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last fifteen years alone, the number of appeals filed per
judge with the United States courts of appeals has doubled
in number."
As the national effort to combat violent crime and drugs in-
creases, the number of criminal cases correspondingly esca-
lates.' In each of statistical years 1992 and 1993, federal pros-
ecutors filed almost 50,000 criminal cases in district courts-an
increase of sixty-seven percent since 1980.'" Appeals of those
prosecutions added substantially to appellate courts already
burdened by, among other things, cases raising new sentencing
issues under the novel Sentencing Reform Act of 1987."4 In-
deed, between 1988 and 1993, the total number of criminal ap-
peals, from convictions and sentences, increased 400%."5
The growth in federal litigation is certain to continue. In re-
cent years, Congress has expanded, rather than restricted, the
scope of federal laws, most notably in the area of civil rights and
employment discrimination. That trend is likely to persist. Con-
gress also has responded to the startling rise of violent crime
across the nation by enacting tough new criminal laws. At a
time when public concern about violent crime is at an all-time
high, 6 and public confidence in the criminal justice process is
TEE REPORTS 26-30 (1990); 1993 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS [hereinafter 1993 ANNUAL REPORT]; 1992 ANNU-
AL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS
[hereinafter 1992 ANNUAL REPORT]; 1991 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS [hereinafter 1991 ANNUAL REPORT].
11. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 18 (1993) [hereinafter STRUCTUR-
AL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES].
12. See William W. Scharzer & Russell R. Wheeler, On the Federalization of the
Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice, 23 STETSON L. REV. 651, 653-54
(1994).
13. 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10; 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10.
14. Pub. L. No. 100-182, 101 Stat. 1266 (1987).
15. 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10; 1988 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIREC-
TOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS.
16. See, e.g., Bob Barr, A 'More Aggressive' Crime Bill This Time, ROLL CALL,
May 22, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rollcl File; Frank James & Timo-
thy J. McNulty, America, the Insecure, CmH. TRIB., May 28, 1995, at Cl; Michael
Janofsky, Thousands Seek Permits To Carry Concealed Arms, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
1995, at A14; Morton Kondracke, Crime Wave, Coming Soon, Demands Action,
1996] 537
538 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:535
at an all-time low, 7 an event such as the bombing of the feder-
al building in Oklahoma City is a shocking reminder of the im-
portance of maintaining an efficient and fair federal criminal
justice system."8 Our overworked, understaffed federal courts
are certain to face an overwhelming number of additional crimi-
nal prosecutions, resulting from enforcement of the 1994 Violent
Crime Control and Prevention Act,'9 the pending Comprehen-
sive Antiterrorism Act,2" and subsequent national anticrime
and reform legislation promised by the Republican Congress's
"Contract With America. ' 21
Case overload at both the trial and appellate levels has led
inexorably to a state of gridlock.22 Federal civil litigants now
COMM. APPEAL, May 14, 1995, at B4; Miriam Pepper, Violence Encroaches on the
Job, KAN. CITY STAR, Apr. 20, 1995, at Bi. For a recent study of the complex dy-
namics involved in the fear of crime, see KATHLYN T. GAUBATZ, CRIME IN THE PUB-
LIC MIND (1995).
17. See, e.g., John Bare, Williamson: The Best Defense, CHAPEL HILL HERALD,
Apr. 24, 1995, at 4; Charles M. Calderon, Jury System Needs Reform, USA TODAY,
June 12, 1995, at AIO; Rhonda Cook & Bill Rankin, The Death GAME, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., July 23, 1995, at Ni; Bill Hutchinson, Poll Shows Lady Justice Is Also
on Trial, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 29, 1995, at 24; Henry Weinstein & Tim Rutten,
Simpson Case Already Is Rewriting the Rule Book, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1995, at Al.
18. See Lincoln Caplan & Peter Annin, And Now, for the Defense ....
NEWSWEEK, June 12, 1995, at 70; Daniel Klaidman, Justice's Rising Star, AM. LAW.,
June 1995, at 39; Melinda Liu, A Case Built on a Web of Damning Detail, NEWS-
WEEK, July 3, 1995, at 28; Trevor Nelson, Not Wanted: Why Bounties for Criminals
Don't Work, NEW REPUBLIC, June 5, 1995, at 19; Pierre Thomas, How Detectives
Cracked Oklahoma Bomb Case; Computers Aid Chase for Clues, WASH. POST, June 3,
1995, at Al; Sam Walker, Bombing Trial Will Test U.S. Justice System, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 10, 1995, at 1.
19. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 20, 21, 26, 28, 31, 42
U.S.C.).
20. S. 735, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995); H.R. 1710, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1995).
21. See Naftali Bendavid, Republican Crime Bill Invades Judges' Turf, RECORDER,
Apr. 20, 1995, at 1.
22. Federal district and appellate courts within the Second Circuit exemplify the
problem. The courts of the Second Circuit, long regarded as the most efficient of all
the federal courts in the nation, have been plagued with chronic judicial vacancies.
With 24 judgeships vacant in 1993, the circuit took 20% longer to dispose of the av-
erage case that year than it did in 1992. During fiscal year 1993, the number of
cases pending before the courts of the Second Circuit rose 24%, the number of bank-
ruptcy filings escalated 72.7%, and the number of bankruptcy appeals increased 35%.
See 1993 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT; Seiberg, supra note 3, at 8. In
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must endure years of unavoidable, yet totally unacceptable,
delays.' Civil trials are postponed habitually, as federal judges
honor the Speedy Trial Act and give priority to processing
criminal cases. Notwithstanding record civil case backlogs, civil
case filings remain high. Indeed, in 1992 and 1993 combined,
nearly 500,000 civil cases were filed in the federal district
courts.24
The delays are certain to worsen and to harm the very people
for whom the judicial system exists. Civil justice delays can be
devastating to individual litigants, many of whom do not have
the resources to queue up outside our federal courthouses to
wait indefinitely for their day in court. These one-time players
are less likely than other litigants (such as commercial enter-
prises) to exercise the increasingly popular option of dispute
resolution alternatives, such as commercial arbitration.' They
are thus more vulnerable to the vagaries of a system that is
struggling under the burdens of gridlock.
The growth of private justice as an alternative to the faltering
judicial system has been remarkable in recent years. The Ameri-
can Arbitration Association, for example, now manages an annu-
al average of 60,000 cases-one-quarter that of the federal judi-
ciary-and has revenues of $100 million and claims estimated at
$5 billion.26 The fact that private justice is becoming more at-
tractive, at least to those litigants who can afford it, demon-
strates the caseload crisis in our courts. Frank E.A. Sander,
head of Harvard's Dispute Resolution Program, succinctly stated
the reason for the explosive demand for private justice: "ADR
U.S. District Courts in Connecticut alone, criminal case filings increased 28% from
1992 levels, resulting in a caseload of 523 cases per district judge and 557 civil
cases pending over three years. Seiberg, supra note 3, at 3.
23. See generally Thomas E. Baker, Imagining the Alternative Futures of the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 28 GA. L. REV. 913 (1994) (summarizing structural reform propos-
als to solve the present problems and to meet the future needs of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals).
24. 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10; 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10.
25. See, e.g., Shannon P. Duffy, 3rd Circuit Caseload: There's Good News and
Bad; Arbitration, Diversity Numbers Up, Sloviter Says, PENN. L. WKLY., Apr. 17,
1995, at 10.
26. Eric Schine & Linda Himelstein, The Explosion in Private Justice, BUS. WK.,
June 12, 1995, at 88.
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[alternative dispute resolution] has become so appealing because
the judicial system has failed so many people."27  *.
Our too few federal judges have endeavored valiantly to han-
dle their burgeoning caseload. As a result, federal courts remain
the preferred forum for attorneys over the even more overcrowd-
ed state court fora.' The caseload crisis has directly resulted in
the use of judicial shortcuts as institutional coping mechanisms,
and such dubious docket management bfforts are likely to
grow2 At the trial level, some judges cope with crushing case-
loads by improperly relying on the work of law clerks and magis-
trates, placing undue pressure on litigants to settle cases, active-
ly encouraging criminal plea bargains, and pressing fellow se-
nior judges (some of whom are in their eighties) to return to full-
time service. Some appellate judges cope with their burdensome
caseloads by reducing the percentage of appellate cases in which
oral argument is granted, limiting the number of written and
published opinions, and relying too often and too readily on the
services of "visiting" district judges who are temporarily elevated
to appellate status in order to make up three-judge appellate
panels.
At this critical juncture in the judiciary's history, we must
ask: Will our national justice system continue to labor under the
strain of its present caseload while facing a substantial increase
in civil and criminal cases and thus ration justice and sacrifice
the rights of litigants in the process? Or, alternatively, will the
nation's political branches honor their constitutional obligation
to establish and regularly maintain the nonpolitical third branch
and thus ensure both civil and criminal justice? The need for
reform is manifest; consensus on solutions, however, is lacking.
Some members of our nominally status quo federal judiciary
are begging for relief from judicial gridlock. Ninth Circuit Chief
Judge Clifford Wallace, concerned that the federal judiciary is
"fast approaching a crisis point," recently called for a national
27. Id.
28. Daniel Wise, Federal Court Still Lawyers' Preferred Forum; Respondents Cite
State's Limited Resources, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 10, 1995, at 6.
29. Thomas Baker described some of these procedural shortcuts as "intramural
reforms." THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 106-50 (1995).
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conference to better define the mission of our national courts. 0
Judicial vacancy rates and their resulting damage have become
so serious in the Second Circuit that Chief Judge Jon 0.
Newman, citing "disgraceful" appointment practices, recently
proposed a constitutional amendment to permit judicial appoint-
ments to be made by the courts when vacancies exist for more
than one year.
31
The more general solutions proposed by judicial leaders are
most unsatisfactory. As noted, the U.S. Judicial Conference's
Committee on Long Range Planning has conducted research that
accurately evaluates the impending crisis of caseload growth."
The Committee's 1995 Proposed Plan, however, advocates that
the political branches implement a sharp curtailment of federal
court jurisdiction and create a system of discretionary access to
give lower federal appellate judges the arbitrary power of discre-
tionary review.33 In addition to suggesting that Congress raise
substantial court access barriers to Social Security, ERISA, and
employment bias litigants, the report encourages the institution-
alization of judicial shortcuts and suggests a "comprehensive
recodification" of the national criminal law to reduce federal
criminal law to comport with the judges' circumscribed inventory
of five offense categories.' Additionally, the Committee recom-
mends that most diversity of citizenship cases be shifted to our
overloaded state court systems.' The judges' report rejects a
substantial increase in the number of federal judges, warning
that "federal law would be babel" with a large judiciary.36 In-
stead of welcoming needed growth and ensuring justice for all,37
J
30. See J. Clifford Wallace, Tackling the Caseload Crisis, A.B.A. J., June 1994,
at 88.
31. See Al Karmen, Judicial Vacancies Spur Amendment Call, WASH. POST, June
20, 1994, at A13.
32. See Robert Pear, Judges Propose Limiting Access to Federal Courts, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 23, 1994, at 30A, Victor Williams, It's Time for a Better, Big-
ger U.S. Judiciary, NATL L.J., Feb. 6, 1995, at A23.
33. See PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 5, at 21-38.
34. Id. at 23-25.
35. Id. at 29-32.
36. Id. at 19.
37. See John F. Rooney, Long Range Plan for Federal Courts Is Target of Some
Blunt Criticism at Last Public Hearing, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 16, 1994, at 1.
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the judicial leaders appear ready to suggest that the political
branches violate what the great American jurist, Second Circuit
Judge Learned Hand, declared to be the first commandment of a
democratic government: "Thou shalt not ration justice."'
This Article seeks to examine the difficult future facing our
federal judicial system, to analyze the constitutional mandate of
our national courts, and to explore from a comparativist perspec-
tive the possibility of a substantial expansion and subject matter
specialization of our national court system. As a beginning place
for such specialization, this Article recommends that Congress
"ordain and establish" a new, separate national criminal court
system.
Part II traces the constitutional origins and historical develop-
ment of our national court system. Part III explores the political
branches' contemporary malfeasance in failing to maintain a
fully staffed judiciary by abdicating their appointment responsi-
bilities. This section includes an analysis of the disappointing
appointment records of Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton
and a discussion of recent Senate confirmation delays and dead-
locks. Part III directly contests the prevailing academic view
that the Senate should play an assertive role in the appointment
process and reviews Yale Professor Steven Carter's The Confir-
mation Mess as an example of the failure of this widely held
view to appreciate the generous, almost exclusive, character of
the Executive's appointment authority granted by both the tradi-
tional and recess appointment clauses of the Constitution's Arti-
cle II, Section 2.
Part IV addresses the ramifications of contemporary criminal
and civil case overloads resulting from an understaffed bench.
Special emphasis is given to the institutionalization of various
judicial coping mechanisms that ultimately shortchange justice,
such as overreliance on staff attorneys, law clerks, and magis-
trates. Part V develops a comparative vision of national court
specialization. This section also examines the efficiency accom-
plished with the numerically large, specialized judicial systems
of Germany and France and applies it to our national courts.
38. Learned Hand, Thou Shalt Not Ration Justice, Address Before the Legal Aid
Society of New York (Feb. 16, 1951), in LEGAL AID BRIEF CASE, Apr. 1951, at 3, 5.
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Part VI explores the need for, and the sustained judicial resis-
tance to, a substantial increase in the number of judges and a
fundamental restructuring of the generalized jurisdiction of
United States federal courts. Providing examples of this judicial
resistance to growth, this section explores the judiciary's active
lobbying and interpretative efforts against further federalization
of crime and presents an alternative analysis of the Supreme
Court's 1995 United States v. Lopez 9 decision that nullified the
Gun-Free School Zones Act. Part VI not only analyzes Lopez in
terms of its restriction on the interpretation of, and congressio-
nal jurisdiction pursuant to, the Commerce Clause for the first
time in almost sixty years, but also analyzes it as a results-ori-
ented constraint on congressional criminal lawmaking authority
for the underlying purpose of controlling the size of the federal
courts' criminal docket. This section also summarily reviews
access-restricting and jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the
judiciary's 1995 Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal
Courts as a further example of the judiciary's commitment to
maintaining a small, elite national law-administering corps.
Finally, Part VII presents a preliminary blueprint for expand-
ing and remodeling the United States federal court system. The
proposal envisions an immediate significant infusion of addition-
al federal judges, focusing placements in our most overcrowded
jurisdictions. Prompt staffing of new judgeships through asser-
tive executive appointment action is explored. The Article next
proposes that Congress approve a substantial increase in the
number of district and appellate judges and concurrently enact a
fundamental restructuring of the generalized federal court struc-
ture, moving to a more specialized model. The restructuring
should begin with a formal division of the national judiciary's
civil and criminal processes and the creation of separate federal
criminal courts-U.S. District Criminal Courts, U.S. Courts of
Criminal Appeals, and a National Court of Criminal Appeals.
Part VII explores the constitutional basis for the creation of
separate criminal courts and asserts that the division is both
necessary to the national government's successful fulfillment of
its increasing role in fighting criminal violence and integral to
39. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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the government's operation of a fair and efficient criminal and
civil justice system. This section also preemptively responds to
opposition that the existing judiciary certainly will level against
a separate system of federal criminal courts. The final section
concludes by discussing the structure and staffing of these new
federal criminal courts.
II. GROWING A NATIONAL JUDICIARY
A. Judicial Deficiency Under the Articles of Confederation
In 1787, the Philadelphia Framers sought to perfect the Arti-
cles of Confederation union by creating a new government
structure resting on three separate pillars of authority. The lack
of a workable judicial system was a chief failing of the Confed-
eration government and was a significant motivation for the
Annapolis meeting and Philadelphia Convention; indeed, it was
part of a larger Confederation failing concerning the absence of
a direct relationship between the people and their national
government."
The Articles of Confederation attempted to fill the appellate
gap left by the loss of the Privy Council on account of indepen-
dence from Britain4 by granting national congressional juris-
diction over three areas-piracy, admiralty, and disputes be-
tween the states.4 2 Ultimately, piracy jurisdiction was trans-
ferred to the jurisdiction of the states. Congress heard admiralty
cases, until it eventually established the Court of Appeals in
Cases of Capture.4' That national admiralty court heard appel-
40. See CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1928). For a
somewhat contrary view, see MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 1774-1781 (1940); MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION 1781-1789 (1950).
41. See generally JOSEPH H. SMITH, APPEALS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE
AMERICAN PLANTATIONS (1950) (describing and evaluating the Privy Council of Eng-
land as a judicial body).
42. See Johm P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1948).
43. The confederate court has been described as the ancestor of the present
United States Supreme Court. See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE GRAND CONVENTION 50
(1986).
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late cases from 1780 to 1786."4 The court often was ineffectual
in enforcing judgments rendered from state courts of origin be-
cause the newly independent states often simply ignored its
rulings.
45
Incredibly, Congress oversaw adjudication of disputes arising
between the states. The Articles of Confederation required the
aggrieved state first to appear before the national legislature
and, next, to proceed through a multifaceted arbitration pro-
cess.4 ' This ridiculously cumbersome process was used in set-
tling three disputes between states, including a substantial land
conflict between Connecticut and Pennsylvania."
The lack of a functioning national court system fostered inter-
state rivalries and damaged efforts to promote interstate com-
merce.4 ' The unchecked aggression of individual state govern-
44. See generally J. FRANKLIN JAMESON, The Predecessor of the Supreme Court,
in ESSAYS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1-45 (1889) (dis-
cussing the judicial functions and organs of the federal, government in the years pre-
ceding 1789).
45. Id.
46. Article IX of the Articles of Confederation provided:
The united states in congress assembled shall also be the last resort
on appeal in all disputes and differences now subsisting or that hereafter
may arise between two or more states concerning boundary, jurisdiction
or any other cause whatever;, which authority shall always be exercised
in the manner following. Whenever the legislative or executive authority
or lawful agent of any state in controversy with another shall present a
petition to congress stating the manner in question and praying for a
hearing, notice thereof shall be given by order of congress to the legisla-
tive or executive authority of the other state in controversy, and a day
assigned for the appearance of the parties by their lawful agents, who
shall then be directed to appoint by joint consent, commissioners or judg-
es to constitute a court for hearing and determining the matter in ques-
tion: but if, they cannot agree, congress shall name three persons out of
each of the united states, and from the list of such persons each party
shall alternatively strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until the
number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number no less than
seven, nor more than nine names as congress shall direct, shall in the
presence of congress be drawn out by lot, and the persons whose names
shall be so drawn or any five of them, shall be commissioners or judges,
to hear and finally determine the controversy ....
ACT OF CONFEDERATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA art. ix, reprinted in 1
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 89-90
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
47. See HAMPTON L. CARSON, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 67-68
(1891).
48. See generally William F. Swindler, Seedtime of an American Judiciary: From
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ments, which would at best ignore, and at worst directly chal-
lenge, the already limited judicial authority of the national gov-
ernment and the legitimacy of national law, threatened a short
existence for the new confederation.49 James Madison wrote to
George Washington just a few weeks before the Philadelphia
Convention on this issue:
The national supremacy ought to be extended.., to the Judi-
ciary departments . . . . It seems at least necessary that the
oaths of the Judges should included a fidelity to the general
as well as local Constitution, and that an appeal should lie to
some National tribunal in all cases to which foreigners or
inhabitants of other States may be parties."
B. Philadelphia Debate on the Need for a National Judiciary
The individuals who attended the Philadelphia Convention
were uniquely educated and experienced to build a national
court system; thirty-four of the fifty-five delegates were attor-
neys or were trained in the law. Drawing on their substantial
experience with the long-established courts of Great Britain and
the courts of the colonies/newly independent states, 1 the attor-
ney-delegates sought to establish a truly independent, and fully
functional, national court system. Section 9 of Edmund
Randolph's Virginia Plan provided a good starting point for
structure, appointments, and independence:
Resolved, That a national judiciary be established to con-
sist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribu-
nals to be chosen by the National Legislature, to hold their
Independence to the Constitution, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503 (1976) (discussing the
development of the American judiciary prior to the adoption of the Constitution).
49. See generally J.C. Bancroft Davis, Federal Courts Prior to the Adoption of the
Constitution, 131 U.S. app. at Ivi-lviii (1889) (describing the American judical system
prior to the adoption of the Constitution).
50. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CON-
STITUTION 15 (1990).
51. In theory, state jurists enjoyed the formal guarantees of judicial indepen-
dence under state constitutions, most of which provided for continuing tenure and
salary on good behavior. In practice, however, the political branches of the state gov-




offices during good behaviour; and to receive punctually at
stated times fixed compensations for their services, in which
no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the
person actually in office at the time of such increase or
diminution."
As to the authority and jurisdiction of the judicial system, Sec-
tion 9 stated:
That the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear
& determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribu-
nal to hear and determine, in the dernier resort, all piracies
& felonies on the high seas; captures from an enemy; cases in
which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such
jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect the collec-
tion of the National revenue; impeachments of any National
officer; and questions which involve the national peace or
harmony."
Not all delegates agreed, however, with the idea of, or need
for, a national court system. Early in the Convention proceed-
ings, John Rutledge of South Carolina argued that state courts
were the only proper fora'in which to decide cases in the first
instance:
Mr. RUTLEDGE, having obtained a rule for reconsideration
of the clause for establishing inferior tribunals under the na-
tional authority, now moved that part of the clause in the
ninth resolution should be expunged; arguing, that the state
tribunals might and ought to be left, in all cases, to decide in
the first instance, the right of appeals to the supreme nation-
al tribunal being sufficient to secure the national rights and
uniformity of judgments; that it was making an unnecessary
encroachment on the jurisdiction of the states, and creating
unnecessary obstacles to their adoption of the new system.54
Roger Sherman agreed with John Rutledge and specifically com-
plained about the financial cost of supporting such a national
judiciary. James Madison, however, responded directly to
52. ROSSITER, supra note 43, at 362-63.
53. Id.
54. JONATHAN ELLIOT, 5 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 AS RE-
PORTED BY JAMES MADISON 158-59 (1941).
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Rutledge's criticism of inferior level national courts:
Mr. MADISON observed, that, unless inferior tribunals
were dispersed throughout the republic with final jurisdiction
in many cases, appeals would be multiplied to a most oppres-
sive degree; that, besides, an appeal would not in may cases
be a remedy. What was to be done after improper verdicts, in
state tribunals, obtained under the biased directions of an
undirected jury? To remand the cause for a new trial would
answer no purpose. To order a new trial at the supreme bar
would oblige the parties to bring up their witnesses, though
ever so distant from the sear of the court. An effective judi-
ciary establishment, commensurate to the legislative authori-
ty, was essential. A government without a proper executive or
judiciary would be the mere trunk of a body, without arms or
legs to act or move.55
During the debate, James Wilson and John Dickinson sup-
ported Madison's argument that a national judiciary was a nec-
essary complement to a national legislature. Madison reported:
"Mr. Dickinson contended strongly that if there was to be a
National legislature, there ought to be a national judiciary, and
that the former ought to have authority to institute the lat-
ter."56 Similarly, Nathaniel Gorham later argued that "[i]nferior
tribunals are essential to render the authority of the national
legislature effectual."'" Initially, the Convention vote was divid-
ed over Rutledge's first motion to eliminate inferior courts from
the new government structure. The question reemerged several
times during the summer and often centered on the jurisdiction
and cost of establishing such national courts."
Opponents of establishing lower federal courts consistently
argued that such courts were not needed and that their jurisdic-
tion would interfere with the authority of state courts. Pierce
Butler of South Carolina "could see no necessity for such tribu-
55. Id. at 159.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 331.
58. Roger Sherman was most concerned with cost: "He dwelt chiefly on the
supposed expensiveness of having a new set of courts, when the existing state courts
would answer the same purpose." Id. at 159.
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nals '59 and, early in the debates, threatened that the "states
will revolt at such encroachments."' ° Butler suggested that the
delegates follow the example of the Greek leader Solon who
"gave the Athenians, not the best government he could devise,
but the best they would receive." 1 In a like vein, Maryland's
Luther Martin was recorded as fearing that national courts "will
create jealousies and oppositions in the state tribunals, with the
jurisdictions of which they will interfere."'
Edmund Randolph of Virginia forcefully answered these politi-
cal and jurisdictional questions, arguing "the courts of the states
cannot be trusted with the administration of the national laws.
The objects of jurisdiction are such as will often place the gener-
al and local policy at variance."63 Ultimately, James Madison
successfully borrowed from the Virginia Plan to phrase the juris-
dictional scope of the new judiciary in a manner acceptable to
the convention delegates: "That the jurisdiction shall extend to
all cases arising under the national laws, and to such other
questions as may involve the national peace and harmony." 4
In the end, the delegates agreed to establish a supreme na-
tional judicial tribunal and to give Congress the authority to
create a system of national lower courts. Opponents of the new
federal judiciary nevertheless registered their disagreement to
the very end of the Convention. For example, Virginia's George
Mason circulated his "Objections To this Constitution of Govern-
ment," which stated in relevant part:
The Judiciary of the United States is so constructed and
extended, so as to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the
several States; thereby rendering law as tedious, intricate
and expensive, and justice as unattainable, by a great part of
the community, as in England, and enabling the rich to op-
press and ruin the poor.'
59. Id. at 331.
60. Id. at 159.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 331.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 332.
65. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 638 (Max'
Farrand ed., 1966) (quoting K.M. ROWLAND, THE LIFE OF GEORGE MASON, 11) [here-
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C. Appointment Process
Convention delegates also were divided over the proper meth-
od of accomplishing judicial appointments.66 The Convention
debated throughout the summer over which of the two political
branches should appoint judges.67 Some delegates, such as
Pennsylvanian James Wilson, believed that judicial appointment
by the Congress would result in "[ilntrigue, partiality, and con-
cealment,"' and that a "principal reason for unity in the Exec-
utive was, that officers might be appointed by a single responsi-
ble person." 9 Other delegates, such as Charles Pinkney, resist-
ed the idea of placing so much power solely in the Executive,
who Pinkney believed "will possess neither the requisite
knowledge of characters, nor confidence of the people for so high
a trust.""
As one of several Philadelphia compromises, the Convention
eventually decided on two alternative appointment processes
found in two different clauses of Article II, Section 2. Under
ordinary circumstances, the President would appoint judicial
officers with the Senate's majority concurrence. Recognizing the
consequence of developing an efficient appointment process, the
Framers divided that ordinary appointment authority unequally
between the President and the Senate.
The Framers sought to charge the lion's share of the responsi-
bility, including absolute initial selection authority and final
appointment commissioning power, to the President. Even after
having made a nomination and soliciting the Senate's "advice
and consent" through confirmation, the Executive can choose not
to commission the selected individual.7' As Thomas Jefferson
inafter RECORDS].
66. ELLIOT, supra note 54, at 156-57.
67. Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 23-24 (1991).
68. ELLIOT, supra note 54, at 155.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 350.
71. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranclh) 137, 155 (1803); Charles L.
Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE
L.J. 657, 659 n.3 (1970).
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described this process, the first appointment clause of Article II,
Section 2 "gives the nomination... to the President, the ap-
pointment to him and the Senate jointly, the commissioning to
the President."72
Alexander Hamilton also described the unequal division of
power between the President and the Senate in The Federalist:
It will be the Office of the President to nominate, and, with
the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint. There will,
of course, be no exertion of choice on the part of the Senate.
They may defeat one choice of the Executive, and oblige him
to make another; but they cannot themselves choose-they
can only ratify or reject the choice he may have made. 3
Further explaining the allocation of responsibility, Hamilton
stated:
The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will nat-
urally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard
to reputation. He will, on this account, feel himself under
stronger obligations, and more interested to investigate with
care the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled, and to
prefer with impartiality the persons who may have the fair-
est pretensions to them.
74
Although the Framers intended that regular appointments be
accomplished by presidential selection with the Senate playing a
limited role through confirmation, they gave the President the
sole and complete power to make recess appointments in alter-
native circumstances, which the -Constitution defined as any
time the Senate recesses leaving a vacancy unfilled.7 5 Article II,
Section 2, Clause 3 states: "The President shall have power to
fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the
72. Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson's Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Re-
specting Diplomatic Appointments (Apr. 24, 1790), in 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 378, 379 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961).
73. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 387 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987).
74. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 429 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987).
75. For historical information on recess judicial appointments, see Thomas A.
Curtis, Note, Recess Appointments to Article IfI Courts: The Use of Historical Prac-
tice in Constitutional Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1758 (1984).
1996] 551
552 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:535
Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End
of their next Session." The second appointments clause, the
Recess Appointments Clause, which was adopted without debate
at the Convention, protects the government from Senate inaction
and guarantees the ceaseless functioning of the judiciary and
the executive branch."
D. Ratification Debates
Even before the Confederation Congress adopted the Septem-
ber 28, 1787, resolution ordering transmission of the proposed
Constitution to the states, 5  popular publication of the
document's final draft generated strong opposition to the pro-
posed national court system among various newspapers and
state legislatures. 79 The most significant debates over the judi-
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
77. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 65, at 540. Congress has attempted to restrict
this constitutional authority by limiting salary payments to recess appointees. See 5
U.S.C. § 5503 (1994), which provides:
(a) Payment for services may not be made from the Treasury of the
United States to an individual appointed during a recess of the Senate to
fill a vacancy in an existing office, if the vacancy existed while the Sen-
ate was in session and was by law required to be filled by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, until the appointee has been confirmed
by the Senate. This subsection does not apply-
(1) if the vacancy arose within 30 days before the end of the session of
the Senate;
(2) if, at the end of the session, a nomination for the office, other than
the nomination of an individual appointed during the preceding recess of
the Senate, was pending before the Senate for its advice and consent; or
(3) if a nomination for the office was rejected by the Senate within 30
days before the end of the session and an individual other than the one
whose nomination was rejected thereafter receives a recess appointment.
(b) A nomination to fill a vacancy referred to by (1), (2), or (3) of subsec-
tion (a) of this section shall be submitted to the Senate not later than 40
days after the beginning of the next session of the Senate.
Id. Application of this statutory encroachment on the Executive's appointment au-
thority obviously raises serious separation of powers concerns.
78. The lame duck Congress resolved that the Constitution "be transmitted to
the several legislatures in Order to be submitted to convention of Delegates chosen
in each state by the people thereof." EDMUND C. BURNETr, THE CONTINENTAL CON-
GRESS 696 (1964).
79. See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatoiy View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A
Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article I1, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741,
797-829 (1984).
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ciary were waged in the state ratification conventions by de-
clared anti-federalists. ° In Philadelphia, for example, anti-fed-
eralists expressed the belief that the new judiciary would prove
to be a '"daring encroachment on the liberties of the citizens,"''
that "'State judicatories would be wholly superseded,'8 2 and
that Congress would probably authorize too few judges, resulting
in court delays.' James Wilson joined the ratification debate,
explaining both the necessity and wisdom of the new Charter's
judicial branch; his strong defense was crucial to securing
Pennsylvania's ratification of the Constitution.84
In other states, similar objections to ratification were based on
an aversion to the new judiciary. In the Massachusetts ratifying
convention, Abraham Holmes stated that the new government
would '"find Congress possessed of power enabling them to insti-
tute judicatories, little less inauspicious than a certain tribunal
in Spain, which has long been the disgrace of Christendom: I
mean that diabolical institution, the Inquisition."'85  In
Virginia's ratification convention, George Mason challenged
almost every sentence in Article III of the new Constitution. In
addition, Mason made a number of genuinely outlandish charges
against the proposed national judiciary, such as that the inferior
courts would not permit prosecution of federal officers for "'the
most insolent and wanton brutality to a man's wife or daugh-
ter."'8 6 James Madison, John Marshall, and Edmund Randolph
S0. For works outlining the movements against ratification of the Constitution,
see THE ANTIFEDERALISTS (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed., 1966); THE COMPLETE ANTI-FED-
ERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); JACKSON T. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS:
CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-1788 (1981); ROBERT A. RUTLAND, THE ORDEAL
OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE ANTIFEDERALISTS AND THE RATIFICATION STRUGGLE OF
1787-1788 (1966).
81. DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, COURTS FOR A NEW NATION 11 (1971) (quoting
PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, at 154 (John B.
MacMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., 1888)).
82. Id. (quoting PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 1787-88, at 154
(John B. MacMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., 1888)).
83. Id.
84. See id. at 10-12.
85. Id. at 12-13 (quoting DEBATES AND PROCEEDING OF THE CONVENTION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETrS HELD IN THE YEAR 1788, AND WHICH FINALLY
RATIFIED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 212 (1856)).
86. Id. at 16 (quoting 9 HUGH B. GRISBY, THE HISTORY OF THE VIRGINIA FED-
ERAL CONVENTION OF 1788, WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF THE EMINENT VIRGINIANS OF
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successfully vindicated the proposed independent national judi-
ciary and finally persuaded the closely divided Virginia ratifica-
tion convention. 7
The convention and ratification processes are important to
today's debates over the judiciary because they demonstrate
that questions about the federal philosophical foundations and
expansive jurisdictional scope of the national court system were
fully discussed and firmly decided at the nation's founding.
Specifically, reconsidering the objections to the creation of the
federal courts is important because the debates demonstrate
that the federal and state ratifying conventions understood com-
pletely the dynamic nature of the new national judicia-
ry-indeed, the new national government-that they were pro-
posing. The United States of America was a national govern-
ment with the power to enact national laws, inclusive of a na-
tional court system created to enforce those laws. In contempo-
rary times when "devolution" is properly being considered in a
variety of public policy areas, it is important that these ideas
should not be seen, or misused, to disempower the national
government as an institution.
Understanding the limits to a constitutional interpretation of
"limited national powers" is crucial inasmuch as the Supreme
Court recently has attempted to strip Congress's authority to
legislate on an issue of the gravest national concern in order to
limit its own docket."8 These debates refute the notion that the
Framers created a national government of such limited and
circumscribed powers as to be impotent to address fundamental
issues of national concern.
The philosophical and jurisprudential federalism underpin-
ning the Articles of Confederation was rethought and laid to rest
in 1787. Ultimately, the requisite number of states decided to
relinquish voluntarily their sovereignty in order to form a more
perfect union. 9 The ratified Constitution thus gave the new
THAT ERA WHO WERE MEMBERS OF THE BODY 286 (1890-1891) (collections of the
Virginia Historical Society, (n.s.) vols. 9-10)).
87. Id. at 16-19.
88. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995) (striking down a
federal law prohibiting firearms in a school zone as violative of the Commerce
Clause).
89. The attempt of certain of the southern states to rescind and repudiate this
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Republic's Congress the assistance of both a strong executive
and a much needed judicial branch-both "arms and legs to
move [and] act."0
E. A Model for Evolving, Efficient Judicial Institutions
The government structure created by the Framers included, as
a necessary part, a new independent national judiciary-a third,
nonpolitical branch of government that was to be more fully
developed and perpetually maintained by the two political
branches. While establishing "one supreme Court,"' the Con-
stitution charged the future political branches with the solemn
responsibility of designing, establishing, funding, and staffing
inferior courts. Article III states: "The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish." 2 Article I affirms this congressional au-
thority: the Congress has the power "[to constitute Tribunals
inferior to the supreme Court."93
In the judiciary, the Constitution created a dynamic national
court system-a model for evolving governmental institutions,
not a static organ of government. Charged with enforcing the
ever-changing laws of the national government, the judiciary
was "established," and is to be "reestablished" regularly, by
Congress, to effectuate Congress's dynamic legislative will. In-
stead of creating constitutionally determined inferior court struc-
tures, the Framers wisely left the form and structure of the
inferior courts to the same Congress that they charged with
writing the laws that the courts would interpret and enforce.94
Alexander Hamilton described the dual system of state and
federal courts as "one whole," yet he stated: "'Tis time only that
can mature and perfect so compound a system, and can liquidate
the meaning of all the parts, and can adjust them to each other
voluntary act of union was rejected at Gettysburg. See GARY WILLS, THE WORDS
THAT REMADE THE CONSTITUTION (1992).
90. ELLIOT, supra note 54, at 71.
91. U.S. CONST. art. III § 1.
92. Id.
93. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
94. Id.
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in a harmonious and consistent WHOLE."95
Congress is given the discretion to choose a court structure
that is best able to effectuate the national law; indeed, the Con-
stitution states only that Congress "may" create courts.96 The
Framers envisioned that changing national concerns and circum-
stances might require future Congresses "from time to time to
ordain and establish" distinctive "inferior Courts."" Although
the Framers were confident in charging Congress with creating
inferior courts, they decided that an efficient appointment pro-
cess necessarily would charge the President alone with the sole
duty to select all federal judges. As Alexander Hamilton stated
in The Federalist, the President is given the "sole and undivided
responsibility" to choose appointees." Efficiency in judicial
staffing is doubly guaranteed by the alternative recess appoint-
ment procedure. By giving the President the sole authority to
appoint federal judges without either the advice or the consent
of the Senate at any time the Senate is in recess, the Framers
sought to ensure a continuous system of justice.99
During both his terms of presidential office, George Washing-
ton worked strenuously to breathe life into the Framers' vision
of a strong, independent federal judicial system. President
Washington took his judicial appointment responsibility most
seriously; he exercised his appointment powers assertively, and
he even used the recess appointment authority to fill a vacancy
on the Supreme Court.
In a letter to John Jay, his appointee as the Supreme Court's
first Chief Justice, President Washington referenced the impor-
tance of executive leadership in building a strong, independent,
and principled federal court system:
95. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 458 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987).
96. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
97. Id.
98. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 429 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987).
99. The Article III authority of recess-appointed judges has been affirmed by two
appellate courts. See United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985) (en
banc); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
964 (1963). For a recent case voiding a recess appointment, see Mackie v. Clinton,
827 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1993).
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I have always been persuaded, that the stability and success
of the national government, and consequently the happiness
of the people of the United States, would depend in a con-
siderable degree on the interpretation and execution of its
laws. In my opinion, therefore, it is important, that the judi-
ciary system should not only be independent in its opera-
tions, but as perfect as possible in its formation."°
During the first 200 years of the Republic's history, the
Framers' concept of a strong, nonpolitical third branch of govern-
ment was regularly refashioned, expanded, and sustained
through the diligent work of both political branches.01 Begin-
ning with the Judiciary Act of 1789,0 congressional leaders of
the past were not afraid of structuring and restructuring the
courts, of adding judges to the inferior courts when needed, or of
adding jurisdictional responsibility to the evolving judicial de-
partment, thus ensuring continuing perfection in its formation
and guaranteeing its ability to meet the changing needs and
demands of the nation.0 3
III. APPOINMENT NEGLECT; CONFIRMATION CIRCUS
Over the past several years, political malfeasance has taken a
grievous toll on our federal court system.' 4 Most fundamental-
100. 10 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 86 (Jared Sparks ed., 1836).
101. See generally ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1987)
(chronicling the history and evolution of the federal court system).
102. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73; see Charles Warren, New Light on
the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923).
103. See DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, COURTS FOR A NEW NATION 1-4 (1971). Exam-
ples of this historical maintenance of the federal judiciary by the political branches
run from the first Judiciary Act of 1789, which established a district court in each
of the 13 states comprised of a single district judge but required Supreme Court
Justices to ride circuit; to the second act of judicial legislation in 1802, which for-
mally established six federal circuits and allowed cases to be decided by one judge;
to the judiciary acts of 1869 and 1875, which required Supreme Court Justices to sit
in circuit every two years and substantially broadened the original jurisdiction of the
inferior courts; to the groundbreaking 1891 act, which established the Circuit Court
of Appeals; to the 1911 act which adopted a Judicial Code formally creating district
courts; to the judiciary acts of 1925, 1948, and 1958, which reduced direct review by
the Supreme Court and changed the circuit court of appeals to the U.S. Court of
Appeals, raised the diversity jurisdictional requirement to $10,000, redefined corpo-
rate citizenship, and allowed discretionary interlocutory appeals. Id.
104. See generally Diana G. Culp, Fixing the Federal Courts, AB.A. J., June 1990,
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ly, the political branches have failed to respond to the third
branch's increasing civil and criminal caseload, chronic judicial
vacancy rates, and significant budgetary concerns. °5 By in-
creasing the federal effort to combat escalating violent crime
without adding any judicial resources, the political branches
recklessly jeopardize the quality of national civil and criminal
justice. °6 Indeed, a five-year retrospective report shows that
criminal appeals increased over thirty percent in the five-year
period between 1989 and 1993,107 a trend that is certain to
continue.
According to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the
1994 Crime Control and Prevention Act has the potential to
overwhelm the federal courts with additional criminal prosecu-
tions.' 8 Individuals accused of federal crimes will look to a fed-
eral court system that already is strained to the breaking point
for criminal justice.0 9 Civil litigants, many of whom already
have waited years to see the inside of a federal courtroom, will
be forced further back in the courthouse queue.
Beginning during the Bush Administration and continuing
through the present, as the caseload of the judiciary has in-
creased and its budget has fluctuated, our federal court system
has functioned with a chronic number of judicial vacancies."
The problem, stemming from general political branch acceptance
at 63 (advocating adoption of a comprehensive plan for reform of the federal judicia-
ry proposed by the Federal Courts Study Committee).
105. Garry Sturgess, Another Clash over Criminal Caseload, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 1,
1991, at 7.
106. See Is U.S. Justice System in a State of Crisis?, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2, 1993, at
23.
107. U.S. Courts: Caseload on the Rise, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 9, 1994, at 1.
108. The Act's authorization of $200 million to finance supervision and defender
services for criminal defendants is not likely to ease the adjudicative burdens im-
posed by the Act. It is important to note that the Act's "Drug Courts" provision does
not allocate any resources to the federal judiciary. Rather, these so-called "courts"
are federally subsidized drug rehabilitation programs. See generally Mark Curriden,
Drug Courts Gain Popularity, A.B-A. J., May 1994, at 16 (discussing the drug courts'
emphasis on intervention and treatment).
109. See Jolm F. Rooney, Crime Bill Could Swamp Courts Moran Says, CIu. DAi-
LY L. BULL., Feb. 17, 1994, at 1; John F. Rooney, Federal Judges Launch New Salvo
at Crime Bill, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 14, 1994, at 1.
110. See Will Pryor, Wanted: 69 Judges for Federal Bench, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Mar. 13, 1995, at A13.
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of delays in the appointment process, and specifically worsened
by a lack of executive leadership in confronting Senate confir-
mation deadlock, is substantial; judicial positions have remained
vacant for years at a time."' Indeed, in his 1993 year-end
state of the judiciary report, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
"There is perhaps no issue more important to the judiciary right
now than this serious judicial vacancy problem.""2
A. George Bush's Failed Four Years
President George Bush declined to assert his appointment
authority vigorously;'13 he failed to keep a full slate of nomi-
nees before the Senate, proved impotent to push nominees
through to confirmation, and refused to exercise his constitution-
al authority to recess-appoint judges. Moving from the vice-pres-
idency to the White House, President George Bush could have
left in place President Ronald Reagan's efficient, albeit strongly
ideological, judicial selection process. Instead, the Bush Adminis-
tration proved extraordinarily ineffective in making judicial
selections, too often allowing senators of the states in which
vacancies occurred to make judicial choices for the President."4
It took the Bush Administration, on average, more than one
year to make judicial selections."5 While encouraging federal
prosecutors to escalate the Administration's war on crime
through increased federal prosecutions," 6  President Bush
failed to provide fully staffed courts in which to adjudicate the
criminal actions, and the judiciary struggled with the criminal
111. Charles V. Zehren, Justice Delayed By Empty Benches; Clinton Falls Short on
a Promise To Fill Scores of Judgeships, NEWSDAY, May 28, 1994, at AS.
112. 1993 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 7.
113. Kevin Cullen, Chief Justice Warns of a Court Overload; Presses Bush Admin-
istration To Fill Vacancies, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 1, 1992, at 3.
114. Judith Havemann, Democrats: Judicial Vacancies Galore; Bush Lags Behind
Reagan, Carter in Filling Bench, Group Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1990, at A21.
115. See Christi Harlan & Jonathan M. Moses, Bush Misses a Chance, WALL ST.
J., May 4, 1992, at B13.
116. Paul M. Barrett, Attorney General Barr Targeting Violent Crime, Comes On
Like Gangbusters in a Campaign Year, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1992, at AlS; Michael
deC. Hinds, Bush Aides Push State Gun Cases into U.S. Courts, N.Y. TIMES, May
17, 1991, at Al; Michael Wines, Drug War To Widen on Same Budget, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 1992, at A9.
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case overload." 7
Moreover, in 1991 and 1992, an appointment impasse arose
between the Bush Administration and the Senate Judiciary
Committee over committee staffers' alleged misuse of confiden-
tial FBI reports. The impasse lasted for months. 18 From this
time until the end of Bush's one term of office, the Democrat-
controlled Senate was successful in repeatedly stalemating
Bush's judicial nominations. 9
Commenting on this political branch malfeasance, the New
York State Bar Association President stated in July 1992: "Pres-
ident Bush's and the Senate Judicial Committee's slow response
in filling federal judicial vacancies has created a state of emer-
gency in the federal courts in New York State."' ° The judicial
work of many other federal courts across the nation was similar-
ly impaired, but the metropolitan areas were especially hard
hit.
21
In one of the most manifest displays of political feebleness in
modem times, Republican President Bush, during the months
before and after losing the 1992 general election, failed to de-
mand forcefully that the Democrat-controlled Judiciary Commit-
tee take immediate confirmation action on fifty judicial nomina-
tions that were languishing in the Senate. As he had done
throughout his four years, Bush also specifically rejected the
suggested exercise of his recess judicial appointment powers"
and handed over 100 empty judgeships to Democrat President-
elect Clinton on January 20, 1993.1'
117. See GAO: More Federal Judges Needed To Cut Case Backlog, CH. TRIB., May
28, 1991, at 4; Senator Says Judges Needed for Drug Cases, WASH. TIMES, May 28,
1991, at A2.
118. Glenn R. Simpson, Panel Studying Nominating Process Puts Onus on Bush,
ROLL CALL, Feb. 6, 1992, at 1.
119. See Another Holdup, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1992, at A20.
120. New York State Bar Scores Senate Judiciary for Federal Judge Vacancies,
U.S. Newswire, July 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Usnwr File.
121. See Gail Appleson, U.S. Court Cases Hit Judicial Vacancy Bottleneck, Renter
Libr. Rep., July 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File; Doreen
Carvajal, Awaiting Judgment: A Special Report, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1995, at Al.
122. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
123. See The Quantity of Justice, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1992, at B6.
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B. Bill Clinton's Troubled Tenure
William Jefferson Clinton was widely expected to move quick-
ly to fill Bush's vacancies and leave his administration's stamp
on the federal judiciary.'24 Selected by the American people on
November 7, 1992, after running on a platform to break gridlock
and change politics, Arkansas Governor Clinton had two and
one-half months in Little Rock before taking the presidential
oath of office in which to develop an efficient judicial selection
process.
In January 1993, there were 109 federal judicial vacancies;
one year later, there were 113 empty federal judgeships." As
President Clinton entered the second half of his second year of
office, vacancy rates of over 100 in number continued to plague
both the trial and appellate federal courts.
26
The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts estimates that in
1993 alone, the district court vacancy rate resulted in 109 lost
"judge-years." In summer 1994, more than one out of eight of
our 840 lower court judgeships was empty.' 7 In the summer of
1993, over sixty benches were still vacant, and half of those
vacancies had existed for more than eighteen months. Personnel
and personal problems within the White House have seriously
harmed President Clinton's judicial selection process."
A serious lack of focus at Janet Reno's Justice Department,
described by University of Virginia Professor David O'Brien as
"far more scandalous" than Whitewater,29 has further retard-
ed President Clinton's judge-picking efforts.13° In the summer
of 1993, then-White House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum firmly
asserted that every one of the 120 federal court vacancies would
124. This Author mistakenly expected the Clinton partnership to take assertive
action and develop an efficient process for filling the over 100 judicial positions. See
Victor Wrilliams, Senators Cannot Be Choosers, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1, 1993, at 17.
125. See Status of Article HI Judgeships, THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 1993, at 3.
126. See Clinton Dithers While Federal Bench Shrinks, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1993,
at B6.
127. See Judicial Boxscore, THIRD BRANCH, June 1994, at 9.
128. See William Grady & Linda P. Campbell, Filling Federal Bench Takes a
Back Seat, CHI. TRiB., July 5, 1993, at 2.
129. David M. O'Brien, Beyond Reno's Charisma: Mismanagement at Justice, LA.
TIMES, May 1, 1994, at M2.
130. Id.
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be filled by May or June 1994.131 As of that date, however, over
100 vacancies remained. 132 George Mason University Professor
Michael Krauss recently attempted to explain why President
Clinton has been tardy in making lower court appointments:
"The Clinton Administration doesn't know what kind of people it
wants on the bench. This is a dilemma of being a new liberal or
an old liberal. This is the internal debate that has characterized
the administration."133
Although Professor Krauss's analysis may account for part of
the answer, an equally plausible explanation is that the Admin-
istration simply does not understand the consequences of a dila-
tory appointment schedule.134 The Clinton Administration ap-
pears plagued by a pattern of appointment delinquency.'35 This
pattern is evident in an all areas of the justice system, with va-
cancies existing on the trial and appellate court benches, in
United States Attorneys' offices across the nation, within the
highest ranks of the Justice Department, and even on the Unit"
ed States Sentencing Commission.'36 At the end of President
Clinton's first year in office, Brookings Institution presidential
scholar Stephen Hess commented on Clinton's appointments
record: "He has done very, very badly, no question about it. It
is his major blemish as a presidential manager. It is really
inexplicable."3 '
131. See Deborah Pines, Swift Action on Judges Promised: Nussbaum Vows To
Fill 125 Existing Fed'l Vacancies Inside a Year, N.Y. L.J., June 28, 1993, at 1.
132. Ironically, President Clinton slightly worsened the lower court judicial va-
cancy rate with the promotion of Circuit Judges Ruth Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer
to the high court and the removal of District Judge Louis Freeh to fill the FBrs top
post. See Kristan Metzler, Further Judicial Backlog?; Ginsburg Gain Is D.C. Court's
Loss, WASH. TIMES, June 15, 1993, at B1.
133. Zehren, supra note 111, at AS.
134. See Ted Gest, Clinton's Law: Front and Center, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
July 26, 1993, at 30.
135. See Alan McConaghan, Top Posts Vacant, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1994, at
A7.
136. Al Kamen, Hang-up at Sentencing Panel, WASH. POST, June 1, 1994, at A17.
A reported dispute between Senate Judiciary Committee members Edward Kennedy
and Joseph Biden regarding who should be selected as chairman of the Sentencing
Commission left four positions on the important criminal justice organ vacant for
months. Id.




The appointment neglect pattern also is evident in the way in
which President Clinton has extended George Bush's
nonconstitutional reliance on "senatorial courtesy" as the stan-
dard process for making judicial selections. 3 ' Notwithstanding
his dependence on senatorial selection of judges, President
Clinton has been unable to shorten the time for Senate confir-
mation so as actually to place judges on the bench. Incredibly,
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reports that it pres-
ently takes the political branches an average of 804 days to fill a
single judicial vacancy." 9 It seems fair to ask whether Presi-
dent Clinton, the former constitutional law professor and former
state attorney general, really understands the severe damage
that every week of appointment delay causes the justice system.
In 1994, the Clinton Administration strongly rejected appoint-
ment criticism and challenged the negative characterization of
the Administration's appointment process. Assistant Attorney
General Eleanor Dean Acheson stated: "I absolutely, aggressive-
ly disagree. Critics have no clue as to the process and how in-
credibly important it is to be deliberate." 4 ° Acheson stated
that a "last gasp" effort to announce more nominees would be
made before the end of the then current session of Congress.'
Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick expressed similar sen-
timents when she stated that she had lived up to her confirma-
tion hearing promise to "keep the pipeline full for the Senate
Judiciary Committee."'4
The Administration has received support and praise from
many commentators for its commitment to racial and gender
138. Some states' U.S. Senators make their "selections" personally, while other
states' senators have institutionalized "senatorial courtesy" with formal nominating
commissions. See, e.g., Metzenbaum's Court Blunder, PLAIN DEALER, June 22, 1994,
at B10; John F. Rooney, Senators Eye "Wisconsin Seat' on 7th Circuit, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., June 21, 1994, at 1; Janet Seiberg, Lieberman Seeks Woman for Federal
Bench, CONN. L. TRIB., May 23, 1994, at 8; Bill Voelker, 2 More Judges Added to
Judge List, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Feb. 5, 1994, at B4.
139. See Senior Judges Help District Courts Keep Pace, THIRD BRANCH, May 1994,
at 1.
140. Tony Mauro, "Last Gasp" Scramble To Clear Up Backlog, USA TODAY, June
27, 1994, at A2.
141. Id.
142. Henry J. Reske, Keeping Pace with Judicial Vacancies, A.B.A. J., July 1994,
at 34.
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diversity on the bench.'11 Facing a Republican Senate majority
for the remainder of his term of office, however, President
Clinton will likely face the partisan realities of further difficulty
in the appointment arena.'44 This difficulty could turn into
deadlock if the Republican-controlled Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee delays confirmation action for Clinton nominees to the de-
gree that Democrats did during the last year of the Bush Admin-
istration. Some court scholars are suggesting that the Clinton
Administration may run short of time in its effort to leave a
lasting impression on the federal judiciary before the 1996 presi-
dential election.'4 ' For example, judicial scholar Sheldon
Goldman of the University of Massachusetts stated: "They have
to act very quickly. I mean now. The confirmation window is
closing fast."'
Agreeing with the catch-up analysis, Virginia Professor David
O'Brien commented: "The Clinton team thought they would get
to judges in the second term. They were confident of reelection.
Now they are playing catch-up."'47 Although his comments are
framed in the context of the present partisan dynamic, Professor
O'Brien has accurately calculated the high cost to justice of both
nomination delay and confirmation deadlock: "Nationally, ap-
peals in the federal appellate courts jumped 24% between 1989-
93. In the district courts, civil filings have increased 9% over the
last three years. Leaving aside the caseload of criminal cases, a
diminished federal bench will further delay civil suits currently
pending, due to crowded dockets." 4'
143. See Carl Tobias, Keeping the Covenant on the Federal Courts, 47 SMU L.
REV. 1861, 1866-72 (1994).
144. See Neil A. Lewis, A Republican Senator Forces the Administration To Re-
think its Strategy on Judicial Appointments, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1994, at B7.
145. See Robert Marquand, Clinton Races To Put His Stamp on the Judiciary,
Ci4RISrIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 7, 1995, at 1.
146. Id.
147. Id.




C. Senate Malfeasance: Confirmation Delay and Televised
Circus Acts
During the past dozen years, the United States Senate, as
an institution, has demonstrated an unparalleled lack of appre-
ciation for its solemn constitutional duties regarding judicial
appointment confirmation. At its root, this problem stems from
a misunderstanding of the relatively limited role the Senate
was designed to play in the appointments process and the
bipartisan lack of strong executive leadership in correcting the
misunderstanding.
1. Senate Confirmation Delay
Even if a full slate of President Clinton's judicial nominations
were immediately forthcoming, our national justice system will
continue to suffer if the Clinton Administration is not forceful in
demanding swift and certain confirmation action from the Sen-
ate. For three years, the Senate has continued the same
sluggish confirmation process for Clinton's nominees that it
demonstrated during the Bush years, notwithstanding the fact
that, for two of those years, both the Senate majority and Execu-
tive were of the same political party. The Senate has delayed
confirmation action on dozens of President Clinton's judicial and
justice system nominations. These delays must be analyzed as
an institutional problem-one that raises serious separation of
powers issues.
A startling example of this institutional retardation of the
appointment process can be seen in Yale Law School Dean
Guido Calabresi's nomination to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.5 ° Dean Calabresi, a legal scholar and
teacher of sterling reputation, a lawyer of impeccable creden-
tials, and an individual of the warmest, most engaging tempera-
ment, was nominated by Yale law alumnus Bill Clinton in Feb-
149. Federal judicial gridlock recently has been blamed in part for the imbalance
and bias in jury selection. See Joseph P. Fried, Bias Charged in Selection of U.S.
Juries, N.Y. TIMEs, June 2, 1994, at Bi.
150. See Todd S. Purdum, Yale Law Dean Is Nominated to 2d Circuit Appeals
Court, N.Y. TIAIEs, Feb. 10, 1994, at B7.
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ruary 1994 to the understaffed Second Circuit.151 Hearings
were conducted shortly before the Senate took its Fourth of July,
1994 recess; 52 however, definitive action was not taken on the
nomination until late July 1994.' For six months, the Second
Circuit was deprived of the needed skills of Judge Calabresi; for
six months, Second Circuit justice was further delayed to the
tangible detriment of anxious litigants. Incredibly, there was no
"problem" with Dean Calabresi's nomination. The nation and the
Second Circuit are most fortunate to have Guido Calabresi on
the important Second Circuit, where some of the nation's great-
est jurists have served-Learned Hand, Jerome Frank, and
Augustus Hand, to name only a few.
The Calabresi appointment detainment is an excellent exam-
ple of institutionalized Senate confirmation delay.' It also sig-
nifies a substantial lost opportunity for President Clinton-that
is, the opportunity to have made a recess appointment of Judge
Calabresi on July 4, 1994. To the Senate and the President, a
six-month confirmation delay apparently constitutes a harmless
appointment hold-up, even considering that each week of Senate
confirmation inaction results in months of lost judge time. The
Senate must have perceived as a sign of political frailty Presi-
dent Clinton's failure to demand immediate confirmation from a
Democrat-controlled Senate or, alternatively, to have recess-
appointed Judge Calabresi.'55
151. Id.
152. David Lightman, Yale Dean Wins Praise at Hearing, HARTFORD COURANT,
June 30, 1994, at A4.
153. Today's News, N.Y. L.J., July 20, 1994, at 1.
154. See Who Will Inherit the Colonial Case fr5om Cabranes?; Action on Cabranes
and Calabresi Expected Soon, CONN. L. TRIB., June 13, 1994, at 1.
155. Another lost recess appointment opportunity for President Clinton involved
his nominee to head the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). Although the nomina-
tion was made in June 1993, no action was taken by the Senate Banking Committee
or the full Senate before the Senate recessed at the end of the first session of the
103d Congress. The nominee specially requested President Clinton to appoint him
during the Senate recess; President Clinton, however, acting through Deputy Trea-
sury Secretary Roger Altman, informed the nominee that a recess appointment was
"not available." Jerry Knight, Tate Denies Reports of Withdrawal, WASH. POST, Nov.
26, 1993, at B12. Roger Altman thus was forced to continue to serve as temporary
head of the RTC during its politically charged investigation of a failed Arkansas
savings and loan institution. Ironically, the Senate's confirmation inaction and Presi-
dent Clinton's failure to recess-appoint an RTC chief forced a dual politi-
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In a more recent demonstration of Senate confirmation delay,
Montana Senator Conrad Burns has effectively put a "hold" on
all district and appellate judicial confirmations related to the
Ninth Circuit until the Congress splits the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit into two separate circuits.'56 A pending
bill introduced by Senator Burns and Washington Senator Slade
Gorton renews an old debate'57 regarding the size, unmanage-
able caseload, and "California slant" of the Ninth Circuit; if
enacted, the legislation would create a Twelfth Circuit, com-
posed of Montana, Idaho, Oregon, Washington, and Alaska.'58
Senator Burns pledged to stop all confirmation action for Ninth
Circuit judgeships until "this miscarriage of justice is correct-
ed";"'59 during the summer of 1995, two Clinton nominees for
appellate judgeships languished as a consequence. 6 °
2. Confirmation Circus: Reviewing Stephen Carter's
Confirmation Mess: Cleaning Up the Federal Appointments
Process
In addition to its institutional torpor in making confirmation
decisions, the Senate has come under increasing criticism for
producing nationally televised "confirmation circuses" worthy of
P.T. Barnum.'6' In these senatorial circuses, select nominees
cal/regulatory role for Altman-a role that exploded into a major controversy and set
the stage for yet another televised Senate circus. Altman Defends His Actions on
Whitewater, BNA Banking Daily, Aug. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Bnabd File.
156. Ninth Circuit Nominations on Hold, THIRD BRANcH, June 1995, at 8.
157. For a history of the movement to split the Ninth Circuit, see BAKER, supra
note 29, at 74-99.
158. Willam D. Murray, Domestic News, UPI, Aug. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, UPI File; see Richard C. Reuben, 'Split Decision' Pending in Congress,
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 34.
159. Id. Senator Burns stated: "It's probably no coincidence that the most vocal
critics of splitting the 9th Circuit are the California judges and lawyers who stand
to lose their huge, powerful fiefdoms. These people control the legal destiny of one-
fifth of the population of the United States, and their decisions are consistently out
of touch with many of the people they are suppose [sic] to serve." Id.; see also Court
Watch; Partisan Game, LA. TIMES, June 23, 1995, at B8 (criticizing Senator Burns's
obstructionist tactics).
160. Howard Mintz, Time of the Essence for Clinton's Judicial Nominee, RECORD-
ER, Aug. 1, 1995, at 1.
161. See, e.g., Sidney Blumenthal, Adventures in Babysitting, NEW YORKER, Feb.
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are expected to perform satisfactorily in three rings: juggling
serious issues of law and scholarship, dodging innuendo knives
of personal attack, and walking the judicial/executive indepen-
dence tightrope. These performances occur while nominees at-
tempt to be forthcoming during exhaustive, often repetitive, and
sometimes inane questioning.
162
Yale law professor Stephen Carter extensively catalogs and
vividly describes various such performances (including Zoe
Baird's, Clarence Thomas's, and Robert Bork's) in his most re-
cent book,'63 The Confirmation Mess: Cleaning Up the Federal
Appointments Process. In the Preface, Professor Carter states:
[W]e have reached in our confirmation processes a
strange pass at which, once we decide to oppose a nominee,
any argument will do. Nobody is interested in playing by a
fair set of rules that supersede the cause of the moment;
still less do many people seem to care how much right and
left have come to resemble each other in the gleeful and
reckless distortions that characterize the efforts to defeat
challenged nominations. All that seems to matter is the end
result: if the demonized nominee loses, all that has gone
before is justified."4
The book describes graphically the deterioration of the confirma-
tion process and how the contemporary search for evidence of a
nominee's "disqualification" too often replaces consideration of
the nominee's substantive "qualifications." Professor Carter
relates how the somber consent responsibility of the upper house
of Congress is and has been transformed into "a full-blown na-
tional extravaganza"'65 and how confirmation "strategy (espe-
cially public relations strategy) [has become] far more important
15, 1993, at 53; Stuart Taylor, Inside the Whirlwind, AM. LAW., Mar. 1993, at 64.
162. See ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION
SHOOK AMERICA (1989); TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITOL GAMES:
CLARENCE THOMAS, ANITA HILL, AND THE STORY OF A SUPREME COURT NOMINATION
(1992).
163. Professor Carter's previous works include The Culture of Disbelief and Reflec-
tions of an Affirmative Action Baby.
164. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS ix (1994).
165. Id. at 17.
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than issues or qualifications."'66
The work paints a disturbing picture of the confirmation pro-
cess. Professor Carter argues that the Senate too rarely votes on
policy issues and too often "votes the nation's moral fervor...
[and] hold[s] a referenda [sic] on how bad a person the nominee
is."'67 He offers a number of proposed structural reforms to im-
prove the present process but rejects each, suggesting that the
only proper solution is "that we make important changes in our
national mood."'68 In offering that perplexing solution, Profes-
sor Carter diagnoses the real and only substantial problem as
stemming from "our attitudes-the way we think about public
service in general, and the Supreme Court in particular."'69
The book is surprisingly disappointing in its historical and
contemporary analysis of constitutional confirmation con-
cerns. 70  Central to the book's deficiency 7' is Professor
Carter's substantial overstatement of the role the Senate should
play in the appointment process 72 and his lack of appreciation
for the constitutional authority of the executive branch in select-
ing and commissioning appointees.'73 Professor Carter argues
that "closer Senate scrutiny of as many nominees as possible
would plainly be a good thing, for the reassertion of the legisla-
tive prerogative moves us closer to the balance of power that the
Founders expected." 74 Indeed, he even criticizes the "tradition
of deference," by which a President selects his own administra-
166. Id. at 14.
167. Id. at 30.
168. Id. at 22.
169. Id. at 206.
170. For a range of popular reviews of the work, see Ross K. Baker, The Con-
firmation Mess, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1994, at 59; Jeffrey Rosen, Prosecuting the
Nominees, WASH. POST, June 19, 1994, at Xll; Cass R. Sunstein, Has the Nominee
Ever Sinned, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1994, § 7 (Book Review), at 9.
171. Professor Carter also fails to acknowledge efforts by former Senate Judicia-
ry Committee Chairman Joseph Biden to reform the confirmation process by, for
example, holding at least one closed hearing for each Supreme Court nominee to
review confidential FBI information and air any concerns that are likely to be
sensationalized.
172. Unfortunately, Professor Carter is in the mainstream of the legal academy in
making such an overestimation. See, e.g., David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The
Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491 (1992).
173. CARTER, supra note 164, at 33.
174. Id. at 37.
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tion team."
Professor Carter stresses the political importance of a
President's support for a nominee, yet a fundamental deprecia-
tion of the President's constitutional role in appointments is
clear in his textual analysis and his treatment of recommended
solutions for cleaning up the mess. 17 Carter's discussion of the
"nanny problem" in the context of Zoe Baird's confirmation deba-
cle further demonstrates his failure to appreciate the authority
of the Executive in executing appointments:
Thus, just two days after his inauguration, Clinton was
forced to withdraw Baird's nomination. One form or another
of this nanny problem would over the next few months fell
another potential attorney general, a possible Supreme Court
nominee, and... lots of other people as well, who suddenly
found themselves crossed off the lists for the posts they
thought were theirs.
177
Of course, it was not a "nanny problem" or the "disqualification"
phenomenon that deprived the nation of Zoe Baird's excellent
legal mind and superior administrative abilities; in truth, Bill
Clinton was not "forced to withdraw" Zoe Baird as a nominee to
head the Justice Department. Instead, President Clinton, on
advice of select senators and with an ear cocked to the daily
chatter of radio talk shows, purposely chose to jettison his care-
fully selected nominee. 17 The result of this decision was monu-
mental: during the critical first weeks of his presidency,
Clinton's Administration had to invest more precious time
vetting another nominee, and the Justice Department remained
without a leader. The very department of government that plays
an integral role in the selection and appointment of many other
executive and justice system officers languished during this
time.
The new President attempted to avoid Senate conflict and
175. Id. at 31-37.
176. Id. at 187-206.
177. Id. at 7.
178. See Ruth Marcus & Michael Isikoff, Clinton Withdraws Baird's Justice Nomi-
nation, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1993, at Al; Diane Rehm, Tower of Babel, WASH.
POST, Sept. 11, 1994, at C1.
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public controversy rather than defend Zoe Baird by both publicly
and privately demanding immediate Senate confirmation of his
choice for attorney general. Analogous to the mistake of running
from the schoolyard bully on the first day of class, the Clinton
Administration, by that act of capitulation, guaranteed the de-
velopment of what Clinton's first chief of staff, Mack McLarty,
would come to describe as "confirmation hell."' 9
Indeed, later that spring, Lani Guinier, nominated as Assistant
Attorney General for Civil Rights, became yet another victim of
the Clinton Administration's conflict avoidance problem. 8 ° With
this nomination, as Professor Carter details, the Administration
did not even allow the victim to respond to maligning critics' 8 '
or, more generally, to express her "disappointment."
182
Contrary to Professor Carter's curious thesis, the confirmation
mess will not be remedied by changes in "our attitudes" or "our
national mood." Professor Carter states that "we should balance
what good the candidate might do when serving in the position
against the evil the putatively 'disqualifying' factor repre-
sents.""8 The book does not explicitly define who is being ref-
erenced by the repetitive use of the terms "our" and "we." Profes-
sor Carter apparently desires, however, to reform society-at-
large. Unfortunately, the harsh societal reality is that a signifi-
cantly large minority of the American public-at-large will contin-
ue to find perverse pleasure in playing the "disqualification"
game.
84
179. CARTER, supra note 164, at xi. For several months before resigning as chief
of staff, McLarty discussed creating a bipartisan group to explore confirmation pro-
cess changes, including ending "leaks" by Senate staffers. See Taking the Fire Out of
Confirmation Hell, BUS. WK., Dec. 6, 1993, at 57.
180. One commentator, reviewing Bob Woodward's The Agenda: Inside the Clinton
White House, has described this as more a personal problem of Bill Clinton's than a
problem with the Administration. See Andrew Sullivan, All the President's Problems,
N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1994, § 7 (Book Review), at 2, 11 ("The psychological origins of
this intellectual blindness are not hard to discern. The Bill Clinton Mr. Woodward
portrays is pathologically averse to real conflict.").
181. See Gwen If61, The Guinier Battle: Anatomy of the Failure To Confirm a
Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1993, at 9.
182. Professor Guinier has proved that she was ready, willing, and able to de-
fend herself and her ideas, as demonstrated by her 1994 book, The Tyranny of the
Majority.
183. CARTER, supra note 164, at 177-78.
184. The recent all day, every day "news" coverage of the O.J. Simpson criminal
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Even if a nominal moral rebalancing of some societal attitudes
were possible, the constitutional and political reality is that only
genuine and forceful presidential leadership, designed to reas-
sert the Executive's full constitutional authority in making both
traditional and recess appointments, will clean up the mess and
reduce confirmation delay."' In 1995, President Clinton's trou-
bled nomination"8 6 and the Senate's procedural defeat of Dr.
Henry Foster for U.S. Surgeon General'87 served as an excel-
lent example of the need for assertive executive energy in selec-
tion, confirmation, and appointment.' The President must
take the process of selecting judicial and executive nominees
quite seriously and must then be prepared to fight for Senate
confirmation or exercise recess appointment authority.
3. Executive Energy To Clean Up the Mess
Professor Carter's work fits well in the mainstream of aca-
demic scholarship in its failure to understand the different roles
of the Executive and Senate in making judicial selections and
appointments. 8 9 This scholarship often misinterprets and ne-
investigation and judicial proceedings is testimony to the media's willingness to feed
that perversity. This coverage included live reporting and endless commentary, in-
cluding murder scene investigations, the nationwide search, the freeway pursuit, end-
less prosecution and defense news conferences, and the months-long trial.
185. For articles favoring a strong executive appointment interpretation of the
Constitution, see Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 672 (1989); W. Bradford Reynolds, Revisiting the Confirmation Process Only
To Find It in the Same State of Disrepair, 75 JUDICATURE 192 (1992); W. Bradford
Reynolds, The Confirmation Process: Too Much Advice and Too Little Consent, 75 JU-
DICATURE 80 (1991).
186. See Gloria Borger, The Foster Nomination: Another Revelation, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Feb. 20, 1995, at 10; Doctor Foster Gets in Trouble, ECONOMIST, Feb.
11, 1995, at 27.
187. See Francis X. Clines, Clinton's Choice for Top Doctor Is Rebuffed by a Vote
in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1995, at Al; Dr. Foster and Political Malpractice,
CHI. TRIB., June 23, 1995, at 20; Jerry Gray, Senate Dooms a Vote for Surgeon Gen-
eral, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1995, at A20.
188. Advise, Consent, Destroy, ECONOMIST, July 1, 1995, at 18.
189. See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 172, at 1491; see also Albert P. Melone,
The Senate's Confirmation Role in Supreme Court Nominations and the Politics of
Ideology Versus Impartiality, 75 JUDICATURE 68, 69 (1991) (stating "it is my view
that senators may reasonably inquire into and base their final decision to confirm or
reject . . . on factors other than the nominees' personal and professional qualifica-
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glects the history of the Constitution by articulating a strong
Senate role in the appointment process. 90 The mainstream re-
peats the quite common, but incorrect, description of the singu-
lar "Appointments Clause" of the Constitution; there are in fact
two appointments clauses in Article II, Section 2. As noted
above, the Framers wisely foresaw the dangers of vacant judicial
benches and executive positions due to Senate confirmation
deadlock, delays, or neglect, and sought to avoid those dangers
by providing for an alternative appointments process-recess
appointments.
Many fine jurists have come to the bench through the recess
appointment process, including Earl Warren, Thurgood Mar-
shall, and William Brennan. Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower
and John F. Kennedy each readily used the recess appointment
authority in filling judicial vacancies.191 Indeed, President Ken-
nedy made twenty-two percent of his judicial appointments by
this extraordinary appointment method, and every one of his
recess appointments eventually received a permanent commis-
sion.'92 Although the recess appointee is a truly temporary
judge,'93 serving no more than two years, and although such
an appointment is properly only an alternative to traditional
nomination and confirmation, the selective exercise of this exec-
utive constitutional authority would serve to rebalance the ap-
pointment process. 94
tions"); Albert P. Melone et al., Too Little Advice, Senatorial Responsibility and Con-
firmation Politics, 75 JUDICATURE 187 (1992) (asserting that "[t]he Framers intended
a shared responsibility between the executive and legislative branch that anticipates
inter-branch cooperation"). For a research bibliography of past commentary on the
Senate confirmation role, see Michael J. Slinger et al., The Senate Power of Advice
and Consent of Judicial Appointments: An Annotated Research Bibliography, 64 NO-
TRE DAME L. REV. 106 (1989).
190. While quoting Alexander Hamilton's writings in The Federalist for the prop-
osition that "advise and consent" serves to restrain the Executive, Professor Carter
neglects to reference or discuss Hamilton's other Federalist writings, which severely
circumscribe the Senate's role in selection and confirmation. See CARTER, supra note
164, at 32-33.
191. See HAROLD CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 114-15
(1972).
192. Id. at 114-17.
193. For an excellent article challenging recess appointment of judges, see Virgin-
ia L. Richards, Temporary Appointments to the Federal Judiciary: Article 11 Judges?,
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 702 (1985).
194. President Clinton surprised many in making two executive branch recess ap-
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The disappointing Confirmation Mess states that the
Constitution's "entire discussion" of the nomination and confir-
mation process derives from Article II, Section 2."' Professor
Carter, however, neglects to quote, discuss, or even reference the
Recess Appointment Clause of that very section, which gives the
President total authority in commissioning temporary appoint-
ments. Professor Carter's failure to either mention or discuss the
President's Article II, Section 2, Clause 3 recess appointment
power is somewhat ironic. Carter, who served as a law clerk for
Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall, provides a lengthy discus-
sion of the 1967 confirmation hearings to which then-Solicitor
General Marshall was subjected when nominated by President
Lyndon Johnson to the Supreme Court.'96 The book fails even
to note the more important and most instructive example of
Thurgood Marshall's earlier initial appointment to the United
States Court of Appeals by President Kennedy, who exercised
his authority under the Recess Appointment Clause.'97 This
initial exercise of political will by President Kennedy positioned
Circuit Judge Marshall for his subsequent appointments as
Solicitor General and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
Although the Senate confirmation mess hinders the federal
appointments process, the root of the problem is the
Executive's lack of political will to exercise appointment re-
sponsibilities assertively. Ultimately, only a strong and deter-
mined President can clean up the appointment process by fully
honoring his or her constitutional appointment responsibilities.
Encountering such strong executive energy, the Senate will
have to cancel future performances of the circus, restore digni-
ty to the confirmation processes, and, simply, decide whether,
as Hamilton framed the process, to "ratify or reject" presiden-
tial selections. 9"
pointments in late 1994. See Al Kamen, Recess Maneuver Raises Eyebrows, WASH.
POST, Jan. 6, 1995, at A19.
195. CARTER, supra note 164, at 11-12.
196. See id. at 3-5, 62-65, 128-32, 161.
197. President Kennedy's use of the recess appointment process was effective in
circumventing Senate resistance to the NAACP attorney's nomination. See CARL T.
ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF JUSTICE THURGOOD MAR-
SHALL 279-86 (1993).
198. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 387 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Krammick ed.,
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C. Judicial Pleas for Appointment Responsibility
Perhaps neither recent administrations nor Senate majorities
understand the damage that their appointment irresponsibility
is having on the national justice system. Reports of civil litigants
suffering from long delays occasioned by judicial vacancies and
overloaded dockets are all too common. Chief Judge Thomas
Platt of the Eastern District of New York, whose busy federal
jurisdiction struggled for more than one year to process cases
despite four vacant judgeships, recently described his court's
backlog of 1,200 civil cases as not atypical, stating: "The old
maxim-justice delayed is justice denied-still remains true
today.'
199
During an April 1994 meeting of the Connecticut Bar Associa-
tion, U.S. District Judge Alan Nevas specifically challenged that
state's legal profession to pressure the political branches to fill
aggressively federal judicial vacancies existing in Connecticut,
noting that one such judgeship had been vacant for four years.
The trial judge informed the attorneys that the state's federal
district courts had almost 4,000 pending civil cases and over 200
pending criminal cases, and that Connecticut's 657 civil cases
per active judge ratio was the highest in the nation.00 U.S.
District Judge T.F. Gilroy Daly also asked those lawyers attend-
ing the Connecticut bar meeting to help pressure the state's U.S.
1987). It is possible that the Senate would refuse confirmation to nonperforming
nominees and, thus, further stalemate the appointment process. As Professor Carter
notes, Senator Arlen Specter was quite upset by Ruth Bader Ginsburg's refusal to
tell the Judiciary Committee her views on the death penalty during her confirmation
hearing for appointment to the Supreme Court. See CARTER, supra note 164, at 54.
Indeed, Senator Specter warned that someday the Senate would "rear up on its hind
legs" and reject a nominee who is nonresponsive to questions about constitutional
theory. Id.
Such a threatened exhibition of the Senate indicates the present imbalance in
the appointment process. In the absence of calculated, demonstrated presidential
leadership, one need only stay tuned to radio talk shows, and, if Nielsen ratings
support, to live, "gavel-to-gavel" television coverage of Senate hearings, to enjoy the
greatest shows on earth, or at least on Capitol Hill.
199. Zehren, supra note 111, at AS.
200. See Janet Seiberg, "You Have Not Done Anything," CONN. L. TRIB., Apr. 25,
1994, at 1. Judge Nevas stated: "The problem is reaching crisis proportions. . . You
need to take an active concerted effort to help us because if you don't, we will
drown and we will take you down with us." Id.
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Senators to fill the empty judgeships, noting that the vacancies
had resulted in eight years of lost judge time." 1
As the remarks of Judges Platt and Nevas suggest, the influ-
ential Second Circuit has the largest number of judicial vacan-
cies in the nation (with some judgeships having been empty
since 1990). Indeed, the chief judge of the Second Circuit, Jon 0.
Newman, is among the foremost jurists demanding appointment
action. In a June 1994 speech before the Judicial Conference of
the Second Circuit, Chief Judge Newman stated: "The number of
vacancies is unacceptably high. The duration of these vacancies
is absolutely disgraceful."" 2 In a startling proposition, and one
reflective of how serious the vacancy problem has become, Chief
Judge Newman proposed a twenty-eighth amendment to the
Constitution that would allow judicial appointments to be made
by the courts when positions are vacant for more than one year.
The appellate jurist bluntly stated to the President and Con-
gress: "Either face up to your joint constitutional responsibility
to nominate and confirm federal judges within a reasonable time
limit or authorise some other mechanism to take action when,
for whatever reasons, you find yourselves unable to do so."2 3
Acknowledging that "the federal judiciary is fast approaching
a crisis point,"0 4 Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Clifford Wallace
recently suggested the empanelment of a national conference,
composed of representatives of the three branches of govern-
ment, to define the mission of the federal courts more clearly. In
an ABA Journal article proposing the national conference, Chief
Judge Wallace specifically questioned whether the political
branches even consider the impact of their political action and
inaction on the health of the federal courts.2 °5
Surely these judicial pleas for full staffing of our federal
201. Id. Judge Daly termed the appointment delay as "an insult to the bar of this
court" and concluded: "I just want to leave you with an urgent request that you
treat this with the highest priority." Id.
202. Al Karmen, Judicial Vacancies Spur Amendment Call, WASH. POST, June 20,
1994, at A13.
203. Gail Appleson, Judge Says Courts, Not Congress, Should Fill Posts, Reuters
World Serv., June 17, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.




courts will be heard eventually. More problematic, however, is
the fact that Congress, the President, and most of the federal
judiciary have failed to recognize that a significant expansion
and fundamental restructuring of the federal judicial system is
the solution needed to ensure that the interests of all federal
litigants can be met into the next century.
206
IV. CONTEMPORARY FEDERAL JUSTICE: ABRIDGED, RATIONED,
DELAYED, AND DENIED
A. Civil Case Overload and Criminal Case Avalanche
As noted in Part I, civil case filings have increased substan-
tially over the last three decades in both our federal trial and
appellate courts.2 07 Between 1980 and 1990, criminal drug
prosecutions increased by 300% in the district courts and seven-
ty-five percent in the courts of appeals. 28 More recently, an
avalanche of all types of criminal prosecutions and appeals has
virtually buried federal court dockets.0 9 In each of statistical
years 1992 and 1993, federal prosecutors filed almost 50,000
criminal cases in district courts, an increase of sixty-seven per-
cent since 1980;21 criminal appeals exceeded 10,000, an in-
crease of 400% since 1988.211
Pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act,212 our nation's judges
must give priority to criminal cases and, thus, have no alterna-
tive but to postpone habitually most civil litigation to make way
for criminal adjudications. 2  Resulting civil justice delays espe-
206. For a variety of viewpoints on the future of the federal courts, see Sympo-
sium on Judicial Administration, 14 MiSS. C. L. REV. 193 (1994).
207. See Federal Court Filings Rise Across the Board, THIRD BRANcH, Feb. 1993,
at 1. In fiscal year 1992, filings in every major area of the federal judiciary in-
creased. Civil trial filings increased nine percent, all appellate case filings increased
nine percent, and bankruptcy appeals filings increased 28%. Id.
208. Federal Courts Register Decade of Record Growth, THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1991,
at 3.
209. Tracy Thompson, Drug Case Avalanche Buries Federal Courts, WASH. POST,
Dec. 24, 1990, at Al.
210. See 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10; 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
10.
211. See STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES, supra note 11, at 27.
212. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1994).
213. See Charles F. Williams, Making a Federal Case of More Crimes Leaves
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cially harm American businesses, which must struggle to com-
pete in an increasingly competitive global market.214 Foreign
trading partners become wary of doing business in a litigious
nation that does not even provide adequate judicial fora for the
resolution of commercial legal disputes.21 Hard economic times
during the early 1990s propelled annual bankruptcy court filings
to one million in number, and bankruptcy appeals increased by
thirty percent.216 Although the total number of initial bank-
ruptcy court filings decreased mid-decade, recent statistics show
bankruptcy filings are on the rise. 17 In general, the complexity
of bankruptcy cases filed has increased significantly; multifari-
ous Chapter 11 cases now consume substantial resources at trial
and on appeal.21
This breakdown of national justice injures civil litigants who
have neither the resources nor the time to play the waiting
game.219 Consider the case of one such litigant, Mr. Kenneth
Krazier, who collapsed and died inside the Buffalo federal court-
house, after waiting eleven years for his age discrimination suit
to go to trial.2 Mr. Krazier's widow remains convinced that
the "bitter, nerve wracking ordeal of waiting for the trial" result-
Judges Skeptical, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 24, 1994, at 1.
214. Sheldon H. Elsen, Why Business Can't Get Its Day in Court, FORTUNE, Apr.
22, 1991, at 251.
215. In the internationally important jurisdiction of the Southern District of New
York, caseload delays have had an especially harmful impact. See Deborah Pines,
New Judges To Attack Federal Civil Backlog, N.Y. L.J., June 23, 1994, at 1.
216. See Miles Magiure, Avalanche of Cases Crushes Judges, WASH. TIMES, June
27, 1991, at C1. In one year, from 1992 to 1993, Connecticut's U.S. Bankruptcy
Courts experienced a 700% increase in the filing of bankruptcy petitions, and time-
consuming adversarial proceedings increased 150%. Presently, individual bankruptcy
case resolutions average 32 months. See 1993 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECOND CIR-
CUIT, supra note 22.
217. Bankruptcy Filings Rise in Second Quarter of FY 95, THIRD BRANCH, July
1995, at 12.
218. See Elaine Song, Bankruptcy Burdens Weigh Heavily on District's Courts,
CONN. L. TRIB., Mar. 27, 1995, at 7.
219. See Allyson L. Moore, U.S. Courts Still Crowded After All These Years, N.J.
L.J., Apr. 25, 1991, at 1.
220. Dan Herbeck, Huge Backlog of Federal Cases Frustrates All Parties Involved
Sharp Increase In Criminal Trials, Shortage of Staff in Courts Offer Little Hope of
Relief to Clogged System, BUFF. NEWS, Mar. 27, 1993, at 1.
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ed in her husband's death."2 Civil litigators now commonly
hear a federal trial judge state: "To tell you the truth, I don't
know when I will be able to try your case." Tragically, as in the
case of the late Kenneth Krazier, litigants bear the ultimate
burden and final cost of court delay.
Ironically, the much-praised 1991 Civil Rights Act222 and the
1992 Americans With Disabilities Act are of little value to
injured plaintiffs, who can not afford to wait years for federal
justice. Nevertheless, such civil litigants continue to seek sanc-
tuary in our national courthouses in the belief that they will
receive timely justice. In fact, in 1992 and 1993 combined, feder-
al civil rights case filings escalated by twenty-one percent.224
The impact of increased criminal prosecutions on civil litigation
is particularly detrimental to civil litigants in our nation's most
overcrowded and understaffed federal court jurisdictions. 2' By
increasing criminal prosecutions, without providing the judicial
resources to provide for fair trials, the political branches also
dramatically increase the danger that federal criminal defen-
dants will not receive the criminal process and criminal justice
due them under the American system of justice.
B. Congressional Denial
The federal court system not only has to deal with the case-
load consequences of expansive national legislation and under-
staffed benches. It also must struggle with irresponsible fiman-
cial projections" and budget cuts2 7 by Congress, and crucial
221. Id.
222. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
223. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
224. See 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10; 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
10.
225. For a recent empirical study of civil delay, see Kim Dayton, Judicial Vacan-
cies and Delay in the Federal Courts: An Empirical Evaluation, 67 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 757 (1993).
226. See Eva M. Rodriguez, Federal Judiciary Frustrated with Budget Appropria-
tions; Bickering Over Indigent Defense, Increasing Caseload, RECORDER, June 22,
1994, at 1.
227. Cf. ABA Report Cites Funding Crisis in Justice System, THIRD BRANCH, Sept.
1992, at 2 (discussing the effects of budgetary constraints on the federal and state
court systems).
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reductions in needed spending.2' In June 1994, the House Ap-
propriations Committee cut more than $210 million from the
judiciary's modest budget request for fiscal year 1995.' 9 Most
problematic and ironic, as Congress finalized details of the 1994
Violent Crime Control Act, ° the House appropriated $30 mil-
lion less for defender services than for fiscal year 1994Y
This action continued a four-year pattern of judicial budget
cuts, which hit defender services especially hardy 2 The 102d
Congress cut almost $400 million from the judiciary's 1993 bud-
getary request, leaving the judicial system with $200 million
less than its 1992 allocation.3 The judiciary's newsletter, The
Third Branch, reported: "Congress handed the Judiciary its
leanest budget in recent years, funding the judicial branch at
about $200 million below the amount needed just to stay even
with the services provided in fiscal year 1992.""2 In 1993, the
court system repeatedly was forced to go to Congress, hat in
hand, begging for supplemental monies to pay for Criminal Jus-
tice Act defense attorneys and civil jurors and to avoid trial
delays and dismissals of criminal prosecutions.' As the ABA
228. See Judicial Conference Approves Cost-Cutting Measures, THIRD BRANCH, Apr.
1993, at 1; Judiciary Faces Broad Spending Reductions, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1993,
at 1.
229. See Budget Passed by House Falls Short of Judiciary's FY 95 Needs, THIRD
BRANCH, July 1994, at 1, 2 [hereinafter Budget Passed by House].
230. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 20, 21, 26, 28, 31, 42
U.S.C.).
231. Budget Passed by House, supra note 229, at 2.
232. See Eva M. Rodriguez, Budget Crunch Said To Imperil Civil Juy Trials, LE-
GAL TIMES, Apr. 5, 1993, at 1.
233. Judiciary Appeals Budget to Congress, THIRD BRANCH, Sept. 1992, at 1.
234. 102nd Congress Adjourns: Results Are a Mixed Bag for the Judiciary, THIRD
BRANCH, Oct. 1992, at 1.
235. In his 1992 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, Chief Justice
Relmquist referred to the budget shorting as one area of significant concern for the
judiciary and forcefully articulated the results of congressional malfeasance in financ-
ing the national court system:
Judiciary funding levels for fiscal year 1993 fall well short of our predict-
ed needs, and will not even fund the same level of services provided in
1992. Although the judiciary will try to do more with less by eliminating
nonessential expenditures, the current state of the budget may force us
to reduce services to the public. The queue for civil litigation could get




For the third year in a row, the federal judiciary has
found itself running out of cash and begging Congress
for millions in supplemental appropriations. While the
situation is by now familiar, and if past is prologue, the
shortfall will likely be made up by Congress, a disturb-
ing pattern has emerged. With each year, the shortfall
not only grows larger but also occurs sooner."
Such cuts from the judiciary's funding have direct effects: it
was estimated that the 1993 cuts would result in the elimination
of as many as 1000 existing staff positions in the judiciary's
probation, pretrial, and clerks' offices for the 1995 fiscal
yearY7 The cuts also impair the judiciary's "abilit[y] to super-
vise criminal offenders who are on probation." 8
In addition to failing to fund the national court system ade-
quately, Congress remains reticent about the general structural
breakdown of federal civil and criminal justice. Congress, it
appears, remains in denial about the extent of the judiciary's
caseload problem and the consequent harm suffered by
litigants." 9 As it cut the judiciary's 1995 budget, the House of
Representatives continued work on a proposed "Judicial Im-
provements Act." -4° The title of the Act was deceiving. The Act
postponed, and worthwhile pretrial services programs may have to be
curtailed. Payments for jurors and defender services will again fall short,
absent supplemental funding. Finally, although we appreciate the 35 new
bankruptcy judgeships Congress provided, we have no funds to bring
these judges aboard.
WILLIAM REHNQUIST, 1992 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY.
236. Henry J. Reske, Federal Courts' Budget Blues, A.B.A. J., June 1993, at 20.
237. John F. Rooney, House Trims Federal Judiciary's Budget Request, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., June 30, 1994, at 1.
238. Id.
239. Congress's investigatory arm has even criticized the courts for undertaking
long-range planning for court and office space. The General Accounting Office re-
leased a "damning" report, in which it charged that the judiciary's plans overesti-
mated the judiciary's physical space needs by 16%. Testifying before Congress, Ger-
ald Thacker of the Administrative Office responded to the report, asserting that the
judiciary had underestimated court space needs by at least 15% and explaining that
the courts presently were understaffed by 3100 positions. See Henry J. Reske, Build-
ing Plan Challenged, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1994, at 29.
240. Actually, the Act was drafted by the Judicial Conference and submitted as
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actually would do very little to attempt truly to improve the
federal court system; 241 instead, it seeks only to patch up the
overworked system.242 An especially problematic provision
would authorize Article I magistrates to conduct certain criminal
trials without the defendant's consent or the defendant's waiver
of rights to trial before an Article III judge.243 In attemptiug to
ease the criminal caseload of Article III judges by eliminating
the defendant's option of insisting on an Article III judge for
petty offenses and allowing defendants to orally consent to hav-
ing magistrates conduct their misdemeanor trials,2" Congress
avoids squarely addressing the need for additional judges.
Not surprisingly, the proposed legislation makes a renewed
effort to reduce federal diversity cases by raising the jurisdic-
tional amount in controversy from $50,000 to $75,000.245 Two
separate measures introduced in the House Intellectual Property
and Judicial Administration Subcommittee would eliminate In-
State-Plaintiff (ISP) diversity jurisdiction. One proposed bill,
H.R. 4357, would eliminate diversity jurisdiction if any plaintiff
were a citizen of the state in which the litigation is filed; the
second proposed bill, H.R. 4446, would eliminate the jurisdiction
proposed legislation to Congress. See Federal Courts Improvement Act Transmitted to
Congress, THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 1993, at 9.
241. Among other things, the legislation would make technical amendments to
judicial administration statutory provisions by, for example, raising the district court
filing fee from $120 to $150, increasing attorney admission fees, lifting the cost-of-
living freeze for judicial personnel, and authorizing probation and pretrial services
personnel to carry firearms. The legislation also would affect various judicial retire-
ment matters. One important provision, which promises some genuine "improve-
ment," allows the creation of public defender organizations in all judicial districts
and requires the creation of such organizations in districts with more than 200 an-
nual attorney appointments. See Federal Courts Improvement Act Transmitted to
Congress, supra note 240, at 9; Judges Voice Support for Judicial Improvement Leg-
islation, THIRD BRANCH, July 1994, at 3-5.
242. For recent Judicial Conference testimony outlining provisions of the legisla-
tion, see Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1994: Hearing on H.R. 4357 Before the
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1994) [hereinafter Improvement Act
Hearing].
243. RI.R. 4357, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 303 (1994).
244. Improvement Act Hearing, supra note 242, at 53.
245. H.R. 4357, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1994); see Improvement Act Hearing,
supra note 242, at 58 (noting the Judicial Conference's estimate that the increase in
jurisdictional amount will result in a 10% decline in diversity filings).
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only if all plaintiffs were citizens of the forum state.246
For years, commentators from the bench and .the academy
have argued strongly that federal diversity jurisdiction should be
totally eliminated or, at least, limited.247 In late May 1994, the
Chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee on Federal-
State Jurisdiction, District Judge Stanley Marcus of Miami,
testified on the Conference's behalf in support of the pending
House bills.248 Appearing before the House Subcommittee on
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration, Judge Marcus
described the "changing jurisdictional environment" of the feder-
al courts and labeled ISP diversity jurisdiction an "historical
relic" that is no longer justified.4 9
Bar groups" ° and members of the academy"' have argued
equally strongly for retaining federal diversity jurisdiction. 2
Their arguments are based on diversity jurisdiction's constitu-
tional basis"3 and the fact that our crowded state court sys-
tems are in no position to absorb these casesY4 The political
246. In 1992, ISP diversity cases comprised 16,000 of the total 220,000 cases filed
in district courts. In-State Plaintiff Diversity Jurisdiction: Hearing on H.R. 4357 and
H.R. 4446 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1994) [herein-
after Plaintiff Diversity Jurisdiction Hearing].
247. See, e.g., Frank Coffin, Judicial Gridlock: The Case for Abolishing Diversity
Jurisdiction, 10 BROOKINGS REV. 1, 34 (1992); Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge
Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671
(1992).
248. Plaintiff Diversity Jurisdiction Hearing, supra note 246, at 8-27, 32-33.
249. Id. at 9, 11. Judge Marcus testified:
As Congress continues to change the jurisdiction of the federal courts, in
light of contemporary social and economic developments, it remains an
obvious concern of everyone to ensure that scarce judicial resources are
used wisely. Repeals of ISP diversity jurisdiction would assist the federal
courts in meeting the needs of contemporary plaintiffs who seek judicial
enforcement of the rights conferred on them by federal law.
Id. at 15.
250. See, e.g., Charles L. Brieant, Diversity Jurisdiction: Why Does the Bar Talk
One Way But Vote the Other Way with Its Feet, N.Y. ST. B.J., July 1989, at 20.
251. See, e.g., James W. Moore & Donald T. Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction:
Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1964).
252. See, e.g., John P. Frank, Diversity Jurisdiction: Lets Keep It, 3 ADELPHIA L.J.
75 (1984).
253. See Henry J. Friendly, The Historical Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41
HARV. L. REV. 483 (1928).
254. See Wise, supra note 28, at 6.
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prospect of Congress's placing an increased burden on crowded
state court systems remains especially problematicy 5 In 1994,
for the second year in a row, the National Center for State
Courts reported substantial caseloads facing our state courts:
93.8 million new cases (civil and criminal) and 259,000 appeals
were filed in the country's state courts in fiscal year 1992."z
The report projected that the dockets of many state trial and
appellate courts will double by the end of this decade. 7
Representatives from the American Bar Association, American
Trial Lawyers Association, and American Corporate Counsel
testified before the judicial administration subcommittee against
the pending House billsY ABA spokesperson Mitchell F. Dolin
forcefully testified against the partial elimination of diversity
jurisdiction, noting that plaintiffs without the financial backing
to bring actions outside their state would be denied access to
federal court. 9 He also challenged the assumption that the
jurisdiction-stripping measure would be an effective method of
dealing with the national caseload problem: "The organized bar
speaks with one voice on this issue... . Moving cases from a
federal logjam to a state logjam is no solution.""26
The stopgap proposed legislation served its purpose in 1994 as
an avoidance measure. Unfortunately, it reinforces the view that
Congress is in denial about the need for more fundamental
changes in our federal court system. Congress's reckless action
in increasing the civil and criminal jurisdictional burdens of the
255. See Randall Samborn, State Court Filings Hit New Highs, NAT'L L.J., May 4,
1992, at 7.
256. Randall Samborn, Accelerating Caseloads Threaten To Swamp Courts, NAT'L
L.J., May 9, 1994, at All.
257. On the criminal side of the state dockets, felony actions increased the most,
up 65% since 1985, and domestic relations cases, taking up one-third of all state
civil dockets, increased 43% during the same period of time. Id.
Brian J. Ostrom, the director of the statistics project of the National Center for
State Courts, stated that state civil, criminal, and juvenile cases are "'growing at
rates far in excess of population and, most importantly, are growing at a rate in
excess of resources and the number of judges that are available to the courts. ...
Courts are continuing to have to do more with less.'" Id.
258. House Subcommittee Hears Arguments on Limiting Federal Diversity Jurisdic-
tion, Wash. Insider (BNA) (May 27, 1994), available in LEXIS, Bnawi File.




federal courts while shorting the judiciary's budget is eclipsed
only by Congress's demonstrated lack of leadership, and appar-
ent lack of understanding and vision, in fulfilling its constitu-
tional duty to the lower courts of the third branch.
More recent examples of Congress's lack of vision can be seen
in proposed legislation that would create special purpose judicial
bodies-such as the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Dispute
Settlement Review Commission and the Comprehensive
Antiterrorism Act's special alien terrorist removal courts 26 2 -
and would staff these bodies with existing Article III judges. As
drafted, neither of these measures would create additional
judgeships or other judicial personnel positions to staff these
new bodies. Instead, the legislation would remove several judges
from their existing courts to process these cases. 3
District of Columbia District Judge Stanley Harris, represent-
ing the U.S. Judicial Conference, testified before the Senate
Finance Committee in May 1995 against the WTO measure that
would authorize the President to appoint five court of appeals
judges to the Dispute Settlement Review Commission for five- to
eight-year terms.264 Judge Harris acknowledged the impor-
tance of international trade issues, but raised the present and
projected workload of the federal appellate courts as a barrier:
'"As important, however, is the ability of the federal Judiciary to
resolve disputes within its jurisdiction justly, efficiently, and
speedily. The Judiciary's challenge to fulfill these responsibilities
over the next decade is particularly acute."'2 65 He presented the
obvious case against pulling these judges from work on their
261. See World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Review Commission Act, S.
16, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
262. See S. 735, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995); H.R. 1710, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1995).
263. Five federal judges would be appointed for each of these bodies. For addi-
tional information regarding the authority of the "terrorism court," whose members
the Chief Justice would appoint from among sitting district court judges for the pur-
pose of deciding the removal cases of aliens charged with terrorist activities,
shielding classified information from defendants, and providing defendants with only
a summary of the charges, see Congress Moves on Antiterrorism Bills, THIRD
BRANCH, July 1995, at 2.
264. Judiciary Urges Change in Make-up of WTO Review Commission, THIRD
BRANCH, June 1995, at 5.
265. Id. (quoting U.S. District Judge Stanley S. Harris).
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existing dockets to fill the full-time positions on the commission:
'The executive branch and legislative branch will be best served
if the commission members are either already well-versed in the
subjects of international law and trade regulation instruments
and procedures, or can devote undivided attention to becoming
so. The judicial branch will be best served if it is able to devote
100 percent of its resources to the resolution of disputes within
its jurisdiction.""'2 " Congressional consideration of legislation
that would remove ten federal judges from the existing judicia-
ry during these times of judicial gridlock demonstrates
Congress's fundamental lack of vision for its responsibility to
federal justice.267
Still another example of the lack of congressional understand-
ing of third branch troubles is the recent effort to terminate
funding for Post-Conviction Defense Resource Centers across the
nation. Even though these federally funded resource centers
have proven to be a most efficient and cost-effective way to pro-
vide required post-conviction legal assistance to indigent prison-
ers, House leaders have targeted the centers for termination.26
Most recently, the judiciary was caught in the political battle
over the 1996 budget after President Clinton vetoed H.R. 2076,
the Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary Appropriations Bill
in December 1995: The Judicial Conference publicly warned of a
"potential shutdown of the Federal Court system" when money
ran out for jurors, court security officers, and contract court
reporters and interpreters. Federal judges across the nation
were encouraged to call their congressperson to request funding.
Days before a shutdown, Congress passed and President Clinton
signed a targeted appropriations bill funding the courts through
September 30, 1996 along with passport offices, national parks,
and other noncontroversial agencies. The aborted debacle dem-
onstrated the specific need for Congress to implement a free-
266. Id. (quoting U.S. District Judge Stanley S. Harris).
267. See Marianne Lavelle, Federal Judges Cast Wary Eye On Trade Panel, NAT'L
L.J., May 22, 1995, at A16; John F. Rooney, House Panel Urged To Prevent Lapse of
Temporary Judgeships, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 11, 1995, at 1.
268. See Naftali Bendavid, Capital Habeas Law Offices on Chopping Block, RE-
CORDER, Aug. 7, 1995, at 1; Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home, Cruel and Reckless,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1995, at A29.
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standing judiciary appropriation process for 1997 and all future
fiscal years."
C. Judicial Coping Mechanisms
It should be emphasized that most of our federal judges have
attempted valiantly to cope with the burgeoning civil and crimi-
nal caseloads.27 Too often, however, judicial coping mecha-
nisms have become institutional shortcuts. Often guised as re-
forms, these shortcuts, at the appellate level, include restricting
(abbreviating and disallowing) oral arguments27' and self-im-
posed limitations on writing7 and publishing273 opinions.
269. See Victor Williams, Keep the Federal Judiciary Out of the Budget Battle,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 29, 1996, at 19; see also Mark Hansen, Court Spend-
ing Under Review, A-B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 24 (discussing funding of the judiciary).
270. See William W. Schwarzer, Teaching Judges How To Cope, LEGAL TIMES,
Dec. 19, 1994, at 20 (discussing the problems posed by large caseloads).
271. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34 was altered in 1979 to allow promul-
gation of a local rule to allow a unanimous three-judge panel to disallow the norm
of oral argument. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a); see Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging:
Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 3, 47-48. The subjective pro-
cess involved in the implementation of the national rule and use of the local rule is
most troubling; the loss of the values of debate and discussion inherent in oral argu-
ment is also substantial. Apparently, the outcome of the decision to grant oral ar-
gument frequently appears to determine the final decision, as cases not argued are
affirmed at higher rates. Robel, supra, at 48; see also Robert S. Thompson & James
B. Oaldey, From Information to Opinion in Appellate Courts: How Funny Things
Happen on the Way Through the Forum, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 66-67 (discussing
success of a program that emphasized oral argument over briefs); Stephen L. Wasby,
The Functions and Importance of Appellate Oral Argument: Some Views of Lawyers
and Federal Judges, 65 JUDICATURE 340 (1982) (analyzing the debate within the
legal community over the value of oral argument).
272. In addition to the obvious purposes of written opinions in a system of com-
mon law, scholars have long recognized that the written opinion gives litigants an
explanation of the result. See Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals
Perish If They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions To Explain and Jus-
tify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757 (1995); see also
Henry J. Friendly, "Soe Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1291-92-(1975)
(discussing the need for written records of administrative hearings). But see Charles
M. Merrill, Could Judges Deliver More Justice If They Wrote Fewer Opinions?, 64
JUDICATURE 435 (1981) (arguing that the overwhelming caseload of appellate courts
precludes written disposition of every case).
273. The effectiveness of this shortcut has been challenged on the ground of the
loss of precedential value of a nonpublished opinion, but opinions are mixed. See
RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 120-29 (1985); see also
Daniel N. Hoffmnan, Nonpublication of Federal Appellate Court Opinions, 6 JUST. SYS.
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Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt has stated: "We have
already abandoned oral argument in too many cases. We are
resolving an extremely high percentage of our cases through
unpublished dispositions, and too often those memoranda repre-
sent shoddy, poorly reasoned explanations for our decisions." '4
These shortcuts and coping mechanisms, born of an over-
worked judiciary, impact jurisprudence as well as specific issues
of justice. In a speech at Harvard Law School in 1995, Justice
Stephen Breyer noted that, since 1950, the caseload of the courts
of appeals has tripled from about 100,000 to 300,000, while ap-
pellate judgeships have far from proportionately increased.275
Justice Breyer stated that this disproportion of judges to cases
prevents federal jurists from accomplishing a minimum level of
research and scholarship desired and, overall, damages the Unit-
ed States legal system: "The inexorable march of the numbers
has consequences."2 '6
Similarly, Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Clifford Wallace, in call-
ing for a national conference on the state of the judiciary to
examine "increased delay and expense," as well as those "nega-
tive consequences" that are more subtle, stated: "We have been
forced to adopt shortcuts to cope with the rising volume: We
hear fewer oral arguments, publish fewer opinions and rely more
heavily on law clerks and staff attorneys."" ' These conse-
quences, both obvious and subtle, deserve full exploration; a few
J. 405, 411-19 (1981) (asserting that there is little affirmative evidence that
nonpublication facilitates decisionmaking); Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Dispos-
able Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940 (1989) (arguing that nonpublication is un-
necessary and gives unfair advantage to "frequent" litigants who will have access to
some unpublished opinions); Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publication of Opinions
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Formal Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICA-
TURE 307, 313 (1990) (suggesting that the guidelines for nonpublication are too
vague to be applied consistently).
274. Steven Reinhardt, Surveys Without Solutions: Another Study of the United
States Courts of Appeals, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1505, 1520 (1995) (reviewing THOMAS E.
BAKEER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF AP-
PEALS (1994)).
275. Ann Puga, Breyer Talks of Burden on Higher Courts, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb.
24, 1995, at 8.
276. Id.




1. Disservice to Senior Judges
Many of our nation's more than 300 "senior judges," formally
retired jurists, some of whom are in their late seventies and
eighties, recently have returned to full-time service in an at-
tempt to assist their too few "active judge" brethren." Ralph
Mecham, the director of the judiciary's Administrative Office, re-
cently praised the work of these retired jurists, emphasizing:
"'Without their help, the high level of judicial vacancies would
severely hamper the federal courts' ability to administer justice
in a timely fashion."'2 9 Although the nation remains grateful
for this senior service,"0 our legal profession and our political
leaders should acknowledge that our federal justice system is in
a sad state when our most senior jurists, deserving of retire-
ment, are pressured to return to full-time duty. As eighty-five-
year-old Southern District of New York Senior District Judge
Whitman Knapp, who works a fifty-hour week full-time docket,
explained: "It's a pressure on everybody. It's a psychological
pressure on the senior judges simply because the regular judges
are under such pressure.' m1
A separate question must be raised on behalf of all litigants
concerning the quality of justice that is available under a system
that works even its most senior jurists into the groundY Judi-
cial vacancy rates have reached such proportions that the case-
278. See John F. Rooney, Senior Judges Tote Heavier Federal Caseload, But
Courts Still Short, Clu. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 12, 1994, at 1.
279. Senior Judges Help District Courts Keep Pace, THIRD BRANCH, May 1994, at
1 (quoting Administrative Office of the United States Courts Director L. Ralph
Mecham).
280. See Wilfred Feinberg, Senior Judges: A National Resource, 56 BROOK. L. REV.
409 (1990).
281. Mary B.W. Tabor, Vacancies on Federal Benches in NY, Elsewhere Creating
Judicial Emergencies, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 10, 1994, at A6. -
282. However much one admires and respects our senior judges, one must consid-
er the harsh reality that the mind is no less susceptible to deterioration than the
rest of the body. Admittedly, at its root this concern implicates the Constitution's
guarantees of life tenure of office and salary, but practical implications are also im-
portant. See Steve Albert, Slap On Wrist for Abusive Judge: Ninth Circuit Finds 82-
year-old Jurist, Long the Target of Bias Complaints, Fit To Serve, But He Won't
Hear Civil Rights Cases Anymore, RECORDER, Sept. 20, 1994, at 1.
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load is becoming unmanageable, notwithstanding the needed as-
sistance of every living federal judge. Consider the analysis
presented in the May 1994 issue of The Third Branch: "Senior
U.S. district court judges can no longer compensate for the lost
resources due to judicial vacancies.""3
2. Trial Judges Visiting the Court of Appeals: Appellate Jurist
for a Week
Another institutional coping mechanism, used by the federal
appellate judiciary to deal with too few appellate judges, is to
have both active and senior district-level judges "visit" the courts
of appeals. Since the mid-1800s, Congress has authorized dis-
trict judges to visit other jurisdictions to replace an absent
judge. 4 or simply to assist 25 in handling a heavy judicial
workload, empowered to "discharge all the judicial duties of a
District Judge therein." 6 Visiting district judges have proven
invaluable in circumstances of rapid caseload growth, such as
that which occurred in the Southern District of New York during
the first twenty years of this century. 7 William Howard Taft,
who was to become Chief Justice, advocated the establishment of
a group of judges--described at the time as the "Light Horse
Calvary" and, alternatively, as a "flying squadron" of jurists-for
the specific duty of visiting overburdened districts. 28
The flexibility inherent in allowing district judges to visit and
perform judicial service as trial judges in jurisdictions other
than their own is an important component of a modern federal
judiciary. The practice of random elevation of certain trial judges
to appellate service, however, is most problematic. This visit-
ing/elevation process enables the appellate courts to have a
sufficient number of judges to comprise three-judge appellate
panels. Under the procedure, appellate court panels comprised of
only one active court of appeals judge are too common. 9 Obvi-
283. Senior Judges Help District Courts Keep Pace, supra note 279, at 1.
284. See Act of July 29, 1850, 9 Stat. 442 (1850).
285. See Act of April 2, 1852, 10 Stat. 5 (1852).
286. Id.
287. See Act of Oct. 13, 1913, 38 Stat. 203 (1913); PETER G. FISH, THE POLITICS
OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION 14-15 (1973).
288. FISH, supra note 287, at 28.
289. Often, the membership of these panels includes one or more senior judges
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ously, in times of national judicial gridlock, such a use of district
judges also runs the risk of diluting sparse trial court judge
power, as trial judges are reluctant to turn down the honor of
appellate service, even if it impacts negatively on their own
dockets.
Separation of powers concerns also must be considered. Dis-
trict-level judges were nominated by the President and con-
firmed by the Senate to do only trial-level work. Does not the
Chief Circuit Judge, then, abrogate the President's appointment
power, or Congress's confirmation authority, by making these
temporary appellate elevations? Do trial court judges have the
ability to do the qualitatively different appellate work, and will
busy visiting district judges have the time and reflective envi-
ronment in which to write quality appellate opinions upon re-
turning to the district courts? Most problematic, will some dis-
trict judges be tempted to defer to the reasoning and ultimate
vote of the "genuine" appellate court judge of the panel-a judge
who perhaps regularly presides over appeals from his temporary
brethren's district court?
Whatever the answer to such questions, the issue of whether
district court judges should "play appellate judge for a sitting" is
a matter that ultimately should be considered on its own merits,
rather than accepted as an emergency measure designed to find
enough judicial bodies to staff the courts of appeals. Consider
the argument made by the first Justices of the Supreme Court
against their dual appellate and circuit riding/trial court respon-
sibilities: the Justices warned President Washington that trial
judges who also work as appellate jurists and vice versa too
often must "'correct in one capacity the errors which they them-
selves [or their trial court brethren] may have committed in
another.., a distinction unfriendly to impartial justice."' 9 °
(appellate or district). This practice too often results in a one-judge appellate review
reality, as the visiting and senior jurists defer to the reasoning and ultimate "vote"
of the one active circuit judge.
290. RUSSELL R. WHEELER & CYNTHIA HARRISON, CREATING THE FEDERAL JUDI-
CIAL SYSTEM 10 (1989) (quoting Letter of Nov. 7, 1792, to Congress, in 1 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS (CLASS X) MISCELLANEOUS 51-52).
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3. Creating a Shadow Judiciary: Externs, Permanent Law
Clerks, and Staff Attorneys
Another Article III judicial coping technique, known, but sel-
dom publicly challenged by the legal profession, is the abdication
of fundamental judicial decisional functions to staff attorneys
and "permanent" law clerks. Debate over elbow law clerks'
"drafting" of federal judicial opinions has proceeded for
years,29' certainly fueled by the bold article critical of the prac-
tice that young William Rehnquist wrote in 1957, after he com-
pleted his service as law clerk to Justice Robert Jackson.292
The fierce competition for "top clerks" may be some indication of
the degree to which judges abdicate decisional authority to these
freshly minted JDs.293
The willingness of judges to take volunteer law students (of-
ten several at a time) for a summer or semester, to serve as the
law clerks' law clerks (described as interns or externs) speaks
for itself. While inviting one or two such law students for the
intern's educational advancement is commendable, the use of
several such students to clear away pending motions from re-
quired six-month reports is most problematic.
The increased reliance on central staff attorneys294 to evalu-
ate or "screen" appeals (the very essence of the judicial decision-
al function) outside even the supervision of a judge,295 and the
291. See J. Daniel Mahoney, Law Clerks for Better or for Worse?, 54 BROOK. L.
REV. 321 (1988); Heather Bupp-Habuda, Law Clerk's Ethical Boundaries, 38 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 187 (1991); John G. Kester, The Law Clerk Explosion, 9 LITIG. 20 (1983).
292. William H. Rehnquist, Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 13, 1957, at 74.
293. For discussion of the competition for the best clerks from the second-year
classes at law schools across the nation, see Alex Kozinski, Confessions of a Bad Ap-
ple, 100 YALE L.J. 1707 (1991); Abner J. Mikva, Judicial Clerkships: A Judge's View,
36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 150 (1986); Trenton H. Norris, The Judicial Clerkship Selection
Process: An Applicant's Perspective on Bad Apples, Sour Grapes, and Fruitful Reform,
81 CAL. L. REV. 765 (1993); Louis F. Oberdorfer & Michael N. Levy, On Clerkship
Selection: A Reply to a Bad Apple, 101 YALE L.J. 1097 (1992).
294. See David J. Brown, Facing the Monster in the Judicial Closet: Rebutting a
Presumption of Sloth, 75 JUDICATURE 291 (1992); Donald P. Ubell, Evolution and
Role of Appellate Court Central Staff Attorneys, 2 COOLEY L. REV. 157 (1984).
295. The circuits vary in their use of such central staff to screen and grade ap-
peals before they reach judicial chambers. See Timothy E. Gammon, The Central
Staff Attorneys' Office in the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit: A Five
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use of permanent law clerks to work as "assistant judges" rather
than as "assistants to the judges," becomes more tempting in
times of docket overload." 6 Indeed, the employment of perma-
nent law clerks has been rising at an alarming rate. A 1994
Judicial Conference memorandum referencing a report produced
for the Judicial Conference's Judicial Resources Committee by
the National Academy of Public Administration Association,
expresses concern that our overworked federal judges may be
tempted to abdicate genuine decisional responsibilities to a
"shadow judiciary" of permanent law clerks.29 ' "Permanent"
law clerks have a qualitatively different institutional position
than traditional clerks, who, for largely educational purposes,
commit to a one- or two-year term in a judge's chambers at a
relatively modest salary. Career law clerks also differ substan-
tially from the increasing number of law students who volunteer
as "interns." Although judges depend heavily on temporary law
clerks for "drafting" orders and decisions,29 the increasing
numbers of permanent law clerks often become players in the
decisionmaking process, having first-line contact with attorneys
and often conducting informal conferences. In such roles, career
law clerks often are correctly seen by the federal bar as "junior
judges" with commensurately generous salaries.299
Year Report, 29 S.D. L. REV. 457 (1984); Arthur D. Hellman, Central Staff in'Appel-
late Courts: The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 CAL. L. REV. 937 (1980); Donald
P. Ubell, Report on Central Staff Attorneys' Offices in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 87 F.R.D. 253 (1980).
296. See Wade H. McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U.
PA. L. REV. 777 (1981).
297. Memorandum from the Committee on Judicial Resources of the National
Academy of Public Administration to All United States Judges 4 (June 24, 1994) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum].
298. See David Crump, Law Clerks: Their Roles and Relationships with Their
Judges, 69 JUDICATURE 236 (1986).
299. A significant percentage of the permanent law clerks employed by the federal
judiciary receive a salary of over $65,000. In 1989, there were no law clerks above a
JSP-13 level; however, by March 1994, 758 such clerks were employed above this
level. See Memorandum, supra note 297, at 2.
1996]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
4. The Subjudge: Vesting Magistrates with Article III
Authority
The third branch also copes with the caseload and high vacan-
cy rates by allowing Article I magistrate-judges to handle in-
creasingly complex and important trial judicatory matters, 00
both criminal and civil.0 1 As reported by the judiciary in the
fall of 1995, "Magistrate judges presided at 912, or 17.2 percent
of the civil trials held in the federal courts for the one-year peri-
od ending September 30, 1994 ... . In addition to civil jury
trials, magistrate judges conducted 831 bench trials and dis-
posed of 6,092 civil consent cases without trial."0 2 From 1975
to 1994, the number of full-time authorized magistrate-judges
rose from 143 to 406, and the annual number of civil and crimi-
nal matters processed by these nonlife-tenured jurists rose from
255,061 to 517,397.303 Legislation has been proposed that
would broaden the statutory authority of magistrate-judges to
include their handling certain criminal trials without the con-
sent of the criminal defendant.0 4 If enacted, this legislation
would continue a trend in which a variety of cases, especially
prisoner petitions for habeas corpus and § 1983 relief, are rele-
gated for de facto resolution to the dockets of these nontenured
judicial employees.0 5
In U.S. District Court in San Jose, California, where the civil
docket is said to be "reaching epic levels"0 6 due to convicted
felon Judge Robert Aguilar's multiyear paid leave of absence,0 7
300. See Brendan L. Shannon, Note, The Federal Magistrates Act: A New Article
III Analysis for a New Breed of Judicial Officer, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 253
(1991).
301. It is telling that, as the quality of the workload of U.S. magistrates became
closer to that of Article III judges, the magistrates' official name was changed to
"magistrate-judge." See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit.
III, §§ 308, 321, 104 Stat. 5089, 5112, 5117 (1990).
302. Magistrate Judges Ease Civil Trial Workload, THIRD BRANCH, Sept. 1995, at 4.
303. See PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 5, at 11.
304. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
305. See Carroll Seron, Magistrates and the Work of Federal Courts: A New Divi-
sion of Labor, 69 JUDICATURE 353 (1986).
306. Howard Mintz, South Bay Wheel Now Landing on Magistrates, RECORDER,
Mar. 15, 1994, at 3.
307. See Back to the Bench, A.B.A. J., July 1994, at 35.
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magistrate-judges are being regularly assigned responsibility for
entire civil cases, just. as if they were Article III judges."' Al-
tering a system under which attorneys had to stipulate in writ-
ing to have a magistrate-judge hear the full civil case, the new
assignment program requires attorneys affirmatively to "opt out"
of the assignment of their cases to the magistrate-judges within
thirty days of the assignment."9 The choice can be difficult,
especially considering that the magistrate-judge whom counsel
insults by "opting out" will be the judicial 6fficer whom counsel
must face during discovery.31 One of the two active judges in
San Jose, Judge James Ware, said of the program: "We don't
perceive that- there will be any reason to object since you can
always opt out. It is a positive for the bar to expand the number
of judicial officers hearing cases."31' Unfortunately, litigants
who do not "opt-out" are denied the advantages that Judges
Ware and Aguilar personally enjoy312 independence of judicial
action guaranteed by life-tenure until impeachment removal."'
Our overworked federal district judges also are less able and
willing to give meaningful review to the myriad decisions,




312. Indeed, the overwhelming caseload of the Northern District of California may
have been one reason that Judge Aguilar was encouraged to return to the bench
immediately upon having his felony conviction reversed on a technicality by the en
banc Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Chief District Judge Thelton Henderson stated
that "there is no legal impediment for him having a caseload." Fellow Judges Allow
Aguilar To Return to the Bench, S.F. CHRON., May 20, 1994, at B3.
According to one observer: "At this point, federal judges and practitioners seem
to discount the possibility of impeachment. For one thing . .. his colleagues on the
Northern District bench immediately signaled that they were ready to welcome him
back to a full docket." Howard Mintz, It's Not Over Yet for Aguilar, RECORDER, May
6, 1994, at 1. The Supreme Court's 1995 reinstatement of Judge Aguilar's conviction
left his docket of more than 250 civil cases in limbo, as he appeals his conviction on
alternative grounds before the Ninth Circuit. See Howard Mintz, Federal Bench
Struggling with Judge Aguilar's Status, RECORDER, June 23, 1995, at 1; David Sav-
age, Justices Reinstate Conviction of U.S. Judge in California, LA. TIMES, June 22,
1995, at A4.
313. See generally Victor Williams, Third Branch Interdependence and Integrity
Threatened by Political Branch Irresponsibility: Reviewing the Report of the National
Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 851
(1995) (discussing the relationship between judicial administration and independence).
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among them Social Security benefit rulings, that are made by
and appealed from non-Article III administrative law judges. As
a consequence, other non-Article III personnel-specifically,
magistrate-judges-are regularly assigned these cases for de
facto disposition.314 The development of what might be termed
an "Article I loop" undermines fundamental values inherent in
an established independent judiciary.
Unfortunately, these magistrate-judges adjudicate cases with
the constant knowledge that if they do not specifically please the
specified "personnel judges" in their jurisdiction, they will even-
tually lose their temporary black robes. It is equally unfortunate
that many on the judiciary who oppose enlarging their own
Article III courts are so eager to enlarge both the number and
jurisdiction of nonlife-tenured Article I judges and magis-
trates.315 Proposals to create appellate magistrate positions are
314. As a troubling example of the danger of such political dependence, consider
the attempt in the 1980s by the executive branch to influence the administrative
law adjudication of Social Security disability benefits. See Michael K. Frisby, Social
Security Tries To Force Denials of Benefits, Panel Says, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 23,
1989, at 23.
In an attempt to save money, Social Security officials have harassed
judges who decide disability cases . . . , according to an investigation by
a House subcommittee.... [A]dministrative judges who are employed by
the Social Security Administration charge that the agency has used as-
signments, transfers and travel arrangements to harass judges who are
thought to side with the public. The judges also say the administration
has instituted hearing quotas that they say reduce the quality of their
work. . . . In President Reagan's first term, the Social Security Adminis-
tration warned judges who allowed claimants to win 70 percent or more
of their cases that steps would be taken against them unless their per-
formance changed.
Id.; see also Deborah Maranville, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security
Disability Claims, 69 MINN. L. REV. 325, 334 (1984) (book review) (discussing 1983
book advocating changes in the Social Security Administration's decision process in
order to promote fairness and efficiency); Judge Suing Co-Workers, Government, UPI,
July 1, 1984, available in LEXIS, News Library, Usnwr File (discussing a $16 mil-
lion suit filed by an administrative law judge against the federal government con-
cerning social security decisions); Judges Want End to Quota System, UPI, Jan. 20,
1983, available in LEXIS, News Library, Usnwr File (discussing administrative law
judges' requests for the federal government to drop quotas on social security deci-
sions).
315. For example, Justice Scalia, who opposes increasing the number of Article H1
judges, proposes to create Article I courts for "'large categories of high-volume, rela-
tively routine cases-Social Security disability cases, for example, and freedom of
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being taken seriously because the Federal Court Study
Committee's Final Report stated that the creation of such junior
appellate judgeships deserved careful consideration. 16 Accord-
ing to one commentator, these new appellate magistrates would
"decide non-merits motions relating to time, manner, and place
of appeal, including jurisdictional issues" and also would "oper-
ate the screening program." ' These magistrates also would
conduct hearings and make recommendations for consideration
by Article III appellate judges, as do trial magistrates for district
court judges.318
These proposed appellate magistrates presumably would an-
swer the concerns of staff attorney critics by removing screen
responsibilities from those attorneys. It is telling, however, that
expansion of a subjudiciary of magistrates is being considered as
a response to concerns about the authority that is now vested in
the shadow judiciary of law clerks and staff attorneys. 19 One
must query how important Article III jurists judge their own life
tenure when they are willing to enlarge the ranks and authority
of nonlife-tenured magistrates.
information actions" with strictly restricted appeal rights. See Antonin Scalia, Re-
marks by Justice Antonin Scalia Before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation
and the National Conference of Bar Presidents (Feb. 15, 1987), quoted in GORDON
BERMANT IT AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE
NUMBER OF FEDERAL JUDGES 11 (1993); see also PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra
note 5, at 46-47, 125 (discussing recommended appeal rights for decisions of magis-
trate-judges).
316. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMrITEE 79-80, 115-16 (1990).
317. See BAKER, supra note 29, at 176 (quoting John B. Oakley, The Screening of
Appeals: The Ninth Circuit's Experience in the Eighties and Innovations for the Nine-
ties, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 859, 920).
318. Id.
319. Oakley, supra note 317, at 903.
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V. A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF LARGE SPECIALIZED COURTS
While riding circuit under Congress's first Judiciary Act,32
Supreme Court Chief Justice John Jay attempted to describe the
developing national court system to citizens of the new republic
because "no tribunals of the like kind and extent had heretofore
existed in this country."32 Charging grand juries in his
circuit's jurisdiction, Chief Justice Jay made reference to the
ever-evolving nature of the national court system, stating: "the
expediency of carrying justice, as it were, to every man's door,
was obvious; but how to do it in a expedient manner was far
from being apparent."'322 As the American legal profession, in-
deed the entire American economy, attempts to enter and suc-
ceed in a global marketplace, perhaps a comparative vision of
the most "expedient manner" by which our national court system
may be structured and staffed for the twenty-first century is
appropriate.3"
A. German Subject Matter Specialization
Virginia Law Professor Daniel J. Meador is the foremost aca-
demic voice in the debate over establishing a subject-matter-
specialized appellate court system.324 In a 1983 law review ar-
ticle, Professor Meador introduced a compelling comparative per-
spective to the court structure debate by describing and ana-
lyzing the specialized court system of the Federal Republic of
Germany.3" Professor Meador prefaced this work by correctly
320. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). See generally Charles War-
ren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 IIARV. L.
REV. 49 (1923) (discussing the legislative history of the Judiciary Act, including its
passage through Congress and the changes made during the legislative process).
321. 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 387, 390-91
(Henry P. Johnston ed., 1971) (Charge to Grand Juries).
322. Id.
323. See Paul E. Geller, Staffing the Judiciary and "Tastes" in Justice: A Com-
mentary on the Papers by Professors Bell and Clark, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1849 (1988);
John H. Merryman, How Others Do It: The French and German Judiciaries, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1865 (1988).
324. See Daniel J. Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution Through
Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 471 (1983); Daniel J. Meador,
The Federal Judiciary-Inflation, Malfunction, and a Proposed Course of Action, 1981
B.Y.U. L. REV. 617.
325. See Daniel J. Meador, Appellate Subject Matter Organization: The German
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predicting the significant increase that has occurred in the fed-
eral caseload during the last decade and by challenging "Ameri-
can judicial architects" to build a structure and establish a pro-
cedure that will accommodate the certain increased number of
appellate judges and ensure stability and jurisprudential unifor-
mity. 26 The article remains important; indeed, together with
other comparative commentary, it deserves careful reconsidera-
tion and review as a continuation of its stated purpose to "dispel
some of the mythology and theoretical objections [to specializa-
tion] that are found in the American legal world.""32
One could emphasize the many fascinating similarities and
differences that exist between the United States' adversarial
judicial system and Germany's inquisitorial legal systems. Par-
ticularly interesting, for example, is the difference between
American courts' use of juries, with the possibility of jury nulli-
fication, and the German courts' use of lay judges, with the
possibility of appellate review of acquittals.s Generally, in
both the United States and Germany, all branches of govern-
ment strongly adhere to the rule of law, to written guarantees of
individual liberties, and to a hierarchy of legal process effectuat-
ed by litigation through a series of appellate courts.329
Germany's unitary federalism, however, may be fairly described
as "virtually another form of government" from the United
States' federalism. $9 The bulk (up to ninety-five percent) of
German law is federal code-based;33' in the United States, fed-
Design from an American Perspective, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 27 (1983).
326. Id. at 28.
327. Id. at 29. For a more recent related article by Professor Meador, see Daniel
J. Meador, Transformation of the American Judiciary, 46 ALA. L. REV. 763 (1995).
Originally presented as the first annual Meador Lecture at the University of Ala-
bama Law School, this article discusses the transformation of authority from state to
federal courts from a comparative perspective. Id.
328. See IAN S. FORRESTOR & HANS-MICHAEL ILGEN, THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM
1 (1972).
329. Id-
330. See generally Richard Davis & D. Jeffrey Burnham, The Role of the Federal
Judiciary in the Development of Federalism in West Germany and the United States,
12 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 63 (1989) (examining the role of the federal judiciary
in the early development and definition of federalism in West Germany and the
U.S.).
331. Meador, supra note 325, at 29-31. In the last quarter of the nineteenth
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eral law is a mixture of statutory and common law. Also, Ger-
many has a single national judicial structure; the system is
composed of at least three levels of review, with courts having
limited geographic jurisdiction (i.e., local/state, regional, and
national).32
What makes study of the German judicial system important
for purposes of a comparative review are the facts that subject
matter specialization is the foundation of the judicial structure
and that extraordinary efficiency is achieved by having large
numbers of judges operate in such a specialized system. 3 This
specialization and efficiency have survivedP' and, indeed, as-
sisted the legally exacting reunification of East and West Ger-
many.33 It remains to be seen, however, what impact the uni-
fication of Europe will have on the member states' national court
systems.336
Considering all local, state, and federal jurists, Germany has
about twice as many judges, overall, as does the entire United
States (state and federal combined); by comparison, Germany's
population is approximately one-quarter of that of the United
States.337 Germany's courts are divided into six specific, formal
subject matter jurisdictions-constitutional, financial, social, ad-
century, five major codes introduced nationwide uniformity to German law. These
codes, although since modified, remain in effect today.
332. See FORRESTER & ILGEN, supra note 328, at 10.
333. See HERBERT J. LIEBESNY, FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALY-
SIS 295-98 (1981).
334. See Johnathon J. Doyle, A Bitter Inheritance: East German Real Property and
the Supreme Constitutional Court's "Land Reform" Decision of April 23, 1991, 13
MICH. J. INT'L L. 832 (1992).
335. See Mary Lovik, The Constitutional Court Reviews the Early Dissolution of
the West German Parliament, 7 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 79 (1983); A Sym-
posium On Developments in East European Law, 13 MICH. J. INTL L. 741 (1992); see
also Jorg Kirchner & Arthur L. Marriott, International Arbitration in the Aftermath
of Socialism: The Example of the Berlin Court of Arbitration, J. INT'L ARB., Mar.
1993, at 5 (discussing the hostility of the former West German arbitral establish-
ment toward the former East German Berlin court).
336. See, e.g., E. R. Lanier, Solange, Farewell: The Federal German Constitutional
Court and the Recognition of the Court of Justice of the European Communities As
Lawful Judge, 11 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1988) (discussing the evolution of
the jurisdictional relationship between the courts of West Germany and the Europe-
an Community).
337. ERIKA S. FAIRCHILD, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 172 (1994).
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ministrative, labor, and ordinary."
Constitutional jurisdiction is allocated to one supreme judi-
cial institution, established solely for reviewing constitutional
claims." Often termed the highest court in Germany, the
one Federal Constitutional Court has the final word in inter-
preting the German Constitution; it protects basic human
rights, articulates some criminal procedure norms, maintains
the federal balance, and balances the powers between the
executive and legislature' 0 The Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) has authority equal to that of the
executive or the legislature and may overrule legislation enacted
by either of those bodies by declaring it at variance with the
Constitution." Structurally, the high constitutional court sits
in two "senates" or divisions, each composed of eight judges.342
The Federal Constitutional Court hears direct inquiries from
pluralities of the legislature and rules on constitutional ques-
tions arising in each of the other five specialized court divi-
sions. 3 Upon resolving constitutional issues arising in cases
from other divisions of the court, the Constitutional Court re-
mands the case for implementation or enforcement by the divi-
sion of origin.344 Additionally, any individual can lodge a "com-
plaint" directly with the Federal Constitutional Court, "alleging
an infringement of his constitutional rights through an act of
public authorities,"345 in other words, a violation of the Basic
Law. 6 The court presides over such fundamental cases involv-
338. PETER DE CRUZ, A MODERN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 76-78 (1993).
339. Id. at 78. In a thoroughly comprehensive pamphlet on the German Constitu-
tional Court, Notre Dame University Professor Donald Kommers portrays the court
as eager to protect the rights of citizens and most willing to involve itself in "politi-
cal questions." See DONALD KOMMERS, THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (1994).
340. DE CRUZ, supra note 338, at 78; FAIRCHILD, supra note 337, at 171.
341. See DE CRUZ, supra note 338, at 78 (I"he Constitutional Court may declare
any law or judgment null and void.").
342. FORRESTER & ILOEN, supra note 328, at 14.
343. Meador, supra note 325, at 34. See generally DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1989) (de-
scribing the role of the Federal Constitutional Court in the development of West
Germany's constitutional law).
344. FAIRCHILD, supra note 337, at 171.
345. DE CRUZ, supra note 338, at 78.
346. See Michael Singer, The Constitutional Court of the German Federal Repub-
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ing public institutions.347 Additionally, "[t]here is always a pos-
sibility to challenge a new law or a final judgment as unconsti-
tutional if it is [a] case of human rights. 348
Unlike the Federal Constitutional Court, each of the five other
specialized jurisdictions is multi-tiered, consisting of trial-level
and two or more appellate-level courts.349 All five jurisdictions
have trial and intermediate level courts in each of the eleven
state political units (Lander or Land)."° Courts of last resort,
or federal supreme courts, for each of the subject matter jurisdic-
tions are dispersed in various cities throughout the nation.3
Three of the specialized court divisions-Financial, Social, and
Administrative-judicially process claims and disputes that arise
between members of German society and the government.5 2
The Financial Jurisdiction oversees tax conflicts between the
government and its citizens. 53 The court has two levels; tax
trial courts (Finanzgericht) are located in each state, and a su-
preme federal tax court (Bundesfinanzhot) is located in Mu-
nich.354 The Social Jurisdiction, the newest of the specialized
court divisions, handles cases involving health insurance, social
security, unemployment compensation, and other social pro-
grams. 5 The division consists of three levels. 6 Decisions of
trial-level Social Jurisdiction courts (Sozialgericht), located in
each state, may be appealed first to regional intermediate social
courts (Landsozialgericht) and, finally, to the one supreme feder-
al social court (Bundessozialgericht) located in Kassel.357
The Administrative Jurisdiction division courts address all
public-law issues and government-individual disputes, other
lic: Jurisdiction Over Individual Complaints, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 331 (1982).
347. See Eric Barendt, The Influence of the German and Italian Constitutional
Courts on Their National Broadcasting Systems, 1991 PUB. L. 93.
348. DE CRUZ, supra note 338, at 78.
349. Meador, supra note 325, at 31.
350. DE CRUZ, supra note 338, at 76-77.
351. Meador, supra note 325, at 31-35.
352. Id. at 31-32.
353. Id. at 32.
354. Id. at 32-33.
355. Id. at 32.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 32-33.
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than social and financial conflicts, that are regulatory in na-
ture."' The Administrative Jurisdiction is tri-level; the admin-
istrative supreme court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) sits in Ber-
lin, and regional intermediate administrative appellate courts
(Oberverwaltungsgericht) and administrative trial courts
(Verwaltungsgericht) are located throughout the nation."'
Private employment disputes, including those arising un-
der collective bargaining agreements, are handled by Labor
Jurisdiction courts.36 ° Labor courts are also tri-level, con-
sisting of trial courts (Arbeitsgericht), intermediate appellate
courts (Landarbeitsgericht), and one supreme court
(Bundesarbeitsgericht)."' Like the Social Jurisdiction supreme
court, the Labor Jurisdiction supreme couri is based in
Kassel.362
Ordinary Jurisdiction is the largest and broadest of
Germany's specialized court divisions and the jurisdiction with
which the average German is most likely to have contact.
363
The cases it handles cover a variety of subject matters, including
all criminal and all remaining civil prosecutions.3 Structural
divisions within the Ordinary Jurisdiction effectuate further spe-
cialization.365 The lowest level of ordinary courts consists of
800 county trial courts (Amtsgericht) dispersed throughout the
nation. 6 Each level of the hierarchy above the county trial
court level is formally separated into subject matter panels. 6 '
Just above the county court level are second-level trial courts
and first-level appellate courts (Landgericht).368 These courts,
ninety-three in number, handle more substantial civil cases369
358. FoRRESTER & ILGEN, supra note 328, at 15.
359. Meador, supra note 325, at 32-33.
360. DE CRUZ, supra note 338, at 78.
361. Meador, supra note 325, at 32-33.
362. Id. at 32.
363. DE CRUZ, supra note 338, at 77.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 77-78.
366. Meador, supra note 325, at 35.
367. Id. at 31-36.
368. Id. at 36.
369. Id.; see Christopher E. Hauschka, Central Issues of Business Litigation in
West German Civil Courts, 19 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 47 (1988-1989) (describing proce-
dures and proceedings in German civil courts).
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and more serious criminal prosecutions than do the county
courts. ° Sitting in special subject matter (i.e., commercial, ad-
miralty, and criminal) three-judge chambers, 37 1 the
Landgericht handle the more significant trials and serve as the
first level of review for the county trial court cases.372
Above this level of courts is an intermediate level of appellate
courts (Oberlandesgericht)."3 Numbering nineteen in all, these
courts review decisions of the second-level trial courts and di-
rectly review some county trial court cases.374 These courts
have final review over pure state cases and federal cases in
which the amount in controversy does not exceed a stated
amount.375 They also exercise original authority over very se-
rious crimes, such as treason. 76 The Oberlandesgericht aver-
age seventy-two judges each, with some having as many as
149 judges.377 The total number of judges on this single
court level of the Ordinary Jurisdiction exceeds 1300."'s In
each Oberlandesgericht, a work distribution plan
(Geschdftsverteilungs plan) divides the jurists into semiperma-
nent divisions of civil, criminal, and special cases. 79
This subject matter division of the appellate caseload accord-
ing to work is replicated in the ordinary supreme court
(Bundesgerichtshof).t0 The Bundesgerichtshof has eleven civil
divisions, five criminal divisions, and seven specialty divi-
sions.38' Sitting in Karlsruhe, the ordinary supreme court
works in separate "senates"--ten civil and five criminal." The
subject matter specialization and generously sufficient number
of judges allow the judges of the highest Ordinary Jurisdiction
370. Meador, supra note 324, at 36.
371. FORRESTER & ILGEN, supra note 327, at 12.




376. FoRRESTER & ILGEN, supra note 327, at 13.
377. Meador, supra note 324, at 36-38.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 44-49.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. DE CRUZ, supra note 337, at 78.
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court to adjudicate a great number of cases efficiently, some on
de novo and others on revision review.' This level made near-
ly 6000 total dispositions in 1978.'
B. French Specialization
0
A discussion of subject matter specialization of the French
judicial system naturally begins with the unique division of
the public law/administrative courts (ordre administratif) from
private law/nonadministrative or ordinary courts (ordre
judiciaire)." Even before this division is addressed, howev-
er, the independent Constitutional Council (Conseil
constitutionel),"6 which has authority to preview the constitu-
tionality of prospective legislation, deserves special note."' As
described by Professor Ren6 David, in addition to various other
duties,
[tihe Constitutional Council determines the constitutionality
of statutes prior to their taking effect whenever the law is an
"organic statute" by virtue of its object, and whenever the
council is requested to do so by the President of the Republic,
the Prime Minister, the President of the Senate, or the Presi-
dent of the National Assembly. Its decisions are final, unap-
pealable, and binding on all branches of government and all
administrative and judicial officials."
As described more fully below, only the Council of State, the
head of the administrative system, has the authority to deter-
mine the unconstitutionality or illegality of executive ac-
tions. 9 The changing nature of this court has been of signifi-
383. Meador, supra note 325, at 41-44.
384. Id. at 43.
385. See MARTIN WESTON, AN ENGLISH READER'S GUIDE TO THE FRENCH LEGAL
SYSTEM 67-71 (1991). Professor Weston provides an excellent linguistic roadmap to
understanding the French judicial system. It is helpful to know that lower courts
are called tribunaux and deliver jugements, whereas higher courts are usually
termed cours and deliver arrets. Id. at 66. Also, it is helpful to know that the
French have several different uses for the word law; "a law" (i.e., statute) is une loi,
"the law" is la justice, and the "academic law" is le droit. Id. at 46.
386. Id. at 99.
387. See REN9 DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY
19-30 (Michael Kindred trans., 1972).
388. Id. at 29-30 (footnote omitted).
389. Id. at 30. Notwithstanding the Council of State's exclusive jurisdiction, in Ju-
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cant interest,39° particularly recently, when the Constitutional
Council severely restricted proposed legislation that would have
criminalized certain use of foreign languages and established a
French "language police."39'
The administrative courts, which are more accurately thought
of as a part of the executive, have exclusive jurisdiction over
cases involving the state, a state employee, or a corporation as a
party.392 Over the last decade, there has been a growing under-
standing of the importance of le droit administratif in the legal
developments of other countries, in and out of Europe and the
European Community.393 At the lowest level of this system
are administrative trial courts (tribunaux administratifs), dis-
persed throughout the nation's regions.3 94 In 1987, a level of
appellate administrative courts (Cours Administratives d'Appel)
was established to review decisions of the trial courts.395
These appellate courts review authority of laws issues (annul-
ment jurisdiction), and exercise full authority (pleine jurisdic-
tion) over cases in which individuals allege injury at the hands
of a public servant.396
At the apex of this administrative governmental division is
the Council of State (Conseil d'Etat),97 which has been de-
ly 1971, the Constitutional Council declared an executive regulatory law on associa-
tions unconstitutional and violative of the principle of freedom of association. Id.
390. See, e.g., David Pollard, France's Conseil Constitutionnel-Not Yet a Constitu-
tional Court?, 23 IRISH JURIST (n.s.) 2 (1988) (examining a proposal to give citizens
access to the Council for constitutional questions).
391. See French Council Eases Language Ban, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1994, § 1, at
12; Panel Rules French Law Against Foreign Words Is Unconstitutional, L.A. TIMES,
July 31, 1994, at A9; see also Michael Durham, Tout Va Bien That Ends Well, OB-
SERVER, July 31, 1994, at 1 (stating that "France's Constitutional Council . . . se-
verely reduced the impact of the Loi Toubon," the proposed legislation).
392. DE CRUz, supra note 338, at 65.
393. For an expansive analysis of the importance and influence of le droit admi-
nistratif, see L. NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 252-
70 (4th ed. 1993).
394. Meador, supra note 325, at 41; see Alain Plantey, Evidence Before French Ad-
ministrative Courts, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 15 (1992).
395. BROWN & BELL, supra note 393, at 50. Both judicial tiers of the one admin-
istrative body are under the supervision of the Secretary-General of the Council of
State. Id. at 85.
396. DE CRUZ, supra note 338, at 70.
397. BROWN & BELL, supra note 393, at 59-83.
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scribed as "the central organ of the executive.""'8 With predom-inantly executive/managerial responsibilities vested in four ad-
ministrative sections,3 99 the judicial role of the Conseil d'Etat is
vested in the fifth section of the Council-the Section du
Contentieux.00 The judicial body is subdivided into ten Sous-
sections, each proceeding independently and in the name of the
entire Council.4"' Three Sous-sections are assigned exclusively
to adjudicate financial matters 0 2
While the administrative courts are executive branch organs,
the ordinary courts (ordre judiciaire) are purely judicial in na-
ture; that is, the latter courts are the French judiciary."' In
1958, General de Gaule undertook a general reform of the judi-
cial/procedural system aimed at making the judicial system
more efficient.0 4 The resulting expansion and specialization of
the ordre judiciaire was significant. The lowest level courts, the
first instance courts (tribunaux d'instance), operate in separate
criminal (tribunaux de police)40 5 and civil divisions. The civil
function is further divided into special first instance or special-
ty courts, including commerce (tribunal de commerce), labor
(conseil des prud'hommes), social security, and landlord-tenant
tribunals."'
Courts in the next level of the French judicial system are
superior trial courts (tribunaux de grande instance), which have
authority over more substantial and serious litigation.0 7
These grand trial courts are separated into a civil division,
which presides over cases in which the amount in controversy
exceeds a set amount of francs, and a criminal division
(tribunaux correctionnels), which presides over trials of more
398. DE CRUZ, supra note 338, at 70.
399. BROWN & BELL, supra note 393, at 61.
400. Id. at 71-73.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. DE CRUZ, supra note 338, at 65-68.
404. See Pollard, supra note 390.
405. See GEORGE E. GLOS, COMPARATIVE LAW 135 (1987).
406. MARY A. GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 122-23 (2d ed.
1994).
407. DE CRUZ, supra note 338, at 66.
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serious felonies. °8
Separate criminal trial courts (cour d'assises) have complete
original criminal jurisdiction over serious felony cases.0 9 Each
of these purely criminal courts is staffed by three professional
judges and nine lay judges/jurors.410 These twelve individuals
adjudicate guilt and impose sentences with a majority of eight
votes."
Above the superior court and specialized criminal trial court
level are two levels of French appellate courts. These courts
serve different review purposes, although their specialized struc-
ture is similar. The first level of appellate review is conducted
by one of thirty-three courts of appeals (cours d'appel).412 The
thirty-three courts are divided into subject matter divisions (i.e.,
civil, criminal, social, commerce, and juvenile) and hear de novo
appeals from the tribunaux courts.413
The second level of appellate review is conducted by the
country's highest level court, the Supreme Court (Cour de cassa-
tion)."4 In contrast with the cours d'appel, the Cour de cassa-
tion reviews cases only for legal error.415 When error is found,
the Cour de cassation usually does not substitute its own verdict
for that of the lower court; instead, the verdict is quashed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings.41 Maximum ac-
cess to the Supreme Court is assured by generous staffing and
408. GLOS, supra note 405, .at 135.
409. Id. at 136-37. To one who first views the French criminal justice system, the
overlapping jurisdiction of the superior courts and the cour d'assises may be confus-
ing and bear closer examination. See id.
410. FAIRCHILD, supra note 337, at 169.
411. Id.
412. DE CRUZ, supra note 338, at 66.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 67.
415. Id. See generally Leila S. Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Princi-
ples by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289 (1994) (tracing the development of crimes against
humanity in the French court system).
416. DE CRUZ, supra note 338, at 67. If on remand the lower court takes the
same position as it originally took, the Cour de cassation will institute a type of
quasi-en banc or Plenary Assembly (Assemblee pleniere), composed of representatives
of all five divisions, to remand for a tbird (and final) time. Id. Recent reforms allow
a Division, or the Assemblee pleniere of the Supreme Court, to render a final judg-
ment if no other issues are to be decided on remand. Id.
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operational efficiency. The Supreme Court has 127 judges who
sit in six "chambers" or divisions (including three general pri-
vate-law divisions, one commercial/financial division, one social
division, and one criminal division) on panels of five to eight
judges."'
C. Comparative Lessons
Under the German and French legal systems, maximum effi-
ciency is obtained through subject matter specialization at all
levels and by generous court staffing.418 Access to the courts by
individual litigants is maximized and uniformity of laws is
achieved,419 resulting in better protection of the rights of in-
dividual litigants.
The elementary view of the French justice system demon-
strates the wisdom of formally splitting the public administra-
tive process from private-law courts.42 The further division of
the private-law courts according to subject matter (from 'the
lowest tribunals through the highest court) allows substantial
numbers of judges to operate with optimum efficiency.42" ' The
relegation of criminal cases to separate courts, such as the cour
d'assisses, deserves closer attention.4" Moreover, beyond its
specialized structure, the French criminal justice system offers a
variety of comparative lessons from which the United States can
learn, especially in an age of radical and frequent acts of crimi-
417. LIEBESNY, supra note 333, at 293-94.
418. See supra parts VA-B.
419. See Meador, supra note 325, at 56-58 (discussing subject matter specializa-
tion and uniformity of laws).
420. See generally STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, SPECIALIZED JUSTICE: COURTS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE TRIBUNAIS, AND A CROSS-NATIONAL THEORY OF SPECIALIZATION (1990) (dis-
cussing the advantages and disadvantages of specialized administrative tribunals).
421. One of the most interesting aspects of -this structure of specialization is the
institutionalization of a special court to decide disputes over court jurisdiction. The
Jurisdiction Disputes Court (Tribunal des conflt) decides whether the administrative
or private court system has jurisdiction when a private court has previously held
that jurisdiction is proper in that court. If the ruling is contested, the Jurisdiction
Disputes Court decides jurisdiction and issues a final ruling. DE CRUZ, supra note
338, at 71.
422. See Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice As a Guide to American
Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should
We Care, 78 CAL. L. REV. 539 (1990).
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nal jury nullification."~
The German justice structure is also exemplary. The structure
demonstrates that with subject matter specialization, a judicial
system (trial and appellate) staffed by thousands of judges can
be effective, efficient, and fair, without being bureaucratic. As
Professor Meador stated in concluding his 1983 article:
While the German plan cannot be copied precisely in an
American court, it does provide a useful source of ideas for
experimentation. Moreover, the German experience does
provide evidence that this style of organizing appellate busi-
ness is an effective way of accommodating large numbers of
judges within a single court. As the volume of cases and the
number of judges continue to grow in the United States, we
may come increasingly to see this as the promising method of
preventing doctrinal chaos in the legal system. Certainly it is
worth a try.424
The court systems of both France and Germany are, first and
foremost, protective of individual litigants' rights of access to the
courts and efficient civil and criminal justice. It is important,
therefore, that contemporary debate on the values of federal
court expansion and specialization prominently reference com-
parative lessons to be learned." Any number of other national
court systems, both civil- and common-law-based, could be cited
as examples of successful subject matter specialization. 2 In
each comparative example, one would find that the spe-
cialization models correspond to the unique needs and particular
423. See id. Professor Frase concludes that there are a number of desirable fea-
tures of the French system, such as "more careful selection, training, and supervi-
sion of police, prosecutors, and judges." Id. at 542.
424. Meador, supra note 325, at 58. One should note that Professor Meador con-
centrates on the value of specializing the United States' appellate court structures;
he does not specifically argue for subject matter specialization of federal district
courts. See id. at 29.
425. See Bryant G. Garth, Book Note, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 684 (1982) (reviewing
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND AND FRANCE (4th ed. 1980)) (criticizing
the author for his failure to consider political developments in his discussion of for-
eign legal systems).




conditions of the society involved. In applying those comparative
lessons, one must consider the unique societal needs of the
United States and specific contemporary demands placed on our
presently constructed federal court system.
In the United States, escalating federal criminal caseloads
and effective national criminal justice must be seen as the most
obvious needs and most demanding institutional concerns of our
federal courts. Five times more civil cases than criminal cases
are filed in this nation's federal district courts.427 From July
1991 to June 1992, however, in thirty-seven of the ninety-four
federal district courts, more than half of the trials were criminal
trials, bringing the national average of federal criminal cases
tried to 46.4% of all cases tried.4" In fiscal year 1992, eighty-
six percent of all cases tried in California's federal district courts
were criminal.429 In North Carolina, criminal trials accounted
for 84.8% of all cases tried in federal district court; 3 New
Mexico's federal trials were 76.4% criminal;43' Arizona's federal
trials were 74.4% criminal;432 and U.S. district courts in Flori-
da, Idaho, Iowa, Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington all devoted
over sixty percent of their trial time to criminal
prosecutions." Federal court administrators must cope with
the fact that, over the last decade, criminal cases have become
increasingly complex and time consuming,"' "result[ing] in
major concerns, especially over the large portion of the available
judicial resources consumed by the criminal dockets." '435 Even
with only a modest enforcement of the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act,436 criminal prosecutions, and re-
427. Criminal Trials Dominate U.S. District Court's Workload, THIRD BRANCH,







434. Criminal Trials Dominate District Courts' Workload, THIRD BRANCH, Sept.
1993, at 4. For instance, multi-defendant cases have grown 70% since 1980. Id.
435. Id.
436. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 20, 21, 26, 28, 31, 42
U.S.C.).
1996] 611
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
sulting criminal trials, will increase. America's unique societal
concerns for safety and the federal courts' present lack of suffi-
cient resources to sustain an effective federal criminal justice
system requires consideration of whether court specialization,
into civil and criminal divisions, would be appropriate.
The time has come for national debate on specialization of the
federal judiciary.17 Such a debate, which should take into con-
sideration the structures of foreign judicial systems, must re-
spond to the status quo bias of the Judicial Conference's Com-
mittee on Long Range Planning.4" Debate would add a needed
dimension to Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Clifford Wallace's pro-
posal for a three-branch conference on the federal courts." 9
Most importantly, such a comparative debate would provide a
more prominent voice for nonrobed citizens-particularly practic-
ing attorneys, concerned citizens, and American businesses-in
the future size and design of their national court system.44 As
Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt stated in calling for a
substantial increase in the size of the federal judiciary:
IT]he problem of the future of our nation's federal courts is
far too important to be left to judges. It is the people and
their elected representatives who must determine what the
size of our courts will be, what role they will play in our
system of government, whose needs they will serve, what
kinds of cases can be brought in the federal courts.44 '
Even if our present federal judiciary were fully staffed and a
437. The Brooklyn Law Review recently published a symposium issue on special-
ization. See Symposium, The Sixth Annual Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture, 61
BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1995).
438. See Steve Albert, The More Things Stay the Same, The More the Federal
Courts Like It, REcORDER, Nov. 15, 1994, at 2 (discussing the Committee's recom-
mendation that no major changes be made to the federal court system).
439. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
440. For recent commentary on the future of federal courts as a field of scholar-
ship and study, see Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions in the Hart and Wecheler
Hotel, 47 VAND. L. REV. 993 (1994); Richard II. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart
and Wecheler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953 (1994); Judith Resnick, Rereading
"The Federal Courts": Revising the Domain of Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the
End of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1021 (1994).
441. Stephen Reinhardt, Whose Federal Judiciary Is It Anyway?, Address at
Loyola Law School (Apr. 26, 1993), in 27 LoY. L.. L. REV. 1, 5 (1993).
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few additional judges were added in our most overcrowded juris-
dictions, our nation's judges still would fail in their good faith
attempt to adjudicate the civil actions and criminal prosecutions
of a nation of over 250,000,000 people. 42 The 104th Congress
should create a significant number of new trial and appellate
judgeships for our most overcrowded jurisdictions. After provid-
ing these needed judges, Congress and the President must honor
their unique responsibility to sustain adequately the nonpolitical
third branch of government by remodeling our generalized court
system. A dynamic, well-maintained national court system is a
basic component of our Republic's governmental structure; every
litigant in each of the ninety-four federal trial court jurisdic-
tions and thirteen appellate circuits44 deserves equal access to
justice.
The comparative lessons and the value and wisdom of a large,
specialized judiciary will have to be learned and promoted by the
public and the bar, for it is clear that the impetus for change
will not come from within the ranks of the federal judiciary.
Again, as Judge Reinhardt stated:
[Ihf those who oppose an elitist federal court system are to
prevail, they will in all likelihood have to overcome the influ-
ence of the judicial establishment ....
I can assure you that the advocates of a minimalist federal
court system-the "jewel" advocates-are well aware of the
effect their proposal[s to freeze the judiciary size at 10001
would have if adopted. The freeze would not just be on the
number of judges. . . . It would also be on our access to our
courts, and thus on our liberties and freedom.444
Judge Reinhardt is most concerned that judicial gridlock and
judicial leaders' desire to "remain elite' will jeopardize the
442. See Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan.
1993, at 52. Judge Reinhardt submits that even if the size of the circuit courts were
doubled, the present caseload "would be more than enough to keep us busy ....
The only difference would be that far more of the cases we are now handling would
receire the full attention they deserve, and the quality of justice in our courts would
be substantially improved." Id. at 53.
443. For a map depicting each of the jurisdictions and circuits, see FEDERAL JUDI-
CIAL CENTER, CREATING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 29 (1989).
444. Reinhardt, supra note 441, at 5.
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"kinds of cases that affect individual rights and involve the prob-
lems of the poor, the oppressed, the disabled and the victims of
discrimination."445 Unfortunately, Judge Reinhardt's simple
call "that Congress double the size of the courts of appeals"446
appears to be a lone voice on the federal bench."7
VI. THE JUDICIARY'S SMALL, ELITIST GENERALIZED VISION
A. Judicial Resistance to Increasing the Judiciary's Number
Despite the fact that additional judges are required to ensure
equal access to justice, during the last few years, leaders of the
federal bench have argued strongly against the creation of a
significant number of additional judgeships."' Some judges ex-
press concern that the unique nature and special personality of
the federal judiciary will be diluted by an increase in the size of
the judiciary above 1000 judges.449 Chief Justice Rehnquist
cautioned against "the long term implications of expanding the
federal judiciary," referencing other jurists' concerns that "a
federal judiciary rising above 1,000 members will be of lesser
quality.., and end up being divided into an almost unmanage-
able number of circuits or plagued by appellate courts of unman-
ageable size with an increasingly incoherent body of federal
law." "5° Similarly, Justice Antonin Scalia has expressed a view
that the federal courts should be reserved only for the important
cases and has opposed court growth. Justice Scalia has stated
445. Reinhardt, supra note 442, at 52.
446. Id. at 53.
447. See id. at 54. Judge Reinhardt acknowledges that even members of his own
court would disagree with his bleak descriptions of the federal judiciary. Id.; see also
infra notes 450-51 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice Relmquist's and
Justice Scalia's views).
448. See Gerald B. Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70.
For an historical perspective on judicial resistance to an increase in the size of the
courts, see HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973);
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985); Felix Frank-
furter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928).
449. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Some Judges Seek Cap on Ranks, NAT'L L.J., May
31, 1993, at 9.
450. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 2.
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that increasing the "number of federal judges ... helps the
docket [but] aggravates... the problem of image, prestige and
(ultimately) quality. 451
Second Circuit Chief Judge Jon 0. Newman is the leading
judicial advocate for a 1000-judge moratorium on the growth of
our federal judiciary. As early as 1989, in a University of Chica-
go Law Review article,452 Chief Judge Newman warned that
increasing the size of the federal judiciary to keep apace with
the increased federal caseload would lead to "appointments of
inadequate distinction! ' and a federal judiciary "indistin-
guishable from the judiciary of most states. 454 Chief Judge
Newman repeated his concerns in a 1991 speech to the Connecti-
cut Bar Association455 and expanded and clarified his position
in both a 1993 article in Judicature45 and a commentary in
the New York Times.457
Written in response to this Author's article suggesting an
increase in the size of the judiciary,45 Chief Judge Newman's
Judicature work began by stating that "the current trend to
increase [the judiciary's] size beyond tolerable limits" is the
"most serious threat to the proper functioning of the federal
judiciary."59 Chief Judge Newman is adamant regarding the
dangers presented by a larger judiciary:
The line must be held at 1,000 because once that number
is exceeded, it will be only a matter of time until the federal
judiciary grows to 2,000, 3,000, and then 4,000. Growth of
451. GORDON BERMANT ET AL., supra note 315, at 11 (quoting Justice Antonin
Scalia, Remarks Before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation and the Nation-
al Conference of Bar Presidents 11 (Feb. 15, 1987) (manuscript)).
452. Jon 0. Newman, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: Proposals To Preserve
the Federal Judicial System, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (1989).
453. Id. at 764.
454. Id. at 767.
455. Jon 0. Newman, Size of the Federal Judiciary Threat to Quality, CONN. L.
TRIB., Nov. 4, 1991, at 3.
456. Jon 0. Newman, 1,000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciay,
76 JUDICATURE 187 (1992-1993).
457. Jon 0. Newman, Are 1,000 Federal Judges Enough?, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
1993, at 17.
458. Victor Williams, Solutions to Federal Judicial Gridlock, 76 JUDICATURE 185
(1992-1993).
459. Newman, supra note 456, at 187.
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such magnitude will seriously impair the federal judiciary's
ability to perform the vital tasks assigned to it under our
system of government.
... A federal judiciary rising above 1,000 and heading for
3,000 judges will be of lesser quality and dominated by a
burgeoning bureaucracy of law clerks, staff counsel, magis-
trate judges, and other ancillary personnel. It will be divided
into an unmanageable number of circuits or plagued by ap-
pellate courts of unmanageable size, with an incoherent body
of federal law and a Supreme Court substantially incapable
of maintaining uniformity of federal law.46°
Many of Chief Judge Newman's arguments against increasing
the size of the judiciary also could be offered in support of add-
ing more federal judges. For example, without additional judges,
the court system certainly wiH not be able "to perform the vital
tasks assigned to it under our system of government."' The
dynamic nature of the nation's population and economy guaran-
tees tremendous civil litigation growth in our federal courts dur-
ing the next decade. Congress's 1994 crime control efforts462
and 1995 antiterrorism legislation463 guarantee a correspond-
ing increase in federal criminal prosecutions during the next few
years. Any number of additional legislative provisions currently
pending in Congress could significantly increase the judiciary's
workload. To avoid delays in, and an irreversible deterioration
of, national justice and national law, an immediate expansion in
the size of the judiciary is required. Expansion is the solution;
status quo notions of slow growth and no growth are the true
threats to the future quality of federal justice.
Judicial coping mechanisms already are too common during
these times of case overload.464 It is the small, elitist vision of
a federal judiciary that causes the present dependence on a
"burgeoning bureaucracy of law clerks, staff counsel, magistrate
460. Id. at 187, 194.
461. Id. at 187.
462. See infra part VII.C.2 (discussing the provisions of the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994).
463. See supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
464. See supra part IV.C.
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judges, and other ancillary personnel."65 Only by increasing
the number of Article III judges can we avoid having important
issues of procedural justice and substantive law rendered by a
burgeoning "shadow judiciary" 6-- staff attorneys, law clerks,
and other non-Article III magistrate personnel. The National
Association of Public Administrators' report on the dangers of
permanent law clerks abrogating judicial decisional authority by
serving as "assistant judges"46 ' and the pending legislative ef-
fort to grant magistrates carte blanche authority to conduct des-
ignated criminal trials without criminal defendants' consent468
are only the most recent warnings of the development of a
"shadow judiciary."'469
A restructuring and concurrent expansion of our national
houses of justice can address these and other concerns, such as
court structure, circuit sizes, and uniformity of federal law. At
the appellate level, such an expansion and remodeling would
foreclose discussion of substituting discretionary review for the
present statutory right of appeal."' Limiting available justice
to the certiorari discretion of the overworked courts of appeals
should not be an option of 'qast resort," as described by the Fed-
eral Courts Study Committee." 1 Indeed, it should not be an
option at all.4 72
As noted above, only Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt
465. Newman, supra note 456, at 194.
466. Memorandum, supra note 297, at 1.
467. Id. at attach. I.
468. See Federal Courts Improvement Act Transmitted to Congress, supra note
240, at 9 (discussing provisions of the Act); supra notes 241-42 and accompanying
text.
469. Memorandum, supra note 297, at 1.
470. For a discussion regarding the proposed elimination of absolute right of ap-
peal, see Donald P. Lay, The Federal Appeals Process: Whither We Goest? The Next
Fifty Years, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 515, 532-33 (1989); Donald P. Lay, A Propos-
al for Discretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 Sw. L.J. 1151, 1155-58
(1981); Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Asks Limit to Automatic.Appeals, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 1984, (Magazine), 27.
471. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 316, at 91. While recogniz-
ing discretionary appeal would be a major change, the Committee recommended the
option be studied. Id.
472. See generally Judith Resnick, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603
(1985) (discussing the Supreme Court's preclusion jurisprudence and suggesting alter-
natives to abolishing appeal as a matter of right).
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advocates adding more judges to the federal court system.4 73
He deems the argument "that we must remain small so that the
quality of judges will remain high" as "wholly meritless."474 In
a recent speech describing a "major battle" that is underway
"over the heart and soul of our federal judicial system, "
Judge Reinhardt asked a group of law students:
Whose courts are they? What is the purpose of federal courts?
Are they there to serve the judges or the people? All the peo-
ple or just a few? . . . Will they grow so that they can serve
the needs of an expanding population with expanding rights,
or will they be frozen in size and the number of judges
capped at the number now serving?
476
Rejecting the arguments of his court brethren who would freeze
the federal judiciary at 1000 judges in number, Judge Reinhardt
candidly stated:
At the heart of the freeze movement is judicial elitism. It
is the view that federal courts and federal judges are too
important for routine matters that only affect ordinary per-
sons.
The essential flaw in the approach of the judicial elitists is
that they believe the courts are there to satisfy their intellec-
tual desires, to provide them with intellectual stimula-
tion-rather than to serve the needs of the public, to promote
the public welfare.477
Judge Reinhardt describes those in the freeze movement as
varied in philosophy, both liberal and conservative.478 He de-
scribes the liberal and moderate judges as "victims of nostalgia
for days they never knew" and of being "comfortable with the
way courts have always operated,... [and] fear[ing] change.
They yearn for the days, long gone if they ever existed, when a
federal judge could walk down the street and be recognized and
473. See Henry Weinstein, Federal Judge Takes Issue With Limiting Court Expan-
sion, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1993, at A3; supra note 442 and accompanying text.
474. Reinhardt, supra note 442, at 52.
475. Reinhardt, supra note 441, at 1.
476. Id.




greeted by an admiring populace." '9
Answering Chief Judge Newman's concern over creating a
judicial bureaucracy, Judge Reinhardt reinforces the point, made
above, that bureaucratization of the judiciary will occur only
"when there are too few judges, not too many," and that, with
too few judges, the courts "lean too heavily on staff, enact pro-
cedures that result in the arbitrary classification of cases that
receive second class treatment, and then dispose of them by
shortcuts taken behind closed doors."
480
If judicial numbers count, as they seem to, Chief Judge
Newman is winning this "great battle," which so far "has been
waged behind closed [udicial] doors."' A recent Federal Judi-
cial Center survey of the entire federal judiciary on the wisdom
of a "cap" on the number of Article III judges found that "[a] ma-
jority of active district judges and more than 40% of active ap-
pellate judges strongly or moderately opposed a cap, while a
quarter of active district judges and a third of active appellate
judges strongly or moderately supported" such a definite numeri-
cal limit."2 The U.S. Judicial Conference has not accepted fully
Chief Judge Newman's proposal for a 1000-judge limit on the
size of the federal judiciary. In September 1993, however, the
Judicial Conference reaffirmed its previous position favoring
"'maintaining a relatively small Article III judiciary."'4
As a practical demonstration of its reluctance to allow growth
of the judiciary, the Judicial Conference rejected the Ninth
Circuit's recent request for ten additional permanent judge-
ships.4" Instead, the Conference agreed only to request "tem-
porary" judgeships from Congress. These "temporary" life-ten-
ured judgeships would expire with the death or retirement of the
first appointed judge, if occurring five or more years after the
479. Id.
480. Id. at 4.
481. Id. at 1.
482. See BERMANT ET AL., supra note 315, at 15.
483. Id. at 14 (quoting REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, Sept. 12, 1990, at 93).
484. The short-term caseload problem of the Ninth Circuit will be worsened by
the loss of two additional active judges to senior status. See Steve Albert, Ninth
Circuit's Norris, Nelson Decide To Take Senior Status, RECORDER, June 21, 1994,
at 3.
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effective date of the title.4" At the same time, the Judicial
Conference adopted a carefully controlled growth policy for the
federal courts.486
As judicial gridlock worsened in 1993, however, even Chief
Judge Newman requested two additional judges for the Second
Circuit. Interestingly, his request to the U.S. Court's Adminis-
trative Office was styled as one for "temporary" Article III judge-
ships."' Asserting that his request for only two additional
judges was not inconsistent with his previous positions taken as
the leading judicial opponent of national federal court growth,
Chief Judge Newman acknowledged that his circuit's need for
more judges will only increase in the future.4" If approved by
the Judicial Conference and enacted into legislation by Con-
gress, the request would be the first expansion of the Second
Circuit's size in a decade." 9
B. Judicial Resistance to Specialized Courts
As Congress ponders the caseload of the federal judiciary of
the twenty-first century, it must reconsider the "Old General
485. See 28 U.S.C. § 133 (1988).
486. Judicial Conference Endorses Carefully Controlled Court Growth, THIRD
BRANCH, Oct. 1993, at 1. The Judicial Conference voted to:
[1.] Reaffirm the federal Judiciary's historical commitment to the princi-
ple that its jurisdiction should be limited, complementing and not sup-
planting that of the state courts.
[2.] Endorse the principle that the size of the Article III Judiciary should
be limited to the number necessary to exercise such jurisdiction, thus
allowing a policy of carefully controlled growth.
[3.J Reaffirm its previous position favoring a relatively small Article III
Judiciary but opposing any efforts to set a maximum limit on the num-
ber of judgeships.
Id.
487. Deborah Pines, Circuit Court Seeks 2 Temporary Judges, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 22,
1994, at 1.
488. Id. The request letter stated:
It is with considerable reluctance that we make this request. We are
impelled to do so, however, by the recent growth in our filings and the
expectation that, by the time any additional judgeships might realistically
be filled, such growth will continue to a level beyond the capacity of our
current complement of judges.
Id.
489. Id. at 2.
FEDERAL CRIMINAL COURTS
Store" model of our federal courts, under which every judge
regularly hears a hodgepodge of cases-from civil antitrust, to
felony homicide, to congressional apportionment, to securities
violations, to criminal cocaine importation-and consider the
efficiency and results that may be achieved with a court struc-
ture divided into specialized judicial functions. Congress must
consider seriously whether the national judiciary, like the legal
profession, should divide and specialize its sundry jurisdictional
duties at the trial and appellate levels. This consideration
should focus primarily on the best interests of litigants, not on
the whims and preferences of the jurists presently staffing our
existing judicial structure.49
In past years, proposals for subject matter specialization of
our federal appellate courts, however limited in scope,491 criti-
cal in analysis,"' or carefully explicated,493 have been vigor-
ously rebuffed.494 Critics of specialization often cite the inaus-
picious weakness of the nation's Commerce Court, created in
1910 for the sole purpose of reviewing Interstate Commerce
Commission orders, as a prime example of the dangers inherent
in constricting the courts' generalized jurisdiction.49
The judiciary's commitment to maintaining the third branch's
status quo is exercised most vigorously in opposition to calls for
court specialization.498 The circular reasoning of the judiciary
490. Some specialization suggestions in the past have even considered establishing
multiple court systems, so as to give litigants a choice between specialized and gen-
eral jurisdiction. See Ellen R. Jordan, Should Litigants Have a Choice Between Spe-
cialized Courts and Courts of General Jurisdiction?, 66 JUDICATURE 14 (1982).
491. See Peter J. Levinson, A Specialized Court for Immigration Hearings and Ap-
peals, 56 NoTRE DAMiE LAW. 644, 651 (1981); Robert E. Rains, A Specialized Court
for Social Security? A Critique of Recent Proposals, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1987).
492. See Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking
System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1990).
493. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 167-84 (1976); Ellen R.
Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 745 (1981).
494. See Henry J. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 634, 639-40 (1974); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Bureaucracy--The Carci-
noma of the Federal Judiciary, 31 ALA. L. REV. 261, 268 (1980); Simon H. Rifkind,
A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary, 37
A.B.A. J. 425, 426 (1951).
495. See George E. Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court: A Study in Institution-
al Weakness, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 238 (1964).
496. Consider the following remarks Judge Patrick Higginbotham made to a meet-
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has become obvious: increasing the number of federal judges is
not an option because the additional judges would create courts
of unmanageable size and conflicting law; the creation of small-
er, specialized courts to provide consistency of law is per se not
acceptable to the existing judiciary; therefore, the judiciary must
remain limited in size.
A 1993 Federal Judicial Center (FJC) study497 reported
strong opposition to specialization of federal appellate review
among federal judges. 98 The report chronicles judicial antago-
nism to specialized Article III courts, including contentions that
appointments to such courts would be politicized, that special
interests or industries could unfairly influence the specialized
appointment process, and that "repeat player" litigants would
have an advantage in such courts.499
One of the most frequently expressed judicial concerns with
specialization is that of resulting docket boredom. Judges sug-
gest that their jobs would become unattractive if they were giv-
en specialized (i.e., limited) responsibilities; a narrow jurisdic-
tional range might lead to judicial "monotony."' Indeed, re-
sponding to an FJC survey, fifty-eight percent of the participat-
ing appellate judges either strongly or moderately opposed the
ing of the ABA's Young Lawyers Division:
I fear, however, courts of specialization. Virtually all substantive areas of
federal judicial decision making, including the area of patent law, impli-
cate broad underlying social concerns and tension. Courts of specializa-
tion, in my judgment, tend to become technically parochial. That is, there
is a higher risk with specialized courts than with courts whose judges
are trained as generalists that "technical" decision making will be cut
loose from its social moorings, and drift and founder on byzantine and
esoteric substantive law. This risk of intellectual inbreeding would be ag-
gravated by its geographical concentration in Washington, D.C. The very
nature of the Article III judicial duty calls for judges who are generalists
with some insight into the social consequences of their decisions; courts
of specialization displace this quality.
H-igginbotham, supra note 494, at 268.
497. The study was conducted, and the report was prepared, pursuant to section
302(c) of the Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5104.
498. See STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES, supra note 11, at 83-87.




idea of creating Article III specialty courts."' According to the
FJC's report on the survey:
[S]ome believe specialized courts result in lessened prestige
for their members. The status of the federal judge, it is ar-
gued, derives in part from the generalist nature of the posi-
tion. The actual risk of boredom and the presumption of bore-
dom by those who would not consider sitting on a specialized
court could result in a court of diminished stature and, ulti-
mately, diminished quality. °2
The results of the survey, which reported that the judges' true
objection was "not to specialization as a way of deciding cases,"
but only to a specialized Article III judiciary, perhaps further
reflects this underlying judicial concern with job satisfaction,
status, and prestige. °3
C. Judicial Resistance to Federal Crime Control by Lobbying
Congress and Constitutional Interpretation: An Alternative
Analysis of United States v. Lopez
1. Lobbying Against Federal Crime Control
Citing allegiance to federalism constructs, °4 judicial com-
mentators have demanded for years that criminal prosecutions
be left to the protected province of the states.0 5 Chief Justice
Rehnquist made this argument in 1992 to a meeting of the
501. Id. at 84 n.158.
502. Id. at 85.
503. Id. Notwithstanding judicial opposition to specialization, the independent Fed-
eral Courts Study Committee favored further consideration of appellate "national
subject matter courts." FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 316, at 120.
The Report stated: "[n]ational tax, admiralty, criminal, civil rights, labor, administra-
tive and other subject-matter courts could relieve the regional courts of appeals of
some of their current caseload and eliminate intercircuit conflicts in those areas of
the law." Id. The Committee specifically disfavored a separate administrative law
court, however. Id. at 72-73.
504. See Roger J. Miner, Federal Courts, Federal Crimes, and Federalism, 10
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 117 (1987).
505. See Judicial Conference Opposes Expanded Role for Federal Courts, THIRD
BRANCH, Oct. 1991, at 1, 3; see also Groups Oppose Federalization of Homicide
Cases, THIRD BRANCH, Oct. 1991, at 5 (arguing that federal jurisdiction over cer-
tain crimes involving weapons carried over state lines would be inconsistent with
federalism).
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American Bar Association: "To shift large numbers of cases pres-
ently being decided in the state courts to the federal courts for
reasons which are largely symbolic would be a disservice to the
federal courts and more importantly, to the whole concept of
federalism.""5 6
True to form, federal judges have been among the strongest
critics of Congress's latest effort to "federalize crime." O° For ex-
ample, Seventh Circuit Judge William Bauer complained that
Congress was "overburdening the judiciary" with the latest
crime legislation."0 ' A recent report released by the Criminal
Law Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States
stated the federal judiciary's official opposition to the 1994 feder-
al anticrime act: 'In short, the character, purpose, management
and operation of a branch of the U.S. government-the judicia-
ry- would be significantly redefined to the detriment of a ratio-
nal national crime control effort."'50 9 The report also acknowl-
edged that the nation's federal courts simply '"do not have the
resources to deal with the anticipated massive increases in
[criminal] cases."'5 10 More recently, Chief Justice Rehnquist ex-
pressed similar concerns: "Most federal judges have serious
concerns about the numbers and types of crimes now being fun-
neled into the federal courts.... [C]ontinuation of the past
decade's trend toward large-scale federalization of the criminal
law has the enormous potential of changing the character of the
federal judiciary."51
A 1992 FJC survey of federal judges supports Chief Justice
Rehnquist's reading of the views of his inferior judges. Of re-
506. Chief Justice Addresses ABA Midyear Meeting, THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1992,
at 1.
507. See John F. Rooney, Federal Judges Launch New Salvo at Crime Bill, CI.
DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 14, 1994, at 1.
508. Id.
509. Id. at 20 (quoting background paper of the Criminal Law Committee of the
U.S. Judicial Conference).
510. Id. at 1 (quoting background paper of the Criminal Law Committee of the
U.S. Judicial Conference).
511. Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 12, at 652 (quoting William H. Rehnquist,
supra note 7, at 6-7); see also William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: National
Conference on State-Federal Judicial Relationships (Apr. 1992), in 78 VA. L. REV.
1657, 1660 (1992) (stating that benefits can be derived from improving the relation-
ship between state and federal courts).
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sponding judges, 91.5% of active district judges and eighty-nine
percent of active circuit judges favored "'narrowing of federal
criminal jurisdiction to reduce prosecution of "ordinary" street
crime in federal courts."'512 Although federal judges cast their
opposition to an increased national campaign against violent
crime in terms of respect for federalism, perhaps their own per-
sonal interests and job preferences, rather than notions of "fed-
eralism," are being protected. In fact, state and local officials are
uniformly grateful for national assistance in the fight against
violent crime. 13
Certainly, the federal judiciary has every right and responsi-
bility to request sufficient resources to perform the jurisdictional
job assigned it by Congress. Should federal judges, however,
actively lobby Congress against crime control provisions in pend-
ing legislation for the purpose of protecting their personal job
assignment preferences? Consider the following August 1, 1994,
memorandum from District Judge Maryanne Trump Barry,
Chairman of the Criminal Law Committee of the Judicial Con-
ference, commenting on passage of the Violent Crime Control
Act through the House-Senate conference committee. Judge
512. See Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 12, at 652 n.3 (quoting FEDERAL JUDI-
CIAL CENTER, PLANNING FOR TBE FUTURE: FIRST REPORT OF RESULTS FROM A SURVEY
OF UNITED STATES JUDGES 11 (1992) (unpublished report, on file with the Federal
Judicial Center)).
513. Consider this frank response to the "federalism" argument, published in de-
bate format by two directors from the Federal Judicial Center:
Opposition to expansion of federal jurisdiction comes mostly from
federal judges and reflects primarily their interests. Rarely are state or
local officials or the bar heard to complain when Congress expands feder-
al jurisdiction. On the civil side, one hears no pleas for limiting the ju-
risdiction of federal courts or the access of litigants to them. When new
causes of action and other remedies are created by Congress, it is in
response to public, and often powerful, demand, as in the case of civil
rights laws. The bar's support for diversity jurisdiction is unwavering,
and even many state court judges favor the relief it affords them.
While one may take issue with the particulars of federal sentencing
law and policy, there is no public opposition to the federal government's
vigorous participation in the fight against crime, particularly crime in-
volving drugs or violence. It is extremely rare that federal prosecutions of
local crime are undertaken over the objections of local prosecutors. Gener-
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Barry stated:
I cannot tell you how awful this process has been, particular-
ly in terms of the brush fires which had to [sic] put out at a
moment's notice-just ten days ago, e.g., out of nowhere the
D'Amato amendment again reared its ugly head with a real
move to have it in the bill. Congressman Hughes, a good
friend of the federal judiciary, came to us for ammunition in-
cluding a letter from me, and D'Amato did not make it into
the bill.
And I believe we won the crime bill itself and, more partic-
ularly, on the two provisions of most interest to the federal
judiciary and as to which the Judicial Conference has taken
positions. First, of course, the D'Amato amendment, which we
opposed, did not get into the bill. Second, a safety value from
mandatory minimum sentences, which we supported, is in
the bill, and is retroactive. I can't tell you how delighted I am
with the safety valve-we've tried before and were unsuccess-
ful and no one gave even a non-retroactive safety valve much
of a chance in these "war on crime" days." 4
Even accepting that the judiciary has a good faith interest in
lobbying Congress regarding their criminal jurisdiction
charge,515 should not their personal preferences against forced
participation in the nation's "war on crime" be presented frank-
ly, rather than masked in "federalism" terms? The judiciary's
defeat of the "ugly head[ed]" D'Amato amendment,51 which
sought to bring the force of the national government to bear
against the most egregious felony firearm homicides, should be
described candidly, not cloaked as a victory for federalism.
Interestingly, state governments did not express concern
that the 1994 federal crime legislation violated their sovereign-
ty. Rather, for some time, they have been urgently seeking
514. Memorandum from Judge Maryanne T. Barry to Members of the Committee
on Criminal Law on the Crime Bill and Testimony Before Budget Comnittee 1-2
(Aug. 1, 1994) (on file with Author).
515. Judge Barry has been public in her opposition to the creation of additional
federal crimes. See Maryanne T. Barry, Don't Make a Federal Case of It, BALT. SUN,




relief and assistance from the national government in their
attempts to confront the scourge of violent crime plaguing
their citizens, especially because state courts systems face
equal or greater criminal and civil case overloads than does
the federal judiciary.517
2. United States v. Lopez51": Terminating Congressional
Jurisdiction To Fight Crime As a Method of Controlling
Federal Criminal Caseloads
U.S. District Judge Jim Carrigan, sitting in Denver, Colorado,
was one of several federal jurists publicly to question the juris-
dictional basis for federal involvement in crime control, citing
the federal law that restricts firearm possession in a school zone:
"Under what power does Congress act in regulating guns in
school zones?... Nothing in the statute hints at any basis for
federal jurisdiction, isn't regulation of schools and school neigh-
borhoods a matter of local and state concern?" 19 Judge
Carrigan framed his concern with national crime control efforts
as one involving the future of federalism: "Shall the constitution-
al concept of a central government of limited powers pass into
history?" 20 In April 1995, the Supreme Court agreed with
Judge Carrigan, and, for the first time in almost sixty years, the
high Court declared a law unconstitutional as exceeding the
powers of the Congress to regulate interstate commerce.521
The United States Congress certainly thought that it was
properly exercising its legislative powers when it passed the
Gun-Free School Zones Act in 1990." In a bipartisan effort to
confront the criminal violence in America's schools that each
year leaves hundreds of children injured and dead, Congress and
517. The Chief Judge of New York's highest court made this point well in criti-
cism of the Proposed Long Range Plan's proposed shifting of diversity of citizenship
cases to the state courts. See Judith S. Kaye, Federalism Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 1994, at A29.
518. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
519. Judge Carrigan's Warning, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 8, 1994, at A33.
520. Id.; see also Jim R. Carrigan & Jessica B. Lee, Criminalizing the Federal
Courts, TRIAL, June 1994, at 50 (discussing the criminalization of the federal courts).
521. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624.
522. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(25), 922(q) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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the Bush Administration enacted a modest act making posses-
sion of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school a federal felo-
ny.5 As had been the course since the 1930s, Congress an-
swered a grievous national concern with a narrowly tailored
national law restricting gun possession." Pursuant to the
Commerce Clause,'m the Supreme Court previously had upheld
Congress's similarly broad exercise of authority to regulate trade
unions,526 to restrict how much wheat an individual citizen
might grow for his or her own personal consumption,527 and to
forbid racial discrimination by restaurants" and hotels.'
In October 1994, Chief Justice William Rehnquist publicly
expressed his concern and dismay at such congressional action,
"which started more than a century ago and continues apace
today,"53 during a Wake Forest University commencement ad-
dress. Upon accepting an honorary doctor of laws degree,53'
Chief Justice Rehnquist targeted recent crime control efforts of
the Congress in his address and specifically outlined provisions
of the Violent Crime Control Act that violated his notions of
federalism. He stated:
Many observers, of whom I am one, have doubt as to the
wisdom of some of these provisions .... This is the same sort
of approach that Congress took initially with the regulation
of the railroads a century ago, with the prohibition of child
labor and the enactment of federal minimum wage and maxi-
523. The law stated that it was an offense "for any individual knowingly to pos-
sess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to be-
lieve, is a school zone." Id. § 922(q)(1)(A). The statute defines a school zone as "in,
or on the grounds of, a public, parochial or private school" or alternatively "within a
distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public, parochial or private school." Id.
§ 921(a)(25).
524. For a more general discussion of the problem of gun violence, see Andrew D.
Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction of Dialogic Re-
sponsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57 (1995).
525. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
526. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
527. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
528. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
529. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
530. William H. Rehnquist, Convocation Address, Wake Forest University (Oct. 25,




mum hour laws in the early part of this century, and with
the enactment of federal civil rights laws in the second half
of the century."2
Considering Chief Justice Rehnquist's publicly expressed views,
it was somewhat curious that court-watchers and commentators
expressed such surprise when Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for a five-member majority, issued its ruling in United States v.
Lopez" in April 1995, nullifying the Gun-Free School Zones
Act.5
34
The Lopez majority opinion first discussed what Chief Justice
Rehnquist termed "first principles" 35-the limited powers of
national government and federalism536 and the history of the
Court's Commerce Clause interpretation.53 The majority then
delineated three varieties of activities that Congress may regu-
late pursuant to the Commerce Clause: (1) "the use of the chan-
nels of interstate commerce," (2) the instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce, and (3) activities -having a substantial relation
to interstate commerce."' Acknowledging that "our case law
has not been clear whether an activity must 'affect' or 'substan-
tially affect' interstate commerce in order to be within Congress'
power to regulate it," Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the
"proper test" was "substantially affects." 5 39 The majority then
532. Id. at 1005.
533. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
534. See Aaron Epstein, Top Court Overturns Ban on Guns at Schools, RECORD,
Apr. 27, 1995, at Al; William H. Freivogel, Uncertainty Surrounds Court Ruling on
Commerce; But Experts Agree Ruling Limits Congress, May Jeopardize Laws, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 2, 1995, at Bll; Bennett L. Gershman, Judicial 'Conser-
vatism,' N.Y. L.J., June 21, 1995, at 2; Linda Greenhouse, High Court Kills Law
Banning Guns in a School Zone, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1995, at Al; Linda Green-
house, States' Rights; High Court Re-Examines A Long-Standing Basis for Federal
Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1995, § 4, at 2; Frank J. Murray, High Court Rejects
Law on Gun-Free School Zones; Curbs Congress' Reach in Local Matters, WAsH.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 1995, at Al.
535. Lopez, .115 S. Ct. at 1626.
536. Id.
537. Id. at 1626-30.
538. Id. at 1630.
539. Id. Justice Thomas concurred in a separate opinion to state his belief that
the "substantial effects test" is flawed because of the aggregation principle, and to
state more broadly his "original understanding" of the Commerce Clause's very spe-
cific limits. Id. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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applied its new test to declare the Gun-Free School Zones Act
unconstitutional.540
The remainder of the majority opinion is merely dressing for
this act of nullification.541 Refusing seriously to address the
government's numerous arguments about how school zone gun
possession affects interstate commerce,542 the opinion firmly
refused to "convert congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States."543
In a separate concurring opinion, Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor wrote what is certainly the most curious language of
the Lopez decision.14 After rehashing a long history of federal-
ism, Justice Kennedy expressed his and Justice O'Connor's poli-
cy belief (opposed to that of a unanimous Congress and Presi-
dent) that local and state governments can better deal with the
problem of guns in schools.545 The opinion specifically noted
that "over 40 States already have criminal laws outlawing the
possession of firearms on or near school grounds," and that
"[olther, more practicable means to rid the schools of guns may
be thought ... preferable" by the states.5 46 Amazingly, Justice
Kennedy gave numerous examples of "more practicable means"
to rid schools of guns that are supposedly foreclosed by the fed-
eral statute:
These might include inducements to inform on violators
where the information lead to arrests or confiscation of the
guns, programs to encourage the voluntary surrender of
guns with some provision for amnesty, penalties imposed on
parents or guardians for failure to supervise the child, laws
providing for suspension or expulsion of gun-toting stu-
dents, or programs for expulsion with assignment to special
facilities.54'
540. Id. at 1630-31.
541. See id. at 1631-34.
542. Id.
543. Id. at 1634.
544. Id. at 1634-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
545. Id. at 1638-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
546. Id. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
547. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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Justice Kennedy had expressed such a policy belief before
Lopez, albeit in more direct form. In 1994, testifying before the
Senate Appropriations Committee, Justice Kennedy warned
Congress against turning the federal judiciary into "police
courts" by passing additional crime control legislation.54 He
stated: "You said the magic words: Police courts .... We're
concerned that's going to be the effect of a number of these
proposals.' 549
In embracing a "substantial" relation or effects test and reject-
ing the government's argument (supported by a number of ami-
cus briefs) that violent crime can affect the economy, the Lopez
majority ensured the interpretive result of nullification of the
Gun-Free School Zones Act. Equally important, the test adopted
ensured for all federal judges a job satisfaction result-an end to
further federal prosecutions under the Act, which would have
merely clogged' up the nation's federal courts and forestalled
consideration of more attractive, or personally gratifying, cas-
es.55° Years of active lobbying efforts by judicial leaders against
congressional passage of additional federal crimes failed with
the passage of the Violent Crime Control Act; thus, the Supreme
Court's five-member majority took the policy, and the law, into
their own hands with Lopez to ensure that their elite federal
courts would not become police courts.55'
An interesting aspect of Lopez is that neither the Govern-
ment/Solicitor General, nor the amici supporting the law, made
548. See McNeillLehrer NewsHour: Crime Stopper? (PBS television broadcast, Mar.
10, 1994), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script File (transcript no. 4881) [here-
inafter Crime Stopper?].
549. Mary Deibel, Justices Fear Effects of Crime Legislation; Federal Courts Could
Become 'Police Courts," S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 4, 1994, at A9 (quoting Kennedy, J.).
550. For a traditional analysis of the Lopez decision, see Erwin Chemerinsky,
Changing Course: Lopez Limits Congressional Powers, TRIAL, June 1995, at 86.
551. The decision also prompted a legislative response from Senator Herb Kohl to
reinstate the law with the introduction of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1995 in
S. 890, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The new act would require that the govern-
ment prove in each prosecution that the gun involved traveled in or affected inter-
state or foreign commerce. The proposal faces opposition. See Herb Kohl, Guns in
Schools: Congress Can't Just Turn Its Back, WASH. POST, May 9, 1995, at A19;
Carrie A. Liberante, Gun-Free School Zone Bill Facing Resistance, CAPITAL TIMES,
July 19, 1995, at C2; Making School a Fed-Free Zone, WASH. TIMES, May 11, 1995,
at A19 (reprinting a memo released by the New Citizenship Project).
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alternative arguments in addition to the Commerce Clause
argument.552 For example, they could have argued that con-
gressional jurisdiction for the Gun-Free School Zones Act and
other substantial criminal legislation could be found, explicitly
or implicitly, within the text and history of the Constitution, a
document written to "insure domestic Tranquility" and "provide
for the common defence, 553 and containing, in Article IV,
Section 4, a specific guarantee that the national government
will protect the states from "domestic Violence."5" When
Constitutional Convention Delegate James Madison successful-
ly presented the Virginia Plan to the convention as a first
draft of the document, he explained that federal court "juris-
diction shall extend to all cases arising under the Nat.1 laws:
And to such other questions as may involve the Nat.1 peace
and harmony.
555
How can the rampant violence perpetrated on American chil-
dren,556 specifically in or near their schools, not be considered
"a question involving the national peace and harmony" subject to
the jurisdiction of the Congress?5 7 Homicide is the leading
552. That is not to say that the Government should be faulted for believing that
the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the specific prosecution of Alfonzo Lopez for
bringing a .38-caliber handgun with ammunition into Edison High School in San An-
tonio was not clearly within the ambit of modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Justice Breyer's dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, argued
clearly that it was; Breyer applied a "rational basis" test for judging whether a law
affects interstate commerce. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1658 (1995)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). He had no difficulty judging guns as inherently a part of
such commerce and understanding that guns near school zones have a clear econom-
ic impact. Id. at 1657-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justices Stevens and
Souter penned separate dissents to state their disagreement with the majority's
result. See id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1651-57 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Stevens agreed with "Justice Souter's exposition of the radical character
of the Court's holding and its kinship with the discredited, pre-Depression version of
substantive due process." Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
553. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
554. Id. art. IV, § 4.
555. 2 RECORDS, supra note 65, at 46 (Madison).
556. See Philip J. Hilts, More Teen-Agers Being Slain by Guns, N.Y. TIMES, June
10, 1992, at A19.
557. See Debbie Howlett, Handgun Crimes Hit Record, USA TODAY, May 16,
1994, at 1A (stating that handgun use in violent crime in 1992 was 40% higher
than the average of the previous five years); Tony Mauro, 200 Million Guns Can't
Be Ignored, USA TODAY, Dec. 29, 1993, at 1A, 2A (stating that, in America, a
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cause of death across the nation in inner cities.55 The Center
for Disease Control reports that the youth homicide rate nearly
doubled between 1984 and 1991 due to firearm deaths,55 9 and
the National Education Association estimates that 100,000 stu-
dents bring guns to school each day across America.5 60
A disturbing irony of Lopez is found in its timing; the Su-
preme Court told the American people that their Congress did
not have the power to criminalize schoolyard firearm possession
within a week of the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma
City.56' The city, state, and nation were relieved and comforted
by the national response to this criminal act that happened on
federal property; Americans were proud of the prompt, profes-
sional federal law enforcement activities following the devasta-
tion. Few citizens would question that such a federal response
and federal prosecution would have been proper had the crime
not taken place on federal property, but rather had occurred at a
local public day care or a local parochial school, even if all the
incidents and effects of the crime and the criminal actors had
been purely intrastate in nature. Lopez certainly questions the
authority of Congress to criminalize 'local bombings," "local
terrorism," and "local crime" that fail the new interstate com-
merce test. 2 As Chief Justice Rehnquist might state:
handgun is used to injure or kill once every 20 seconds).
558. See Mowing Down Our Children, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1992, at A16; A Mur-
derous Double Standard, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at A26.
559. See Bo Emerson, A Deadly Epidemic, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 3, 1993, at
Gi; see also B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Children Frightened by Gunfire Plead with
Congress for an End to Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1994, at A12 (discussing the
impact of violent crime on children); Bob Herbert, Reading, Writing, Reloading, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1994, at A23 (discussing the economics of marketing firearms to
children).
560. See Karen Brandon, Violence Tackled at 'Safety Summit,' CHI. TRIB., Apr. 10,
1995, at 3.
561. See Jesse Katz & Lianne Hart, Car Bomb Shreds Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, LA. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at Al.
562. See Joan Biskupic, Ban on Guns Near Schools Is Rejected; Congress Exceeded
Commerce Power, High Court Holds, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 1995, at Al; Catalina
Camia, High Court Strikes Down Law Banning Guns Near Schools; Decision in Tex-
as Case Could Affect Federal Firearms Measures, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 27,
1995, at Al; High Court Overturns School Gun Law; Other Legislation Now in Ques-
tion, STAR TRIB., Apr. 27, 1995, at Al.
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The possession of a gun [or bomb] in a local school zone is in
no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition
elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate com-
merce. Respondent [bomber] was a local [work-study] student
at a local school [and fertilizer plant]; there is no indication
that he had recently moved in interstate commerce."
Of course, the distinction between local and national concern
may depend on one's security perspective. In addition to prepar-
ing to announce the Lopez decision, the federal judiciary had
another response immediately after the bombing: "The day after
the Oklahoma City bombing, Administrative Office Director L.
Ralph Mecham directed staff to prepare a request for additional
funding for security, which the Executive Committee of the Judi-
cial Conference endorsed."5 ' The funding would provide for a
variety of security equipment, such as x-ray machines, and
would employ additional staff to conduct entry screening, in
addition to adding 400 court security officers for protection.
565
Firearms at federal buildings thus appear to be a genuine na-
tional concern, while the over 100,000 guns that enter our
nation's schools each day are only a "local" matter.566
D. Implementing the Judicial Leaders' Small, Elitist, Generalist
Vision: A Preliminary Review of the U.S. Judicial Conference's
Long Range Planning Committee's Proposed Long Range Plan
for the Federal Courts
The 1990 Federal Courts Study Committee made an adminis-
trative recommendation that the federal judiciary establish a
"permanent capacity to determine long-term goals and develop
strategic plans by which they can reach those goals."567 The
Report further stated: "The volatility of change throughout our
society requires the federal courts to have also a more systemat-
ic capacity to anticipate broader societal changes and plan for
563. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995).
564. Security Review Slated for Courts, THIRD BRANCH, May 1995, at 3.
565. Id.
566. See James Podgers, Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Arson Rulings illustrate
Lower Court Quandary over Congressional Power, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1995, at 44.
567. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 316, at 147.
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more distant horizons."568 The Judicial Conference immediately
responded to this challenge by creating the Committee on Long
Range Planning, composed of a magistrate judge, a bankruptcy
judge, three district judges, and four appellate judges. A Long
Range Planning Office also was established by the Administra-
tive Office to assist the Committee's work.
The design and incredible labors of the planning exercise, self-
described by the Committee in its 1995 Proposed Plan, unfortu-
nately were far more grand and impressive than its proposed
future for the federal judiciary.569 After the Committee issued
a Draft Report for public comment in November 1994, three
public hearings were conducted across the country, at which
seventy-four individuals made presentations.7 ° Additionally,
written comments were solicited.5 ' The Proposed Long Range
Plan for the Federal Courts (Proposed Plan or Plan) was submit-
ted to the Judicial Conference on March 15, 1995.72 The Judi-
cial Conference members were given the opportunity to review
the report and defer approval while requesting further study on
any of the Proposed Plan's 101 recommendations. Further action
was scheduled for the Conference's September 1995 meeting.7 3
Although comprehensive in detailing present case overload" 4
568. Id. at 146.
569. The labors included various stages of meetings with other federal and state
jurists, executive officials, legislative leaders, professional associations, and academ-
ics; reviewing the past work accomplished by other commissions addressing the work
of the federal courts and of hundreds of pieces of correspondence sent by parties
interested in the process; carefully considering the special reports from 13 standing
committees of the judicial conference; analyzing reports and research papers pre-
pared by staff and consultants of the Administrative Office; and taking up a specific
charge given by the full Judicial Conference to address the issue of a "cap" on the
number of Article II judges. PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 5, at 151-58.
570. Id. at 158.
571. Id.
572. Id.
573. For a list of the recommendations that were not identified for further study
and thus were deemed "approved" by the Conference, see Notices: Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States: Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, 60 Fed.
Reg. 30,317 (1995). See also Robb M. Jones, The Future of the Federal Courts, JUDG-
ES J., Fall 1995, at 17 (giving an overview of the Long Range Plan); A New Ap-
proach to Long-Range Planning for the Federal Courts, 79 JUDICATURE 4 (1995)
(critiquing the Long Range Plan).
574. PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 5, at 9-15.
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and predicting future judicial gridlock7 ' (including the conse-
quences of appointment delays 71), the resulting Proposed Plan
demonstrates the judiciary's firm commitment to a small,
generalist, elitist national court system. The final version of the
Long Range Plan, when publicly reported by the full Judicial
Conference,5 7 will deserve a detailed analysis of each recom-
mendation, suggestion, and all commentary.5 8 Presently, the
Proposed Plan serves as disturbing evidence that the jurists
constituting the Committee, with support from a bureaucracy of
third branch officials, external consultants, and co-opted aca-
demics, are willing to ration justice severely in order to keep
their own numbers limited and their jurisdiction generalized.
The Proposed Plan boldly demands that Congress and the
President limit the role of the national government in address-
ing violent crime57 9 and eliminate access to justice to a wide
575. Id. at 17-20, 137-50.
576. The Proposed Plan suggests that retiring judges should give advance notice,
id. at 94 (Recommendation 69), promotes a timely and efficient selection and ap-
pointment process, id. at 94-95 (Recommendation 70), and recommends a statutory
benchmark for timely appointments, id. at 95 (Recommendation 71). Most interest-
ingly, the Proposed Plan represents the first time that the judiciary has publicly
supported use of the President's recess appointment power pursuant to Article II,
Section 2, Clause 3, even while acknowledging past Senate disapproval of such ap-
pointments. Id. at 95-96 (Recommendation 72).
While supporting recess appointments by the Piesident alone, other provisions of
the Proposed Plan reinforce state-based selection of judges: 'judges in the district
courts should continue to be drawn from the states they are appointed to serve or
at least endorsed by representatives of those states." Id. at 48 (Recommendation 25).
The state-based selection of national judges has been the foundation of "senatorial
courtesy," a tradition used over the years to weaken the Executive's appointment
authority. See supra notes 114, 138, and accompanying text; infra notes 619-20 and
accompanying text.
577. Each page of the Proposed Plan includes the following disclaimer: "The
Committee on Long Range Planning has proposed this Long Range Plan for consid-
eration by the Judicial Conference of the United States. None of the recommenda-
tions presented herein represents the policy of the Judicial Conference unless ap-
proved by the Judicial Conference." PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 5; see
also Judicial Conference Acts on Long Range Plan Recommendations, THIRD BRANCH,
June 1995, at 6 (stating that the Judicial Conference had approved 64 of the Pro-
posed Lcng Range Plan's recommendations).
578. See Busy Conference Discusses Plan, THIRD BRANCH, Oct. 1995, at 1; Confer-
ence Acts on Long Range Plan, THIRD BRANCH, Oct. 1995, at 4.
579. PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 5, at 23-27 (Recommendations 2-5).
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range of civil litigants.s" ° Further, the Plan promotes the for-
mal institutionalization of various judicial shortcuts that threat-
en both judicial independence and excellence."31
The Proposed Plan's most radical and sweeping recommenda-
tions demand that Congress severely limit federal criminal juris-
diction to prosecutions "only in those instances in which state
court prosecution is not appropriate or where federal interests
are paramount."582 The Proposed Plan declares that federal
court criminal jurisdiction should be limited to five specific of-
fense types or categories," and it further recommends that
Congress comport to this list as it engages in a "thorough revi-
sion of the federal criminal code" that should include "sunset'
provisions to require periodic reevaluation" of federal crimes." 4
Additionally, the Proposed Plan directs Congress and the
President* to cooperate better with the states "to determine
whether offenses should be prosecuted in the federal or state
580. Id. at 27-36 (Recommendations 6-12).
581. Id. at 32-33 (Recommendations 9-10).
582. Id. at 23 (Recommendation 2).
583. The five offense categories are as follows:
(a) The proscribed activity constitutes an offense against the federal gov-
ernment itself or against its agents, or against interests unquestionably
associated with a national government; or the Congress has evinced a
clear preference for uniform federal control over this activity.
(b) The proscribed activity involves substantial multistate or international
aspects.
(c) The proscribed activity, even if focused within a single state, involves
a complex commercial or institutional enterprise most effectively prosecut-
ed by use of federal resources or expertise. When the states have ob-
tained sufficient resources and expertise to adequately control this type of
crime, this criterion should be reconsidered.
(d) The proscribed activity involves serious, high-level or widespread state
or local government corruption, thereby tending to undermine public
confidence in the effectiveness of local prosecutors and judicial systems to
deal with the matter.
(e) The proscribed activity, because it raises highly sensitive issues in the
local community, is perceived as being more objectively prosecuted within
the federal system.
Id. at 24-25 (Recommendation 2) (commentary omitted).
584. Id. at 25 (Recommendation 3).
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systems,""5 and specifically suggests that 18 U.S.C. § 3231,
which makes federal crimes an exclusively federal matter, be
repealed and replaced with a statute granting state courts
concurrent jurisdiction over certain crimes.8 6 Finally, the
Proposed Plan suggests that the executive branch should de-
velop standards for the Justice Department to make
"prosecutorial guidelines" that comport with the Plan's stated
circumscribed view of federal criminal jurisdiction, and specifi-
cally asserts that the potential for harsher federal sentencing
should not be a sufficient basis for federal, rather than state,
criminal statutes." '
With respect to the civil side of the federal docket, the Pro-
posed Plan demands that Congress "exercise restraint in the
enactment of new statutes" that would add to the judiciary's
civil jurisdiction, and states that Congress should only enact
new legislation when necessary "to further clearly defined and
justified federal interests.""s The Proposed Plan then lists six
appropriate subjects for federal civil jurisdiction.8 9 The Pro-
posed Plan specifically targets general diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction for elimination59 ° and directs Congress to limit di-
585. Id. at 26 (Recommendation 4).
586. Id.
587. Id. at 27 (Recommendation 5).
588. Id. (Recommendation 6).
589. According to the Plan:
Federal court jurisdiction should extend only to civil matters that-
(a) arise under the United States Constitution;
(b) deserve adjudication in a federal judicial forum because the issues
presented cannot be dealt with satisfactorily at the state level and in-
volve either (1) a strong need for uniformity or (2) paramount federal
interests;
(c) involve the foreign relations of the United States;
(d) involve the federal government, federal officials, or agencies as plain-
tiffs or defendants;
(e) involve disputes between or among the states; or
(f) affect substantial interstate or international disputes.
Id. at 27-29 (Recommendation 6) (commentary omitted).
590. Id. at 29 (Recommendation 7) (excepting cases involving aliens, interpleader,
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versity jurisdiction pending total elimination by not allowing in-
state plaintiff jurisdiction, by considering elimination of federal
appellate review of such cases, and by imposing a stricter (high-
er) amount in controversy requirement that does not include a
punitive damages assessment.59'
The Proposed Plan contends that Congress should eliminate
federal court jurisdiction over a wide range of "disputes that
primarily raise questions of state law or involve workplace inju-
ries."'592 This jurisdiction-stripping measure would target all
work-related personal injury actions brought in federal court
under the Federal Employers Liability Act and the Jones
Act. 9 Additionally, the Proposed Plan would bar from federal
courts routine claims for benefits brought pursuant to the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.' 9' The Pro-
posed Plan also recommends that any future national benefits
programs (such as a national health insurance plan) should
designate a state court forum for review.5 95
Besides advocating stripping the federal courts of significant
criminal and civil jurisdiction, the Proposed Plan formally seeks
to institutionalize a number of the judicial shortcuts, such as
those discussed above, that have been developed to cope with
judicial gridlock.596 The Proposed Plan encourages longer and
more intense service from senior judges ("as much as possi-
ble"597) and favors using additional permanent clerks to screen
certain pro se claims.595 The Plan also advocates either replac-
ing appeals of right with discretionary review for decisions of
Article I courts that have received initial review in the district
court, or allowing review of such decisions only by the courts of
appeals.599
and cases in which the petitioner has a clear need for a federal forum).
591. Id. at 29-32.
592. Id. at 34-35 (Recommendation 12).
593. Id. at 35.
594. Id. at 35-36.
595. Id. at 35.
596. See supra notes 574-76 and accompanying text.
597. PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 5, at 91-92 (Recommendations 65-
66); see id. at 77 (Recommendation 52b (1-4)) (explaining four ways in which senior
judges can increase their involvement in governance).
598. Id. at 61 (Recommendation 35d).
599. Id. at 44-47 (Recommendations 21-24). Additionally, Recommendation 22 de-
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The most disturbing of these shortcuts involves granting
greater power to subjudges-nontenured agency judges and
Article I court judges: "Where constitutionally permissible, Con-
gress should assign to administrative agencies or Article I courts
the initial responsibility for adjudicating those categories of
federal benefit or regulatory cases that typically involve inten-
sive fact-finding."00 The Proposed Plan specifically seeks to ex-
pand the authority of magistrates: "Magistrate judges should
perform judicial duties to the extent constitutionally permissible
and consistent with sound judicial policy."0 1 The Proposed
Plan's commentary calls for the "extensive use" of existing mag-
istrates, urges the recall of retired magistrates in order to "con-
serve the increasingly scarce time of district judges," and recom-
mends an expanded "role of the magistrate judge in the area of
felony criminal trials.""2 A separate recommendation seeks to
empower magistrate judges with "limited contempt power to
punish litigants or counsel directly for misbehavior, disobedience
or resistance to a lawful order."' 3 This direct authority to pun-
ish fellow members of the bar would amend 28 U.S.C. § 636(e),
which presently requires magistrate judges to certify the alleged
contempt to a district court judge.0 4
Reaffirming judicial resistance to subject-matter-specialized
federal courts, the Proposed Plan, in two separate recommenda-
tions, explicitly rejects specialization for both appellate and trial
courts. Alleging, but not referencing, "well known dangers of
judicial specialization," the Proposed Plan states: "The federal
appellate function should be performed primarily in a generalist
court of appeals established in each regional judicial circuit,"6 5
tails the special considerations and plans necessary for bankruptcy judges. Id. at 45
(Recommendation 22).
600. Id. at 33 (Recommendation 10).
601. Id. at 93 (Recommendation 67). Local districts, however, should retain flexi-
bility in deciding how to best use magistrate judges in light of local conditions and
changing caseloads. Id.
602. Id.
603. Id. (Recommendation 68).
604. Id. at 93-94.
605. Id. at 41 (Recommendation 17) (allowing also for the appellate fumction to be
performed in a Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with nationwide jurisdiction
in certain unspecified subject matter areas).
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and "the primary trial forum for disputes committed to federal
jurisdiction should be a generalist district court. 60 6
Similarly, reaffirming judicial leaders' desire to keep their
numbers few, the Proposed Plan warns generally that "federal
law would be babel" 7 with a large judiciary and details specif-
ically the harm that would be incurred by growth at the trial..
and appellate levels.0 9 The Plan, however, cautiously avoids
discussing the controversial and more blatant "fixed numerical
limits" 610 idea for the judiciary's future size.6" The Proposed
Plan thus demonstrates the circular logic of the judicial leaders'
opposition to both specialization and a large judiciary. Their
argument is simple: we want to remain generalist because of
"well known dangers of judicial specialization"; 12 if we remain
generalist and allow our numbers to increase, our courts will
cease to be unified and the resulting law will be "babel"; there-
fore, Congress should strip the third branch of criminal and civil
jurisdiction, as we recommend, so that we may remain a
generalist, elite number.
Irrespective of individual judges' opinions concerning the wis-
dom of adding members to their fraternity or specializing the
generalized judiciary, litigants and lawyers know that the nation
needs significantly more federal judgeships now and that the
606. Id. at 47 (Recommendation 25) (excepting contexts such as bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, international trade matters, and claims against the federal government).
607. Id. at 19.
608. Id. at 18.
609. Id. at 41-42 (Recommendation 18).
610. Id. at 42.
611. The Proposed Plan's commentary considers growth especially bad for the ap-
pellate courts:
Unrestrained growth has a different effect on the courts of appeals than
on the district courts. The effectiveness, credibility, and efficiency of a
court of appeals is intricately linked to its ability to function as a unified
body. . . . Rather, a "court" is a cohesive group of individuals who are
familiar with one another's ways of thinking, reacting, persuading, and
being persuaded. The court becomes an institution-an incorporated real
body of precedent and tradition, of shared experiences and collegial feel-
ings, whose members possess a common devotion to mastering circuit
law, maintaining its coherence and consistency (thus assuring predictabili-
ty), and adjudicating cases in like manner.
Id. at 42.
612. See supra note 605 and accompanying text.
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courts will need substantially more judges as we enter the next
century.613 The appeal for more judges operating in a contem-
porary, specialized judicial structure must be made directly to
Congress,6"' the branch of the government that is constitution-
ally charged to "from time to time ordain and establish" 5 the
nation's lower court system.
VII. A PRELIMINARY BLUEPRINT FOR REMODELING AMERICA'S
NATIONAL JUDICIARY
A. Assertive Executive Appointment Action: Implementing a
National Selection Process and Commissioning Recess Appointees
Before cooperating with Congress to implement a program of
expansion and specialized restructuring of the federal courts, the
President should take immediate steps to fill all existing trial
and appellate court vacancies. In doing so, he or she should
remember that it is the duty of the Executive, and of the Exec-
utive alone, to select and appoint federal judges; the Senate's
role is limited to a simple "yes" or "no" vote on the President's
choice.6"6 Despite the fact that over ninety-eight percent of in-
ferior court decisions are not reviewed by the Supreme Court,
President Clinton, as noted above, has followed the lead of
George Bush in neglecting lower court appointments. 6 7 Like
Bush's, Clinton's selection process has been painfully slow and
largely defaults choice to the political preferences of the senators
of the state in which vacancies happen to occur.6 8 By extend-
ing this practice of "senatorial courtesy" and, thus, expanding
the Senate's "yes or no" role in the appointment process, Presi-
dent Clinton encourages senators to give away judgeships much
613. See Deborah Pines, 6 Suburban Bars Ask U.S. Court for More Judges, N.Y.
L.J., May 23, 1994, at 1; Bruce Vielmetti, U.S. Courts Slow But Needn't Be, Report
Suggests, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 15, 1993, (Business), at 5.
614. See Randall R. Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative Response, 40 AM.
U. L. REV. 1003 (1991).
615. U.S. CONST. art. IL § 1.
616. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
617. See supra part III.B.
618. See Naftali Bendavid, Avoiding the Big Fight; Seeking Diversity; Not Con-




like patronage jobs.6 19
In an act of real political courage, and as a needed exercise of
genuine executive authority, the President should abandon the
practice of "senatorial courtesy" and the provincial practice of
state-based federal judicial selection. The Executive can best
achieve excellence and intellectual diversity on our national
courts by creating an efficient national selection model. The
creation of a national selection process effectively would end the
nonconstitutional practice of "senatorial courtesy."'20
In fact, judges chosen by the President through a national
selection process would be better insulated from the provincial
passions, prejudices, and politics of any given home state. In-
deed, in direct contrast with the present state-based selection
system, a national selection process could invoke a presumption
against selecting a federal judge to sit in a locale or state with
which he or she has substantial professional or personal ties.
The national judiciary was established by the Framers over
strong "states' rights" objections by the anti-federalists. 621 The
creation of a national selection process for these national judg-
es is consistent with the historical reasons for, constitutional
basis of, and contemporary design needed for our national court
system.
Such a selection process would allow the President to keep a
full slate of national judicial nominees to present for Senate con-
firmation. Under such a system, the Senate should not expect to
take a recess before acting on those nominations; rather, the
Senate should be prepared to stay in session year-round to take
619. Senatorial courtesy has been grossly enlarged in the last half of this century,
from the power to reject a nominee for a federal court position in any given state to
the power to select. As one commentator stated in 1960, "[olver the years it has be-
come traditional for senators of the president's political party to recommend nomina-
tions for federal judicial vacancies occurring in the districts of their states." Law-
rence E. Walsh, The Federal Judiciary . . . Progress and the Road Ahead, 43 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SoC'Y 155, 156 (1960).
620. See generally Sandra E. Strippoli, Note, Senatorial Courtesy: Not in the Pub-
lic Interest, Justiciable and Unconstitutional, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 957 (1984) (analyzing
the practice and abuse of senatorial courtesy at the state government level in New
Jersey).
621. See generally Aldhil R. Amar, Anti-Federalists, "Federalist Papers" and the Big
Argument for Union, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 111 (1993) (giving detailed history
of debates on the national judiciary at the Constitutional Conventions).
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swift confirmation action on each such nomination.
In the absence of Senate diligence, the President should be
prepared to recess-commission judges, in order to ensure the
continued functioning of the national justice system.6" The
U.S. Constitution grants the President such appointment au-
thority: "The President shall have the Power to fill up all Vacan-
cies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by grant-
ing Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next
Session."' This underutilized appointment authority holds
promise for an end to the confirmation mess6 24 and can be an
effective method for keeping the federal judiciary fully staffed.
Second Circuit Chief Judge Jon Newman's recent proposal of a
constitutional amendment to allow the federal judiciary to ap-
point its own judges in the face of appointment delay reflects the
serious nature of the vacancy problem.6" Obviously, such a
proposal's worth is found in its shock value: it would be an error
to amend the Constitution in this manner.626
The constitutional system for exclusive executive choice in
appointments, combined with the recess appointment authority,
remains a perfectly good constitutional system.6" In consider-
ing Senate delay, one must remember that any president retains
the constitutional privilege to fill the judiciary and run his or
her administration with a government of recess-appointees. Al-
though such action should not be instituted carelessly, recess-
appointments require neither the advice nor the consent of a
622. For a recent student note on the practicalities of the use of recess appoint-
ment power, see Michael A. Carrier, Note, When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes
of the Recess Appointments Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2204 (1994).
623. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 3.
624. See supra part Ill.
625. Chief Judge Newman's proposal suggests that if a judicial vacancy is not
promptly filled (within one year), the sitting judges would make the selection them-
selves. See Mordecia Rosenfeld, Reproducing Federal Judges, N.Y. L.J., July 6, 1994,
at 2.
626. For a harsh criticism of Chief Judge Newman's suggestion, see id. But see
Elliot Golden, Essay on Selecting Judges Is Misleading, N.Y. L.J., July 12, 1994,
at 2.
627. See generally John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution,
and the Confirmation Process; A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 633 (1993) (criticizing and pointing out factual errors in Strauss's and
Sunstein's sweeping proposals for the reform of Appointment Clause powers).
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recalcitrant Senate. The simple, and only proper, solution is for
all future chief executives to take seriously their constitutional
duty to appoint all federal judges-to view the selection and
appointment of lower court jurists as being just as important as
selecting Supreme Court Justices.
B. Expanding and Remodeling Our National Houses of Justice
Congress should be encouraged to authorize immediately
additional trial and appellate level judgeships for our most over-
crowded jurisdictions. Only with an increased number of judges
can the court system hope to cope adequately or adeptly with
the increased caseload that is certain to follow even a modest
enforcement of recent federal crime control legislation.6'
Ensuring such immediate relief to our most overburdened
judges should be followed with plans for a fundamental expan-
sion of the federal judiciary. One only has to look at the num-
bers to see that such an expansion of the federal courts is re-
quired. Today, there are 649 district court judges attempting to
adjudicate all the civil litigation, commercial disputes, adminis-
tratiye actions, and criminal prosecutions of a nation of over 250
million people.629
At the appellate level, the numbers are even more revealing.
As Professor Thomas E. Baker reports in Rationing Justice on
Appeal, in 1950, there were sixty-five appellate judges deciding
2355 appeals, or thirty-six annual appeals per judge; in 1990,
there were 156 appellate judges deciding 38,520 appeals, or 245
appeals per judge.63 It is no wonder, then, that it takes 255%
longer to decide an orally argued case in 1990 than 1950.631
The judiciary's own projections for the future growth of their
caseload is demonstrative of the need for more judges. The Long
Range Planning Committee's Proposed Plan conservatively esti-
mates that, by the year 2020, the annual number of district
628. As a related area of concern, security in our federal courts deserves atten-
tion. See Court Security: How Safe Are the Federal Courts?, THIRD BRANCH, Sept.
1993, at 1.
629. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPi OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 9 (114th ed. 1994).
630. BAKER, supra note 29, at 45.
631. Id. at 46-47.
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court cases commenced will rise to over one million-1,109,300
from the present level of 276,636-and that is only if the federal
courts' civil and criminal jurisdiction grows at the same rate as
it has over the last fifty-three years.632 The annual appellate
caseload will rise to approximately 325,100 from the present
level of 50,224.633 More startling than these numbers is the
judiciary's desire to strip their courts of jurisdiction so as to
ensure their continued smallness.
Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt has clearly sounded
the alarm that the consequences of the judiciary's "fetish for
smallness are beginning to border on the disastrous. '6  Under
the Framers' design, the guarantees of individual liberty and
fundamental rights, both constitutional and statutory in origin,
are meant to be enforced by independent, life-tenured Article III
judges. As Judge Reinhardt argues, "we must have enough judg-
es to give every case that comes before us the scrutiny and con-
sideration it deserves."635
We need more judges today in order to break the present
gridlock that leaves civil litigants waiting years in queues, out-
side our federal courthouses, on increasingly dangerous streets.
We need substantially more judges for the future to ensure that
justice is available to all. In honor of George Washington's
avowed mission to develop a federal "judicial system as perfect
as possible in its formation,1 31 the President and Congress
should work together to expand the size and restructure the
generalized nature of our federal judiciary.
Applying comparative lessons, the federal judiciary could be
effectively specialized in any number of subject matter catego-
ries at the appellate level, with commercial courts of appeals,
labor courts of appeals, Social Security courts of appeals, and
632. PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 5, at 18 ("present level" refers to
the 1993 data used by the Committee on Long Range Planning throughout the Pro-
posed Plan).
633. Id.
634. Reinhardt, supra note 274, at 1520.
635. Id. at 1521.
636. Potter Stewart, Retirement Press Conference, 55 TENN. L. REV. 21 (1981) (re-
ferring to comments made by George Washington in the creation of the Judiciary
Act of 1789).
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regulatory courts of appeals. Additionally, the Supreme Court's
increasingly shrinking docket recently has raised the need for
third-tier national (junior supreme) courts to provide greater na-
tional law consistency.637
Past specialization success has been achieved by the United
States Court of Custom,63 the United States Tax Court,"9
the Court of International Trade,640 the Emergency Court of
Appeals,"' the Temporary Court of Emergency Appeals,642
and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.6 3 As dis-
cussed above, a strong per se prejudice, especially among federal
judges, continues to exist against further Article III specializa-
tion;644 however, there have been and remain proponents for a
move away from generalized federal court jurisdiction.6 5
637. See Victor Williams, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Mastrobuono and the
Need for Creation of a National Court of Commercial Appeals, 100 COM. L.J. 281
(1995).
638. See Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L.
REV. 329 (1991); Nathaniel L. Nathanson, The Administrative Court Proposal, 57 VA.
L. REV. 996, 1008-09 (1974).
639. See HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS (1979).
640. See Johm B. Pegram, Should the U.S. Court of International Trade Be Given
Patent Jurisdiction Concurrent with That of the District Courts?, 32 HOUS. L. REV.
67 (1995).
641. See NATHANIEL L. NATHANSON, THE EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS, IN OF-
FICE OF PRICE ADMINISTRATION, PROBLEMS IN PRICE CONTROL: LEGAL PHASES (1947).
642. See Note, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Temporay Emergency Court of
Appeals, 64 MINN. L. REV. 1247 (1980). For blunt criticism of this court, see James
R. Elkins, The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals: A Study in the Abdication of
Judicial Responsibility, 1978 DuKE L.J. 113.
643. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); Daniel J. Meador, Origin of the Federal Circuit:
A Personal Account, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 581 (1992). For jurisdictional statements of
the Federal Circuit, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(c), 1292(d), 1295 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
644. For the most balanced judicial analysis of specialization, see POSNER, supra
note 448, at 147-60; Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive
Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56
S. CAL. L. REV. 761 (1983).
645. See Envin N. Griswold, Cutting the Cloak To Fit the Cloth: An Approach to
Problems in the Federal Courts, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 787 (1983); Clement F.
Haynsworth, Jr., Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the Federal Appellate
System, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 597 (1974). Preeminent among those academics willing
to contest the prevailing judicial prejudice against specialized jurisdiction is Virginia
Professor Daniel Meador. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial.Archi-
tecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L.
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The legal profession long ago abandoned its sentimental at-
tachment to the generalist practice of law; specialties and
subspecialties are now the norm of the bar even as the bench
revels in its generalist traditions.646 Specific arguments against
specialization, such as loss of the supposed benefits of general
jurisdiction "percolation" of issues,"' and fear of "capture" of
subject matter litigation by one side,64 become less compelling
with time. In 1989, after weighing the arguments for and
against specialization, the ABA Standing Committee on Federal
Judicial Improvements favored specialization and reasoned "that
cases of nationwide significance should be subject to review by a
single, national forum."649 Justice Antonin Scalia, not a pro-
ponent of court growth, has recognized that the time for federal
court specialization may be at hand: "A nation of a quarter-bil-
lion people that no longer distributes the bulk of its judicial
business regionally, through separate state systems, must sim-
ply consider distributing it through subject matter.'2 50
A subject matter restructuring proposal for both the trial and
appellate level that deserves immediate study and eventual
implementation is the formal division of the criminal and civil
functions of the federal judiciary and the establishment of a
junior criminal supreme court. The prosecutions resulting from
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
and other pending and future national efforts to combat violent
crime, mandate the creation of such criminal courts.6 51 To al-
low the federal judiciary to provide effective civil and criminal
justice into the twenty-first century, U.S. District Criminal
Courts, U.S. Courts of Criminal Appeals, and a third-tier U.S.
REV. 603 (1989).
646. See BAKER, supra note 29, at 262.
647. Id.
648. See Lawrence Baum, Specializing the Federal Courts: Neutral Reforms or Ef-
forts To Shape Judicial Policy?, 74 JUDICATURE 217 (1991).
649. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMM. ON FED. JUDICIAL IMPROVE-
MENTS, THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS: REEXAMINING STRUCTURE AND PRO-
CESS AFTER A CENTURY OF GROWTH 21 (1989).
650. Gary A. Hengstler, Scalia Seeks Court Changes-Discounts Intercircuit Panel
in Favor of Special Courts, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1987, at 20, 20.
651: See Zachary R. Dowdy, U.S. Prosecutors Hit the Streets with Police, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 15, 1995, at 17 (illustrating the effects of recent anticrime statutes).
648 [Vol. 37:535
FEDERAL CRIMINAL COURTS
National Court of Criminal Appeals should be established as
Article III courts, separate from the existing federal court
structure.
C. Policy and Theory Supporting a Separate System of Federal
Criminal Courts
1. Advisory Committee Recommendations
Under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,65 each federal
court jurisdiction was required to empanel an "advisory group,"
comprised of local attorneys and other professionals, to evaluate
the efficiency of the federal court.65 The Act further directed
each jurisdiction to use these external advisory committee evalu-
ations to prepare a court plan for reducing civil justice delays
and expenses.654 The Act required court reports to be submit-
ted to the Administrative Office by early 1994.5
Interestingly, the Advisory Committee reports from the Cen-
tral District of California and the Middle District of Florida each
recommend a division of the courts' civil and criminal judicial
functions. In the Central District of California, whose federal
courts in Los Angeles and Santa Anna have the most civil filings
of any jurisdiction in the nation, the advisory group termed the
criminal-civil division "as an important step toward easing cost
and calendar burdens."56 Indicative of the status quo en-
trenchment of the federal judiciary, the court plans of the Cen-
tral District of California and the Middle District of Florida did
not adopt the civil-criminal division recommendations of their
advisory groups.65'
652. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. V 1993).
653. Id. §§ 472, 478.
654. Id. § 472.
655. Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(b), as amended by Pub. L. No. 102-572, tit. V, §
505, Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4513.
656. See Henry Weinstein, Split of Area's U.S. Court, Civil, Criminal Branches
Urged, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1993, at A3.
657. Id.
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2. The Reality of American Violent Crime and Recent
Congressional Responses
Recent Justice Department statistics indicate that reported
crime has declined in recent years;... yet, for good reason, the
American people remain terrified of criminal violence. Although
overall crime statistics fluctuate from year to year, occurrence of
the most violent of criminal offenses has consistently and dra-
matically increased over time.5 9 In the last four decades, the
average rate of per capita violent crime has quadrupled in the
United States.66
Workplace violence has become common, extending into law
firms and federal courthouses. In fact, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) ranks homicide as the third
leading cause of workplace death in America.6"' Federal judges
should not need to be reminded that criminal violence brutalizes
the most vulnerable and least wealthy among us. Violence is
both terrorizing and corrupting our nation's children,662 and
crime so frightens our nation's elderly and disabled that many
have become prisoners in their own homes.663
658. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. NO. NCJ-
148211, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1993, at 363 (1993) (showing
a decline of 3.3% between 1991 and 1992); Adam Walinsky, The Crisis of Public Or-
der, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1995, at 39.
659. Walinsky, supra note 658, at 39, 44.
660. Id.
661. Job Safety, Vehicle Crashes Top Worker Risks; Homicides Emerge As Major
Threat, Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA), Nov. 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Curnvs File.
662. Recent Justice Department statistics indicate that juveniles comprise only
10% of the population, yet are 23% of all violent crime victims. See Carl Weiser,
Stats Confirm Juvenile Violence, But What's Answer?, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, July
28, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. A Senate Juvenile Justice
Subcommittee found that murder arrests for children increased 50% from 1982 to
1991 and that arrests for weapon offenses increased by 100% in the same period. Id.
U.S. Representative Charles Schumer, former Chairman of the House Judiciary
Crime Subcommittee, recently spoke of the danger of a morally numbing effect of
such crime statistics: "Disturbing figures about violence in America are released so
often we treat them as if they were a box score from yesterday's baseball game. Our
country has to take radical action to counter this trend of violence." Id. For an illus-
tration of this violence, see John W. Fountain, Boy Shot in Gang Fight Dies; He's
81st Victim of a Deadly July, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 1994, at 1.
663. See Peter J. Howe, Target: Crime Against Elders; Weld To Propose Stiffer
[Vol. 37:535650
FEDERAL CRIMINAL COURTS
Homicide now causes the deaths of children both in American
inner cities and nationwide. School violence has reached epi-
demic proportions, sparing not even students of Harvard and
Yale.6 We are a people so desensitized by the "normal" crime
that kills a classroom of children every two days in America
that it takes the intensity of the Oklahoma City federal build-
ing bombing to touch our hearts and open our minds. This
hateful and vicious act, which spread shock, grief, and terror
across the country, compels us as a nation to judge national
violence, organized and chaotic, to be the ultimate civil rights
violation against individuals.665
The objective and situs of the Oklahoma City criminal attack,
to instill terror in America's heartland, necessitates us to regard
the "insurance of domestic peace" as a national security issue
just as crucial as international peace. For, just as violent crime
destroys the life of the individual victim and devastates the lives
of the victim's family and friends, crime also debilitates the
moral, political, and economic foundations of the Republic.
One should not be surprised that even in these political times
of devolution and neofederalism, the national legislature has
begun to take seriously its national obligation to help ensure the
safety and domestic security of Americans. The Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994666 allows for federal
prosecution of gang crimes, bans nineteen types of semi-auto-
matic assault weapons, imposes a "three strikes and you are in
for life" sentencing provision, increases from two to sixty the
number of federal crimes punishable by death (including fatal
caijackings and drive-by shootings), creates a number of new
death penalty offenses, creates a new federal crime for posses-
sion of a handgun by a juvenile, and requires the prosecution of
juveniles as young as thirteen as adults when charged with gun
Penalties, BOSTON GLOBE, July 18, 1994, at 15.
664. Life and Death on Amercia's Campuses, PHOENIX GAZETE, June 1, 1995, at
B8.
665. For a discussion of the impact of the Oklahoma City bombing, see Judicial
Family Responds to Crisis in Oklahoma City, THIRD BRANCH, May 1995, at 1.
666. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 20, 21, 26, 28, 31, 42
U.S.C.).
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crimes."' In addition to expanding the federal effort to chal-
lenge violent crime, the new law creates and expands a number
of "white collar" crimes; among other things, the law prohibits
computer abuse, insurance fraud, and bank fraud, and commits
federal law enforcement resources to help to reduce fine art
theft. 6
68
The new legislation also confronts violence against women by
creating a federal crime for interstate stalking and spousal
abuse.669 It also provides a new civil remedy for gender-based
crimes of violence.67' Even the most timid efforts by federal
prosecutors to enforce the new criminal laws certainly will over-
whelm our federal trial and appellate court dockets and serious-
ly threaten the ability of civil litigants to obtain justice.67 The
recent antiterrorism legislation,6 72 developed as a result of the
Oklahoma City bombing,673 promises additional work for our
federal courts, if enacted.
Other federal anti-crime legislation has been promised by the
Republican Congress in their Contract with America.674 The
final version of these landmark pieces of legislation will deter-
mine the future direction of the workload of the federal courts.
As Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt has noted, reform proposals
based on a future congressional restriction of criminal jurisdic-
tion are "wholly illusory or fanciful at best and dishonest or
deceptive at worst. Criminal law has already been federal-
ized .... [I]t would be ludicrous to premise a reform plan upon
the naive belief that Congress is going to heed calls to reduce
667. See Carolyn Skorneck, Lawmakers Forge $33B Anti-Crime Bill, RECORD,
July 29, 1994, at Al; see also Katharine Q. Seelye, Accord Reached on Sweeping
Bill To Battle Crime, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1994, at Al (highlighting the bill's
main provisions).
668. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 §§ 290001, 320603,
320606, 320902.
669. Id. § 40221.
670: Id. § 40302.
671. Skorneck, supra note 667, at Al.
672. S. 735, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995); H.R. 1710, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1995).
673. S. 735; H.R. 1710.
674. Andrew Mollison, Republicans Get 'Marching Orders' for Coming Battles on
Capitol Hill, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 7, 1995, at A7.
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the federal courts' federal criminal jurisdiction."" 5 Separate
federal criminal courts are a practical necessity to ensure effi-
cient, competent, and fair adjudication of the certain increased
number of prosecutions of the certain increased number of feder-
al crimes.
3. Creation of Separate Criminal Courts As Mandated by the
National Government's Constitutional Duty To "Establish
Justice," "Insure Domestic Tranquility," and Enforce the
"Protection Against Violence Clause"
Judicial concern over Congress's failure to provide substantial
additional judicial resources as a part of the crime control effort
is understandable. Philosophical arguments advanced by judges
against an increased federal response to violent crime, however,
might be judged as elitist, or even callous, when considering the
present level of violence across America. Notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez,"6
which, as noted, radically altered the Court's historic Commerce
Clause interpretation,"7 both explicit and inherent powers of
the national government to maintain national law and order
exist. A corresponding constitutional duty exists to maintain an
orderly, functioning national criminal justice system.
The federal government's constitutional role in ensuring "do-
mestic Tranquility" was a central concern of the Constitution's
Framers. Developing the capacity for a national response to
insurrections and criminal violence, typified at the time by the
Vermont Uprisings" and the Shays Rebellion,"' was a cen-
675. Reinhardt, supra note 274, at 1515.
676. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
677. See supra part VI.C.2.
678. See RICHARD B. MORRIS, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON THE CONFEDERATION AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1970).
679. See DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAY'S REBELLION (1980); see also CHRISTOPHER
COLLIER & JAMES L. COLLIER, DECISION IN PHILADELPHIA: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
VENTION OF 1787 (1986).
To men like Madison and Washington, Shays' Rebellion was an im-
perative. It hung like a shadow over the old Congress, and gave both
impetus and urgency to the Constitutional Convention. It was the final,
irrefutable piece of evidence that something had gone badly wrong. For
some time these men had known the deficiencies of the American govern-
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tral concern of the 1787 Constitutional Convention.8 ° The
Framers expressly imposed a duty on the national government
to protect the internal safety and security of the new nation's
citizens. As John Jay, then the Confederation Congress's Foreign
Secretary, commented: "Justice must have a sword as well as a
balance."68' The Framers understood the importance of having
the constitutional capacity for a national response to widespread
criminal violence. Remembering Daniel Shay's proclamation to
his riotous mobs to "[cllose down the courts, " '2 the Framers
were careful to ensure that capacity by, inter alia, envisioning
federal courts in which to adjudicate national criminal actions.
Among the purposes for the new Constitution, as declared in
its Preamble, were the establishment of justice and insurance of
domestic tranquility.6" In the same section that authorizes
Congress to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court,"6 4 the Constitution explicitly grants Congress the pow-
er to raise revenue for the specific purpose of providing "for the
common Defence" of the states.8 The Constitution also be-
stows upon Congress the authority to "call forth the Militia to
execute the Laws of the Union and to supress Insurrections," in
addition to the power to protect against foreign invasions. 8 In
addition, it grants Congress the power to "make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitu-
tion into the Government of the United States, or in any De-
partment or Officer thereof."8 '
Another explicit textual dedication of this national constitu-
tional responsibility, which this Author recently labeled the
ment must be remedied. Shays' Rebellion made it clear to them that it
must be done now.
COLLIER & COLLIER, supra, at 13.
680. See supra notes 678-79 and accompanying text.
681. RICHARD B. MORRIS, WITNESS AT THE CREATION: HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY,
AND THE CONSTITUTION 177 (1985).
682. Id. at 172.
683. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
684. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
685. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
686. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
687. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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Constitution's "Protection Against Violence Clause, appears
in Article IV, Section 4, Clause 3. That clause provides, in rele-
vant part: "The United States shall protect... each of [the
states] ... against domestic violence."6 9 Contemporary consti-
tutional scholars largely have either ignored this important
textual language, or they have merged it into the Guarantee of a
Republican Form of Government Clause of the same Article IV,
Section 4, and thereby have avoided analyzing it separately.
60
This textual charge to the "United States," however, is unequivo-
cal in demanding protection of the citizens and residents of the
states from uprisings, commotions, and, yes, from criminal vio-
lence, upon "application" of assistance requests from the states.
The inclusion of the "Protection Against Violence Clause" in
the main text of the document was in direct reaction to constitu-
tional convention delegates' concerns with violent uprisings and
internal disorder. During the debates, William Randolph stated
that Article IV, Section 4 was to have two different purposes:
"The Resoln. has 2. Objects. I. to secure Republican Government.
2. to suppress domestic commotions."691' Randolph "urged the
necessity of both these provisions."692
James Madison, in The Federalist, argued for ratification of
the new Charter and specifically referenced this national prom-
ise of domestic security: "We have seen the necessity of the Un-
ion.., as the conservator of peace among ourselves."693 Surely,
James Madison would have seen the present level of violent
688. See Victor Williams, Founders Mandated Federal Role in Crime Control,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 8, 1993, at 15.
689. In full, Article IV, Section 4 states:
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive
(when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
690. See POSNER, supra note 448, at 178; WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE
CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1972); Hans A. Lind, When Is Initiative Law-
making Not "Republican Government"?, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 159 (1989);
Deborah J. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a
Third Centuiy, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988).
691. 2 RECORDS, supra note 65, at 47.
692. Id.
693. THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 140 (James Madison) (Issac Kramnick ed., 1987).
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crime in America, especially violence that is directed against our
children, as violative of the notion of "peace among ourselves."
Both as President of the Constitutional Convention and as the
nation's first Chief Executive, George Washington took most
seriously the duty of all three branches of the national govern-
ment to maintain an orderly and safe society. In his November
19, 1794, speech to a joint session of Congress, President Wash-
ington announced with "deepest regret" that "some of the citi-
zens of the United States have been found capable of an insur-
rection." '94 Describing how the violence in the western counties
of Pennsylvania had endangered the national peace, Washington
began by acknowledging the role of the federal courts in main-
taining civil order:
Upon the testimony of these facts, an associate justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States notified me, that "in
the counties of Washington and Allegheny, in Pennsylvania,
laws of the United States were opposed, and the execution
thereof obstructed, by combinations too powerful to be sup-
pressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceeding, or by
the power vested in the marshall of the district." 5
The new national government, led by the newly created federal
courts, took a front-line position in the implementation of law
and order. There were no rambling "federalism" discussions
regarding whether it would have been better for the state gov-
ernment of Pennsylvania to exercise its police powers, or juris-
dictional questions raised as to whether the national govern-
ment should be suppressing rampant violence. Rather, criminals
and their victims alike were viewed as "citizens of the United
States." Washington and others looked to the national judiciary
first to ensure "domestic Tranquility" and "establish Justice."
This role of the federal courts was to provide national justice "a
sword as well as a balance."
696
When the fledgling federal courts proved too feeble to match
the gross act of violence, President Washington made the diffi-
cult decision to call out the militia and personally led them west
694. 12 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 100, at 44.
695. Id. at 46.
696. MORRIS, supra note 681, at 177.
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to restore order and law:
[Tihe judiciary was pronounced to be stripped of its capacity
to enforce the laws; crimes, which reached the very existence
of social order, were perpetrated without control; the friends
of government were insulted, abused, and overawed into
silence or an apparent acquiescence; and to yield to the trea-
sonable fury of so small a portion of the United States would
be to violate the fundamental principle of our constitution,
which enjoins, that the will of the majority shall prevail.697
President Washington's success in restoring peace to Pennsylva-
nia was due, as reported by him to the Congress, "to the charac-
ter of our government, and to its stability, which cannot be
shaken by the enemies of order.) 698
The establishment and regular maintenance of a strong, fully
functioning federal criminal court system by the political
branches of government is essential to fulfill the government's
constitutional obligation to preserve societal order in this violent
age. Certainly, the burdens that are placed on the national court
system by an increasing number of federal criminal prosecutions
are real, and such burdens certainly will be increased by addi-
tional federal criminal legislation. Considering the societal need
for protection from crime, those burdens are justified. It is in
accordance with James Madison's articulation of the jurisdiction-
al scope and political function of the new national court system
"that the jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising under the
Nat.1 laws: And to such other questions as may involve the Nat.1
peace and harmony. 699
As noted above, recent crime statistics indicate that it is chil-
dren who bear the greatest burden of violence. 00 Certainly,
President Washington would not have hesitated to call these
crimes against our children "crimes, which [have] reached the
very existence of social order.""7 1 The constitutional preamble
697. 12 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 100, at 46.
698. Id. at 44.
699. 2 RECORDS, supra note 65, at 46 (Madison).
700. See supra notes 664-65 and accompanying text.
701. 12 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 100, at 46; see supra text
accompanying note 697.
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mandate both to "establish Justice" and "insure domestic Tran-
quility," textualized in the main document by the "Protection
Against Violence Clause" of Article IV, Section 4, compels the
political branches to work together to establish a federal crimi-
nal court system that is capable of adjudicating the nation's
present federal crime control laws and to assist further "the
National peace and harmony.'" °2
4. Creation of Separate Criminal Courts As Necessary to the
Protection of the Constitutional Rights of Criminal Defendants
Pursuant to its constitutional responsibility, Congress should
split the federal courts into formal civil and criminal functions
at both the trial and appellate levels and establish U.S. District
Criminal Courts, U.S. Courts of Criminal Appeals, and a Nation-
al Court of Criminal Appeals. Such a separation of criminal and
civil processes is required to ensure the speedy and fair adjudi-
cation of federal criminal cases.
These new federal criminal courts should be authorized to
adjudicate all criminal cases and criminal-justice-related Bivens
claims °3 and § 1983 suits,04 in addition to all § 2255 (feder-
al-based)05 and § 2254 (state-based).0 6 habeas corpus actions.
Severing criminal cases and criminal-justice-related actions from
the civil docket eventually would promote the development of a
motivated and experienced bench of expert criminal procedure
and criminal law jurists.0 7 In the single area of federal crimi-
nal sentencing, the development of an expert federal bench
would ensure the very consistency and precision that the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines are meant to provide criminal defendants
and the criminal justice system.
702. Before the 1995 Lopez decision, the Commerce Clause was the traditional
basis of congressional jurisdiction. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
703. See Bivens v. Six Unnamed Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
704. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
705. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
706. See id. § 2254.
707. The creation of federal criminal courts also would ensure that an upswing in




This suggestion is not meant to disparage the criminal adjudi-
cation skills of the present federal judiciary; rather, attempting
to build an expert federal criminal bench is proffered as a reali-
ty-based solution to the significant increase in criminal actions
that has occurred over the last ten years and to the substantial
increase in federal prosecutions that will come with enforcement
of the new crime control laws. As a constitutional matter, one
must consider that many of the amendments suggested during
and immediately after ratification of the Constitution directly
related to the national courts' conduct of criminal trials. Of the
173 amendments proposed in the first Congress's first session,
thirty-six concerned trial by jury and other rights of criminal
defendants."' Half of the amendments that were ratified and
became the heart of the Bill of Rights addressed the rights of
criminal defendants. 79 The constitutional criminal procedure
principles that are embodied in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Sev-
enth, and Eighth Amendments, however, are only as meaningful
as the national criminal court system is well-ordered and effi-
cient. Those fundamental criminal procedural rights are only as
authoritative as federal court judges are motivated, interested,
learned, and experienced in criminal law, criminal procedure,
and constitutional adjudication of criminal defendants' rights
and liberties.710
Indeed, as federal criminal defendants' constitutional rights
are reduced in practice by an overworked federal court system,
the jurisprudence of criminal procedure "exceptions" grows larg-
er.711 Constitutional criminal procedure values are diminished
as the judiciary attempts to keep the overloaded justice system
afloat. As a prime example of this phenomenon, consider how
708. See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURT AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 20-21 (3d ed. 1988).
709. See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY (1971) (presenting the history of the federal Bill of Rights in documentary
form).
710. See Symposium, The American Criminal Justice System Approaching the Year
2000, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1993).
711. See generally William D. Anderson, Jr. et al., Project, Tnventy-Third Annual
Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals
1992-1993, 82 GEO. L.J. 597, 841 (1994) (describing the federal criminal rights given
under Rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
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the entire federal criminal justice process encourages, entices,
cajoles, and even demands criminal defendants to plead
guilty. 1' The time and resource savings occasioned by guilty
pleas to the strained national justice system are significant;
however, the constitutional cost to the criminal defendant is
tota171'3-a voluntary guilty plea automatically voids a
defendant's important and legitimate Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment claims." The most egregious constitutional viola-
tions are automatically "cured," swept under the criminal justice
rug.71
5
Federal courts collaterally review the criminal actions of the
states for violations of national criminal justice protections and
proscriptions of the Constitution. The obligation of the political
branches to "ordain and establish" an efficient and competent
system of national courts has become an important and pressing
constitutional duty.716 The whole of the national criminal jus-
tice system's (state and federal) enforcement of fundamental con-
stitutional values ultimately depends on the capacity of the
lower federal court system to conduct meaningful habeas re-
view.7  For example, a substantial number of federal trial
court jurisdictions relegate their § 2254 (state habeas) cases to a
separate docketing status;718 and, in practice, too many Article
III district judges relegate de facto, final decisionmaking author-
ity in state habeas cases, Bivens claims, and § 1983 state prison-
712. This pressure is brought to bear throughout the process-from the arresting
officer, to the prosecutor, to probation officials who calculate guideline sentence re-
ductions for "acceptance of responsibility," and, unfortunately, even from some judi-
cial officers.
713. See Priscilla Budeiri, Collateral Consequences of Guilty Pleas in the Federal
Criminal Justice System, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 157 (1981).
714. See Rosemary Gordon, Appealing a Guilty Plea, 65 MICH. B.J. 72 (1986).
715. See James Eisenstein, Keeping an Eye on Prosecutors, 66 JUDICATURE 165
(1982) (reviewing ABRAHAM GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY (1982)).
716. Evan T. Lee, The Theories of Federal Habeas Corpus, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 151
(1994).
717. See, e.g., Robert D. Davidson, Federal Habeas Corpus: The Effect of Holding
State Capital Collateral Proceedings Before a Judge Running for Re-election, 8 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 317 (1994); Margery M. Koosed, Habeas Corpus:
Where Have All the Remedies Gone?, 29 TRIAL 70 (1993).
718. Once habeas corpus was regarded much more highly. See Zechariah Chafee,




er claims to the increasing workload of the magistrates.
This institutional banishment of prisoner cases to non-Article
III personnel is extremely problematic. 19 Legal observers have
made good faith arguments in support of the need for reform of
prisoner cases flooding the federal courts. 2" Regardless, ten-
ured Article III judges should be available to process those peti-
tions that legitimately seek to enforce constitutional and statuto-
ry protections of fundamental liberties. Senator Joseph Biden
has described the federal judiciary as being a '"superior fo-
rum... because of the institutional independence enjoyed by
federal judges and [their ability] to ensure consistent enforce-
ment of constitutionally protected rights [and] ... to speak
with the voice of the entire nation."'721 This life-tenured "su-
perior forum" does not include magistrates, agency judges, staff
attorneys, permanent law clerks, or other shadow judiciary
personnel.
Additionally, our constitutional criminal procedure rights are
national rights that require uniform interpretation and enforce-
ment. Separate federal criminal courts, especially a National
Court of Criminal Appeals, will better "speak for the entire na-
tion" in preserving and protecting those rights. Certainly, with-
out a National Court of Criminal Appeals, the U.S. Supreme
Court's "incredible shrinking docket," which produced fewer
than ninety published opinions during the Court's 1993 and
1994 Terms, will increasingly diminish such uniformity.7"
719. For a somewhat dated empirical assessment of the increasing role of magis-
trates in criminal justice issues, see CARROLL SERON, TnE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES IN
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 6-9, 14-20, 77 (1983).
720. For an excellent analysis of the prisoner suit debate presented in a two-part
report, see Howard Mintz, The Paper from the Pen, RECORDER, July 25, 1995, at 11;
Howard Mintz, Fighting over Solution, RECORDER, July 26, 1995, at 1.
721. Scharzer & Wheeler, supra note 12, at 681 (alteration in original) (quoting
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Address Before the Third Circuit Judicial Conference 26
(Apr. 19, 1993) (transcript on file with the Federal Judicial Center)).
722. Tony Mauro, Long-Winded Short Days: The 1993 Court's Hits and Misses,
CONN. L. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1994, at 16.
723. See Deborah Pines, Thomas Predicts Increased Output by Justices, N.Y. L.J.,
June 21, 1994, at 1.
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5. Responding to Judicial Criticism
The first volleys of damning criticism of the idea of creating
separate criminal courts likely will come from members of the
existing judiciary, who will express federalism concerns about
the growing national role in fighting crime. Justice Anthony
Kennedy's testimony before the Senate Appropriations Commit-
tee, warning Congress against turning the federal judiciary into
"police courts" by passing additional crime control legislation, is
an example of such criticism.724 Responding to Senator Earnst
Hollings's statement about not wanting to turn the federal
courts into police courts, Justice Kennedy stated: "You said the
magic words: Police courts.... We're concerned that's going to
be the effect of a number of these proposals."'7
The Judicial Conference repeatedly has expressed concern
about the federalization of criminal law and has lobbied against
specific criminal legislation, such as the Violence Against Wom-
en Act.726 Proponents of the legislation, which created new fed-
eral crimes and sentences for those who attack women and es-
tablished a civil rights cause of action against gender-based
offenders,727 effectively argued that the bill was a classic exam-
ple of contemporary national legislation.7" Congress often has
passed national civil rights legislation when the states have
refused to take responsibility.729
The federal judiciary, however, warned that the Violence
Against Women Act would flood the federal courts with "domes-
tic relations" cases. As early as 1991, the Judicial Conference
said that the legislation would "significantly threaten the ability
of the federal courts to administer this Act, and other Acts of
724. See Crime Stopper?, supra note 548.
725. Deibel, supra note 549, at A9 (quoting Kennedy, J.).
726. Naftali Bendavid, Will Federalizing Domestic Violence Really Help Women?,
RECORDER, June 21, 1994, at 1.
727. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 20, 21, 26, 28, 31, 42
U.S.C.).
728. See Bendavid, supra note 726, at 1.
729. Id. As Sally Goldfarb of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund stated:
"As a society, we already have a policy that crimes motivated by group prejudice are




Congress, promptly, fairly, and in accordance with their objec-
tives."30 The judiciary's Administrative Office later threatened
that the Act would result in a fifty percent increase in civil
rights actions."' If this is the judicial response to obviously
needed increased federal criminal and civil rights legislation for
the protection of America's women (who are, as Representative
Patricia Schroeder said, "not safe on the streets, but also not at
home"'32), the reaction by judges to separating criminal
courts/processes from civil courts/processes will likely be severe.
The response to this judicial criticism, however, is found in
the Constitution itself: the national government was established
to protect citizens from both external and internal dangers. The
jurisdiction for the new federal judiciary was framed in the Vir-
ginia Plan as being an answer to "questions which may involve
the national peace and harmony." '33 As discussed above, the
Constitution grants both explicit and inherent authority to the
political and judicial branches to maintain domestic tranquil-
ity. '34 Additionally, the Constitution's "Protection Against Vio-
lence Clause" '35 mandates that the national government be
prepared, upon request from a state, to protect citizens against
"domestic violence." The "federalization" of criminal prosecu-
tions, including actions to fight violence against women, repre-
sents a long-delayed national response to the most serious, most
profound social, economic, and legal problems facing this nation.
Many judges now serving on the federal bench are also likely
to oppose vigorously the creation of U.S. District Criminal
Courts, U.S. Courts of Criminal Appeals, and a National Court
of Criminal Appeals, simply because they are comfortable with
the status quo of the present court structure. Restating the well-
worn arguments regarding the job satisfaction inherent in a
generalized docket, the judiciary will contend that a purely crim-
inal bench will carry less prestige and, therefore, attract judicial
730. 1991 U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 57.
731. See First Session of New Congress Draws to a Close, THIRD BRANCH, Dec.
1993, at 1.
732. Bendavid, supra note 726, at 1.
733. CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787 THE GRAND CONVENTION 361-63 (1966).
734. See supra notes 688-798 and accompanying text.
735. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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candidates of lesser quality.
Respondents to such criticism have to articulate the systemic
benefits inherent in having jurists on the bench who really de-
sire to serve as criminal court judges. Criminal defendants de-
serve, at least, to appear before judges who are interested in the
criminal process; they certainly have the right not to appear
before judges who feel that "ordinary" criminal cases are below
them. Understandably, most judges like to have an interesting
mix of cases on their dockets, including the occasional criminal
case, in order to keep their judicial duties interesting. The feder-
al court system exists for many contemporary reasons and pur-
poses; however, the personal jurisdictional preferences of indi-
vidual federal jurists should only be considered ancillary in
making future structural modifications to the judiciary.
Rather, Congress should listen closely as the public pleads for
crime control measures, such as violence against women legisla-
tion."6 Additionally, Congress should hear the many litigants
and lawyers who are increasingly requesting more judges and
suggesting a division of courts' civil and criminal functions.737
As noted above, two advisory committee reports recently filed
with the Administrative Office pursuant to the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990 recommend formal separation of the criminal
from the civil functions in the federal courts.73
The cost of establishing a separate federal criminal court
system certainly will be used against the idea. During times of
staggering deficits, the answer "we can not afford it" is a pow-
erful, albeit simplistic, argument against any significant expen-
diture of governmental resources. Perhaps some perspective
would be useful in considering the cost of national justice in
general, and of establishing separate criminal courts in particu-
lar. The third branch of the United States government, which
consumes only two-tenths of one percent (.0002) of the entire
federal budget,739 is an absolute bargain. Ninth Circuit Judge
736. A woman is a victim of domestic violence every 16 seconds in America. See
Patterns of Abuse, NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1994, at 26; When Violence Hits Home, TIME,
July 4, 1994, at 18.
737. Pines, supra note 613, at 1.
738. See supra part VII.C.1.
739. GORDON BERMANT ET AL., supra note 315, at 35-36. The total cost of sup-
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Stephen Reinhardt advanced the argument that the federal
courts are a bargain when he proposed doubling the size of the
Court of Appeals:
Finally, let me add one word about cost. Doubling the size
of the judiciary will cost a small amount of money. That is
true. But the price is right. The annual cost of operating the
federal court system is less than the cost of building one
space shuttle, only slightly more than one stealth bomber.
Doubling our size would be a drop in the bucket. And the
benefits to our criminal and civil justice system would be
enormous. Even in an age of deficit reduction, court expan-
sion is a winner.40
Regardless of the obvious fact that our judiciary is a bargain,
the failure to expand and remodel the federal judiciary will have
resulting direct fiscal costs, and indirect social costs, that should
not be acceptable to the nation. The fiscal costs alone, when
judicial gridlock results in civil justice delays to American busi-
nesses, exceeds many times the cost of expanding and restruc-
turing the federal courts. The societal costs when a violent crim-
inal is not prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law, or when a
criminal defendant does not receive the full benefit of his con-
stitutional protections, cannot be calculated.
D. Structuring and Staffing U.S. District Criminal Courts, U.S.
Courts of Criminal Appeals, and a U.S. National Court of
Criminal Appeals
The structure of the newly created federal criminal courts
should follow existing district and circuit jurisdictional bound-
aries in order to ensure the most efficient use of buildings and
porting one federal judge, including salary, benefits, chambers personnel, and all
court operations, is $696,000 for a district judge and $814,000 for a circuit judge. Id.
Apart from start-up costs for physical resources and ancillary personnel, the cost of
establishing a federal criminal court system staffed by 500 judges (375 trial judges
and 125 appellate judges) would be less than $400 million. Other judicial costs relat-
ing to increasing the national effort against crime and increasing the number of fed-
eral prosecutions, such as those for probation and pretrial services, will be incurred
regardless of whether adequate numbers of judges are available to conduct criminal
and civil trials.
740. Reinhardt, supra note 441, at 7.
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other physical resources. The nature of criminal trials is such
that, once criminal trial judges are appointed and in place in a
given trial jurisdiction, subsequent criminal calendars can be
processed by the new criminal court. Correspondingly, once a
circuit's criminal courts are established, all new criminal ap-
peals filed can be assigned to three-judge criminal court divi-
sion panels. As stated above, the jurisdiction of the criminal
district courts and courts of criminal appeals would include all
federal criminal cases and both state and federal habeas corpus
petitions."1
Staffing of the new criminal courts should begin with the
voluntary transfer of judges who presently sit on existing gener-
alized district courts and courts of appeals. A preliminary survey
of federal court judges could be easily accomplished to predict
the percentage of the present judiciary that might be interested
in transferring to the Article III criminal court positions. Staff-
ing the remaining judicial positions will require dedicated and
assertive executive appointment action. The necessity of a firm
presidential commitment to appointing quality, nonpartisan
individuals to the new criminal courts cannot be overempha-
sized. '42 The President could begin the appointment process by
selecting the best and brightest from the state criminal court
trial and appellate benches. The best of our federal magistrate
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys also may provide a
741. See supra notes 704-07 and accompanying text.
742. Greater emphasis must be given to education and training of new trial
judges, far beyond the present new judge workshops of a couple weeks duration. As
Judge Jerome Frank stated in Courts on Trial:
I suggest that we should at once set about contriving methods of
avoiding the avoidable tragedies caused by lack of systematic training of
trial judges... . Such a man should be specially educated for that
job. . . . He should be shown, in great detail, the problems, related to
the facts, which confront a trial judge . . . . He should learn all that is
now known about psychological devices for testing the trustworthiness of
witnesses as to their individual capacities for observation, memory and
accuracy in narrating what they remember. He should be taught to be
alert to the possibilities of using such devices, as they become improved,
in trials .... In short, he should not be naively intuitive. His should be
a carefully trained intuition.
JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 247
(1973).
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ready pool of potential Article III appointees. 43
The creation of the U.S. National Court of Criminal Appeals,
as the first of several such subject-matter-specialized junior
supreme courts, 44 would provide uniformity of national law in
all areas of criminal procedure, a uniformity that is long over-
due. 45 The problem of national law inconsistency and the cost
of national law conflicts in all subject matter areas have been
recognized for years. 46 Similar proposals for the establishment
of a generalist intermediate court of appeals and nonregional
subject matter courts, however, have been met with vigorous
opposition. 47
As a criminal court variant of the junior supreme court that
was proposed in the early 1970s by the Commission on Revision
of the Federal Court Appellate System (the Hruskra Commis-
743. As relevant collateral changes to the national criminal justice system, Con-
gress should establish a federal public defender's office and provide increased re-
sources for the criminal divisions of U.S. Attorneys' offices for each federal trial
court jurisdiction. The present system of ad hoc criminal attorney appointments for
indigent criminal defendants is far too inefficient and expensive. The quality of rep-
resentation provided by the Criminal Justice Act ad hoc appointment is too often
just above ineffective. If federal prosecutors are to enforce new crime control legisla-
tion effectively, they will require generous increases in resources. Although federal
community defender programs are superior to CJA appointments, they do not offer
the independence of a fully funded federal public defender.
744. For a parallel discussion and design of a National Court of Commercial Ap-
peals, see Williams, supra note 637.
745. See Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 IIARV. L. REV. 542
(1969).
746. See Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a New Na-
tional Court, 100 HIARV. L. REV. 1400, 1407 (1987).
747. For a small sample of academic commentary critical of past suggestions for
circuit conflict institutional measures, see William J. Brennan, Jr., The National
Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CH1. L. REV. 473 (1973); Ruth Bader
Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1417
(1987); Eugene Gressman, The Constitution v. The Freund Report, 41 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 951 (1973); Luther M. Swygert, The Proposed National Court of Appeals: A
Threat to Judicial Symmetry, 51 IND. L.J. 327 (1976). For support of circuit conflict
institutional measures, see Charles R. Haworth & Daniel J. Meador, A Proposed
New Federal Intermediate Appellate Court, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 201 (1978); A. Leo
Levin, Adding Appellate Capacity to the Federal System: A National Court of Appeals
or an Inter-Circuit Tribunal?, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1982); S. Jay Plager, The
United States Court of Appeals, the Federal Circuit, and the Non-Regional Subject
Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 853 (1990).
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sion)745 the National Court of Criminal Appeals would be com-
posed of seven permanent judges, separately appointed to the
court.749 The National Court of Criminal Appeals, proposed
here, would serve as a second level of appellate review and func-
tion independently from both the Court of Criminal Appeals and
the Supreme Court. The National Court of Criminal Appeals
would be staffed, budgeted, and disciplined just like other Ar-
ticle III inferior courts. Structural and jurisdictional indepen-
dence would distinguish the National Court of Criminal Appeals
from all previously proposed intercircuit panels750 and third-
tier intermediate court models.7"'
The jurisdiction of the National Court of Criminal Appeals
would include "transfer jurisdiction" from, and discretionary
"certiorari review" of decisions of, the various circuits of the U.S.
Court of Criminal Appeals. The intermediate level appellate
court transfer jurisdiction would allow the lower appellate crimi-
nal circuits the option to transfer select cases that raise issues of
significant circuit conflicts or require a clarification of national
law. This jurisdiction would ensure full and equitable resolution
of criminal/habeas cases in accordance with a genuinely national
jurisprudence.
The National Court of Criminal Appeals' certiorari jurisdiction
would place criminal justice jurisdiction directly between the
criminal circuit courts and the U.S. Supreme Court. Additional-
ly, the National Court of Criminal Appeals would have certiorari
jurisdiction over criminal cases appealed from the states' su-
preme courts or courts of last resort. The certiorari process
748. See Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure
and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975).
749. See Roman L. Iruska, The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Ap-
pellate System: A Legislative History, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 579.
750. See Warren E. Burger, The Time Is Now for the Intercircuit Panel, A.B.A. J.,
Apr. 1985, at 86; Arthur D. Hellman, The Proposed Intercircuit Tribunal: Do We
Need It? Will It Work?, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 375 (1984).
751. See Kevin L. Domecus, Congressional Prerogatives, the Constitution and a
National Court of Appeals, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 715 (1978); James A. Gazell,
The National Court of Appeals Controversy: An Emerging Negative Consensus, 6 N.
ILL. U. L. REv. 1 (1986); Maurice Rosenberg, Enlarging the Federal Courts' Capacity
To Settle the National Law, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 709 (1975); J. Clifford Wallace, The
Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Mountain or a
Molehill?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 913 (1983).
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would terminate with the National Court of Criminal Appeals;
however, the nation's highest court would retain a discretionary
review jurisdiction over decisions of the National Court of Crim-
inal Appeals, thus honoring the Constitution's demand for "one
supreme Court."52 The National Court would reduce the po-
tential workload of the U.S. Supreme Court, and, by consistent-
ly sitting en banc like the Supreme Court, it would provide
much needed consistency of national criminal law and proce-
dure issues.753
VIII. CONCLUSION
Our national courts must be cherished as our national houses
of justice, into which citizens enter expecting' safe, timely, and
fair adjudication of their controversies. Under our constitutional
system, the political branches are responsible for creating, struc-
turing, staffing, and fiscally sustaining these houses of justice,
so that the laws may be enforced and citizens' constitutional
rights upheld. The nation's inferior court system was designed to
be an evolving organ of our government, able to be altered as
needed to enforce the laws that the political branches enact and
to meet the needs and demands of the republic. The civil dock-
ets of the national courts have increased substantially over the
last three decades, as the United States has developed a truly
national, and now international, economy. If the federal judicia-
ry is to be able to continue providing its past high level of ser-
vice into the next century, Congress and the President must
take immediate action to fully staff and generously fund our
national courts.
Particularly, the President must exercise his unique appoint-
ment responsibilities fully and aggressively. By implementing a
national selection process, the President can avoid undue reli-
ance on the nonconstitutional process of "senatorial courtesy."
Additionally, in response to dilatory Senate confirmation, every
Executive should be prepared to exercise his or her authority to
recess-appoint judges in order to keep the national courts opera-
752. U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 1.
753. For alternative commentary questioning the extent of circuit conflict in the
existing court system, see Hellman, supra note 750, at 375.
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tional. For the long-term welfare of the United States, the politi-
cal branches, together with the legal profession and the public,
should begin a substantial expansion and restructuring of the
federal judicial system. As the United States begins to compete
more fully in a world economic arena, a comparative vision of
specialized court structures is appropriate. German, French, and
many other court systems have achieved unparalleled success
with large judiciaries organized according to subject matter
functions.
The "old general store" model for our national court system is
inefficient and is becoming ineffectual. The time has come to im-
plement subject matter specialization at both the trial and ap-
pellate levels of our federal judiciary. We must make changes for
the future of our national courts, notwithstanding the strong
objections of this generation's federal judiciary.
As a starting point for this specialization, Congress should
create separate federal criminal courts-U.S. District Criminal
Courts, U.S. Courts of Criminal Appeals, and a U.S. National
Court of Criminal Appeals. Such action is necessary to ensure
that the next century's national judiciary will be as President
Washington hoped--"as perfect as possible in its formation.""4
Recently, Congress and the President have begun to take
more seriously the national government's fundamental responsi-
bility to "insure domestic Tranquility." 5 In the near future,
the national government will provide additional relief from the
increasing scourge of violent crime, which strikes fear into the
minds and hearts of citizens and terrorizes a generation of chil-
dren. As the government fulfills its responsibility to protect its
citizens, the political branches will continue to increase the
criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Notwithstanding the vocal "federalism" objections of many
sitting on the national bench, the alteration of the jurisdictional
role of the federal judiciary is consistent with the Framers' vi-
sion of an evolving institution charged with maintaining the
"national peace and harmony."756 As Felix Frankfurter and
754. Stewart, supra note 636, at 21.
755. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
756. ELLIOT, supra note 54, at 305.
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James Landis skillfully stated:
So-called jurisdictional questions treated in isolation from the
purposes of the legal system to which they relate become bar-
ren pedantry .... The Judiciary Acts, the needs which urged
their enactment, the compromises which they embodied,...
the changed conditions which in turn modified them, are the
outcome of continuous interaction of traditional, political,
social and economic forces. In common with other courts, the
federal courts are means for securing justice through law.
But in addition and transcending this in importance, the
legislation governing the structure and function of the federal
judicial system is one means of providing the accommoda-
tions necessary to the operation of a federal government.757
Few contemporary concerns are more basic to the "operation" of
this national government and to the construct of "justice through
law" than providing a competent, reliable criminal justice sys-
tem to adjudicate impartially prosecutions resulting from the
national effort to lessen the worsening level of criminal violence.
The contemporary establishment of separate federal criminal
courts will help ensure that national justice incorporates what
John Jay deemed essential-both a true balance and a swift,
certain sword.75 The future expansion and specialization of the
entire U.S. national court system will ensure the most funda-
mental of civil liberties-access to justice. Such restructuring
will help guarantee the historic promise made by King John in
our antecedent constitutional charter, the Magna Carta: "[T]o no
one will we deny or delay right or justice." '759
757. Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court of
the United States-A Study in the Federal Judicial System, 38 HARV. L. REV. 1005,
1006 (1925).
758. See supra note 681 and accompanying text.
759. MAGNA CARTA 327 (James C. Holt trans., 1965).
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